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War’s wounds can only be healed by those who have suffered its fury. 
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0.1. General Introduction 
On 5 August 1995 Croatian forces entered the region known as Krajina, or military frontier. 
Historically, this was a more or less self-governing frontier region established by the 
Habsburg Empire in 1538 to serve as a buffer zone against the advancing Ottoman forces.  
The Krajina was inhabited by, among other, a large Serb population who remained inside 
Croatia when the Habsburg Empire collapsed, and Krajina became Croatian soil. Roughly 
three quarters of a century later, as Yugoslavia spiralled into its violent break-up in the early 
nineties, this border region was the ignition point for the conflict in Croatia, following the 
“log-revolution” and the establishment of the para-state Republic of Serbian Krajina 
(Republika Srpska Krajina). As the tables of history turned once again four years later, the 
Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia (Oružane snage Republike Hrvatske – OSHR) were 
re-establishing control of the area which comprised approximately one third of the entire 
Croatian territory, while the Croatian soldiers were celebrated in the public sphere as 
liberators and noble defenders of Croatia’s self-established right as a sovereign nation. Their 
sacrifices “on the altar of the Homeland”, as the popular phrase went, had been substantial, 
yet now they were part of the winning team again, and the soldiers of operation “Storm” 
(Oluja) interacted with the media and the public in an intoxicating celebration of heroism, 
martyrdom and the rebirth of the Croatian state tradition. At this important and controversial 
point in modern Croatian history the fulfilment of the “thousand year old dream” of statehood 
  3 
became the symbolical and mythical vantage point for the construction of the image of the 
Croatian soldier and veteran, the branitelj,1 in the post-war discourse.   
 The initial great enthusiasm continued into the period following Operation Storm, 
which was marked by the increasingly tight control of President Franjo Tuđman and his party, 
the Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica – HDZ), over the media and 
public discourse. Through the construction and idealization of the official Croatian narrative 
of the state’s re-birth, and its reproduction and enactment through public ritual and 
“historical” research, an atmosphere was created where the effort of the Croat people to 
realise their natural right to a state was viewed in an unquestionably favourable moral light. 
Any criticism of the role of the leadership in the theatre of war, not to mention of that of its 
main actors, the branitelji, was equated with treason. Croatia, as well as her bravest sons, was 
the moral imperative.       
Twelve years later, when I undertook my 
first research-trip to Dalmatia in March 2008, the 
veterans were once again occupying the headlines 
of the national press, as they had done quite 
frequently since the war ended. The branitelji, 
now veterans instead of soldiers, surely never had 
really left the forefront of the discourse. Yet this 
time the media image of the branitelji was quite 
pronouncedly negative, as the question of “fake” 
veterans and the immense privileges some of them 
enjoyed while most citizens were experiencing 
increasingly difficult economic times, was 
dominating the discourse. Incredibly as it seems to 
most Croats, the number of veterans that allegedly 
participated in the Homeland War has been 
established at closer to 500 000, or well over 10% 
of the entire populace. However, the details behind this figure – especially how and on what 
basis the rights to these privileges have been distributed – have never been revealed to the 
public, as the register containing the names and grade of disability as well as details of 
                                                 
1
 Literally ”defender” or ”guardian”. Branitelj as a concept, however, is coloured by a distinct Croatian post-war 
setting, thereby conveying a meaning which this provisional definition fails to cover. I will return to a discussion 
of the term shortly, thereby approaching a more satisfactory understanding of the concept of the branitelj.     
 
“Knin is Free!”Front page of the biggest Dalmatian daily, 
Slobodna Dalmacija, the day after the liberation of the 
“capital” of Krajina, Knin.  
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individual roles in the war has been proclaimed a national secret. Speculations run wide as to 
the reasons for this secrecy which especially HDZ is insisting on. When I visited the country, 
a badly needed revision and investigation of so called “fake veterans” was under way. The 
privileged group of veterans could constitute a potential for the manipulation of war records 
and the simulation of sufferings of war, which are difficult to diagnose, as well as a huge 
strain on an economy already under massive pressure, especially now that Croatia has entered 
a difficult recession. Suspicions that the scale of this fraud was immense had been fanned by 
rumours down to individual level, and many of my interlocutors were convinced that 
diagnoses, invalidity and war records had obviously been for sale for quite some time, and 
that, according to some undocumented claims, of 11 000 cases this investigation had looked 
in to at the time, more that 10 000 were believed to be so called “fake veterans”.     
Demands were abundant that Jadranka Kosor of the Ministry of Family, Veterans, and 
Intergenerational Solidarity (Ministarstvo obitelji, branitelja i međugeneracijske solidarnosti 
– MOBMS) should grant public access to the disputed register, so that the full extent of this 
scandal could be known. In the words of Heni Erceg, one of Croatia’s most fearless and 
outspoken journalists, this “mother Teresa of all those who live on state benefits” was the 
high end of a “mafia chain” which tolerates corruption and threats in the name of the 
Homeland War, thus in fact ruining the dignity of those who really defended Croatia to secure 
the support of the “half million strong voting machinery” that the branitelji constituted.2 
Kosor had also earlier come under heavy verbal attack by another columnist, Ante Tomić of 
Jutarnji List, who put responsibility for the high number of branitelji committing suicide – 
1632 since the end of the Homeland War, according to several sources – on Kosor, stating 
that her performance as minister was characterised by “cynicism and stupidity”. The large and 
still increasing number of branitelji, even though the war ended a decade and a half ago, 
under the auspices of Kosor had brought “inflation” to the status of the veterans, thus 
reducing the worth of their substantial wartime sacrifice. Tomić concluded wryly that “among 
the 1632 unlucky ones who killed themselves, you may rest assured that there were no fake 
veterans”.3      
Erceg and Tomić were obviously in line with the public – I was amazed to experience 
several of my initial informants reacting with contempt bordering to disgust when confronted 
by my questions about the veterans. According to a survey completed at the time, around 80% 
of Dalmatians were supportive of opening the register of veterans and legally pursueing those 
                                                 
2
 Erceg 2008. All translations in this paper are my own, unless otherwise stated.  
3
 Tomić 2006.   
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who had obtained benefits on false grounds.4 The scepticism towards the branitelji had 
probably also been strengthened by fear and uncertainty, as violent and dangerous acts 
committed by this special segment of the population were frequently reported in sensationalist 
detail by the most important media in Croatia. The latest incident had also been arguably the 
most grave among desperate deeds, namely the murderous rampaging by retired general and 
official war hero Ivan Korade, which left a trail of five persons killed and one injured, 
Korade’s own suicide included, in early spring 2008. A journalist saw Korade as the 
“production of a system which no one has made any serious attempt to deconstruct”5, aligning 
himself with Erceg who in the comment mentioned above pointed to the obvious paradox of 




Caricature artists’ diverging conception of the branitelji.  
 
Between these two diametrically opposed images of the branitelj – that of the nineties 
and that of the new millennium – what had happened? The gradual development of a more 
relaxed society, where necessary critical reassessment of Croatia’s role in the break-up of 
Yugoslavia slowly became possible, only partly explains the surprisingly firm discontent and 
widespread suspicion – or even fear – that the veterans were viewed with. How had the 
greatest heroes of the rebirth of Croatia become such villains in the eyes of the Croatian 
citizen?  It is within the span of these binary opposed normative conceptions of the branitelji 
– the branitelj as hero versus the branitelj as villain – that the argumentative space of this 
thesis is constituted.  
                                                 
4
 ”Lažne branitelje treba kazneno goniti”. Slobodna Dalmacija, 03.03.2008. 
5
 Ɖikić 2008.  
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0.2. An Outline of This Study  
In the earliest phases of my work on this thesis I had a strong preference for meditating on 
nationalism and its origin in “social” difficulties in a post-war society in transition, i.e. the 
link between general dissatisfaction and right-wing extremism. Quite quickly, this proved to 
be an enormous task, difficult to narrow down to manageable bricks of scientific construction. 
Yet this final result has perhaps, in some ways, gone surprisingly little astray from this 
original point of orientation, as both nationalism and social discontent are highly present in 
this thesis, though perhaps more between the lines than on them. The veterans are a social 
category and a social phenomenon, and as such they must be studied in their “natural 
surroundings”. It follows from this holistic approach that context is vitally important for the 
clarity of this thesis – a context which in the case of post-war Croatia necessarily must be 
described by using terms such as the mentioned “nationalism” and “social discontent”, yet 
also by other terms and concepts such as post-communism, corruption, struggle for political 
power and the fight for personal gain. The remnants of a near past in which standards of 
living and privileges where closely intertwined with political loyalty, and a critical 
reassessment of Croatia’s role in the break-up of Yugoslavia was political as well as – in 
many instances – social suicide, kept societal tensions high and provided difficulties for 
making viable plans for Croatia’s future. The fact that the wounds of the Homeland War6 
were kept open by the collective memory as well as by new political priorities demanding a 
reassessment of the past, contributed to this problematic coming to terms with the recent past.  
 As my research on this theme progressed, I was amazed to discover what an apt door 
opener the veterans of the Homeland War were to wider problems marking Croatia’s post war 
history. It seemed as if I, in one way or the other, encountered the veterans on every important 
political, social or historical crossroad that had presented itself in Croatian society since 1995.  
Yet given the above considerations, it is perhaps not surprising that the veterans are in the 
foreground of this transitional discourse. They might easily be pictured as the embodiment of 
the recent past, and thus it is not surprising that the history of the branitelji is also the history 
of post war Croatia.  Few other groups in Croatian society can claim to have experienced and 
sacrificed on the level of these veterans, many of whom will never be able to escape the 
memory of the Homeland War. Indeed, for many that memory is all they have left. The 
                                                 
6
 The war of the break up of Yugoslavia has been officially termed the “Homeland War” (Domovinski rat) in 
Croatia, its capital letters and usage reflecting the extremely important place it has in the modern history of 
Croatia. In October 2000, as the role of Croatia in the war was slowly beginning to undergo critical analyses, the 
Croatian parliament, the Sabor, adopted the Declaration of the Homeland War which stated its value and, some 
would say, its unassailability as a ideological concept (Narodne Novine, issue 102/00).     
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veterans occupy a special place in society as their destinies are intimately linked to the 
(re)birth of Croatian state tradition. The veterans are indeed the “official” heroes of the 
Homeland war, alongside the “father” of the Croatian nation, the deceased President Tuđman. 
Given that Tuđman based the main body of his political activity on this thesis of rebirth and 
its unquestionable moral justification, since it represented the “fulfilment of a century long 
struggle of the Croatian nation”, it was apparently only a natural consequence that the 
veterans and their destinies should become intangible from the destiny of Croatia. In the 
hands of powerful actors in the political discourse the branitelji were ideally constructed as 
symbols of pure “croatness”, a homogenous mass whose ideals are essentially the same as 
those of Croatia, in the nationalist sense propagated by the HDZ of the nineties. However, this 
ideal construction blurs the fact that the veterans, as a large social group, are ideologically and 
normatively diverse and complex, just as the Croatian populace as a whole. And this 
supposition is highly important to the argument of this thesis.   
Still, given this artificial, yet immediate closeness between the branitelji and one 
narrow side of the political landscape, it is not surprising that the reintegration of the veterans 
into the plurality of Croatian society after demobilization has been extremely difficult. The 
immense privileges they were granted during the Tuđman era – and the failure of both the 
subsequent governments of Ivica Račan and Ivo Sanader to put the record straight –  has 
gradually made many Croats look askance at the branitelji, rather than welcoming them back 
after well performed service. Not only have these privileges, when taken in consideration the 
number of citizens that enjoy them, posed a serious threat to an already weak economy; they 
have also given rise to widespread suspicions that the majority of the veterans have received 
their status without deserving it, either as rewards for political loyalty or by manipulating or 
buying off contacts. Through the veterans’ interest organizations, this “hijacking” of hero-
statuses and benefits has apparently taken the form of a well organized onslaught. Meanwhile, 
the veterans have received substantial negative coverage from the national press, which has 
curbed its hunger for sensationalism and big figures by exploiting some of the more ill-
tempered and poorly timed statements and actions of certain individual veterans. Added to 
this is the political intermingling of certain organisations, which seem bent on influencing 
society to become more to their liking. This has contributed to the fact that many Croats hold 
a view of the veterans as organized hard-line nationalist desperados who systematically 
exploit the fear of ordinary citizens as well as the structural legacy of Tuđmans regime to 
secure privileges for themselves as well as political power, thereby continuing to drain the 
state budget and exercising some form of control over the democratically elected government. 
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However, the reasons for the widespread scepticism directed at the veterans are, of 
course, far more complex than those stated by this preliminary and almost popularly 
superficial cause and effect analysis. This thesis seeks to explore in detail the possible reasons 
for the turn in popularity of the veterans, partly by asking such questions as: Behind the media 
coverage and the ongoing political discourse, who are really the veterans? How are they 
organized? What are their aspirations, and what privileges do they enjoy? How have these 
organizations developed in relation to Croatian society and political discourse as a whole?  
Related to the organisations themselves, there is simply no hiding the fact that many of 
the veterans’ organizations have had – and to some extent still have – important political 
connections and ideological sympathy with actors on the far right side of the political spectre.  
At the same time, these organizations are to perform the highly important task of providing its 
members with support in their struggle to resume life and return to society after their 
strenuous ordeals in the Homeland War. The question arises: are these quite different 
commitments possible to fulfil at the same time? Are these organizations to be reckoned as 
part of civil society or are they purely political, possibly even militant? Are they as politically 
homogenous as they appear? Have the organizations been infiltrated by loud-speaking, well-
informed and connected individuals who exploit the misery of the veterans to gain political 
points for specific parties?  
Finally, as mentioned, the branitelji have become so closely intertwined with post-war 
Croatian politics that viewing them as separated from the domain of the political is extremely 
difficult, if not impossible. In accordance with this, it is unavoidable that this thesis must also 
explore context, understood as domestic and international political considerations which have 
put a mark on Croatian post war society. How have the branitelji and their organisations 
influenced this aspect of developments? And what effect has this political involvement, as 
well as every other aspect of the veterans and their organisations, had on the branitelji 
themselves, their “cause”, and their status in society?  
 
0.3. Launching the Hypothesis 
In the following pages I will argue that the veterans’ organizations have represented a 
context-specific hybrid between civil and non-civil society, something which, in many ways, 
reflects the transitional phases Croatian society itself has passed through in the last two 
decades. However, it is not within the scope of this thesis to establish if the veterans’ 
organizations are to be reckoned as part of civil society or not. Still, I hope to indirectly show 
that the associations are civil in some of their activities, but their status as such, as well as 
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their objective success – measured against their own goals as stated in the statutes of the 
various organizations – is challenged by political allies of various parties as well as fake 
veterans and well connected leaders who are actively or passively manipulating many of these 
organizations for the sake of their personal political careers and financial winning. The 
organisations have, from the start, invested a lot more effort into political ambition than the 
humanitarian ideals which they support on the surface. This is by no means the work of 
individuals alone; political parties have also more or less secretly actively engaged in securing 
their own henchmen top positions in various organizations to secure stability of and control 
over the close to 500 000 strong electorate that the veterans constitute.  
Further, I argue that the mingling of roles of these organizations has proven 
destructive for the veterans themselves. Mainly due to the politicization of the organizations 
and its various effects, the veterans have – in the eyes of the ordinary citizen – become 
synonymous to a corrupted, lawless and fearful phase of recent Croatian history. Yet it is also 
important, in my opinion, to point out that various hard-line nationalist individuals within the 
organizations, not necessarily “on the payroll” of any political party, have contributed to the 
widespread mistrust and suspicion with which the veterans are viewed with. The erratic and 
fanatic behaviour of such “celebrities” among the branitelji continues to set an unfortunate 
example to the rest of the public; such actions have become the popular, easily 
comprehensible, essence of the branitelj. In this the media must also take some of the blame, 
given their sensationalistic delight in reporting the activities of such “desperados”.  
The final points of my argument will hopefully become clear when I assess the 
widespread effects of the destruction of the popular status of the veterans. I argue that the 
process of reintegration of Croatian veterans to society after their tormenting experience of 
war has essentially failed, though it might be difficult to extract cause from effect on this 
point. After all, whether the reintegration has failed because of the low popularity of the 
veterans or the low popularity of the veterans is to blame on the failed reintegration is a 
difficult question to answer. My argument will lean on the principle of the vicious circle on 
this matter, trying to depict the relation between cause and effect as a downwards spiral of 
perpetual deterioration. Importantly, I do not view the fact that the overwhelming majority of 
veterans today have been “taken care” of financially by the Croatian state as proof of 
successful reintegration – quite contrary, actually, as will hopefully become clear when I 
discuss the Law of Rights of the Branitelji and the privileges and benefits it secures for them. 
Successful reintegration can not be understood as anything but active participation in society, 
something which is not provided for by immense, unconditional privileges.    
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0.4. Dalmatia as the Main Field of Study 
Initially, I decided to delimit my main field of focus geographically to the region of Dalmatia. 
The idea was that some geographical narrowing down would be required to make this 
endeavour practically realizable within the limitations in time and resources that are available 
for a thesis of this kind. However, it remains questionable whether this delimitation can be 
said to have been successful. As I returned to re-evaluate this decision when I was 
approaching the end of my work, it dawned upon me that, rather than a clear cut delimitation, 
it was more a question of placing more weight on incidents and developments taking place in 
Dalmatia contrary to those in the rest of Croatia, though such events also figure prominently 
in my argumentation. Moreover, I realised that the weight was automatically placed on 
Dalmatia without my really following the methodical delimitation launched on the outset. 
This provokes the necessity of some reflections on Dalmatia as a region.  
Firstly, the region of Dalmatia has some of the most actively engaged veterans’ 
organisations of Croatia as a whole, perhaps only comparable to those who are located in the 
region of Eastern Slavonia, which is, at any rate, a far smaller and less populous region. Both 
these regions were far more affected by the Homeland war in the early 90’s than the rest of 
Croatia and perhaps this is why one also finds the highest density of organizations here. 
Indeed, Dalmatia, a region from which parts of the infamous Republic of Serbian Krajina 
stole a large part of territory, still licks its wounds even today. Not only are most of the areas 
that were liberated by the Croatian army in 1995 Dalmatian, many of the more profiled Croats 
indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) are also 
residents of this region. This perhaps also partly explains why it is in Dalmatia that one has 
seen the most furious outbursts of nationalistic sentiment and opposition to the ICTY and the 
European Union. One should also – parallel to this – keep in mind that Dalmatia has arguably 
seen an even more conflict-ridden history than the rest of what today constitutes Croatia. 
Wars and revolts against Venetians, Ottomans, Hungarians, Austrians, Fascists and 
Communists have definitely made their mark on the collective memory of Dalmatians. The 
latest conflict with the Serbs of Dalmatia left the entire region “on the edge”. The eviction of 
Croatian squatters to facilitate the return of the “Serbian enemy”, excavations of Croat and 
Serb victims of war crimes, war profiteers and criminal ruffians flashing their wealth in public 
and other controversies of the legacy of the Homeland War are still at the forefront of the 
regional political and media discourse.  
 Another of Dalmatia’s peculiarities is what one may call the strong warrior traditions 
which put their mark on the region. I return to a discussion of the hajduk myth shortly, as it is 
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relevant also in a far more complex way – suffice to say here that Dalmatia, especially the 
hinterland, is fused by tales of heroism and warriors. Due to these reasons it is perhaps no 
surprise that the aura of heroism surrounding the veterans is especially pronounced in this 
region. Another point, or more precisely, an overlapping point, is the fact that Dalmatia is a 
region which in long periods throughout history has in various ways been separated from the 
northern parts of Croatia, something which contributes to the strong identification with the 
region that most inhabitants testify of even today. Perhaps part of this separation has come 
from the fact that Dalmatia has been forced to relate to the Venetian and Ottoman empires in a 
far greater degree than the Croats of Northern Croatia, who were relatively firmly established 
within the Hungarian, and to some extent Austrian, spheres for longer periods of time. One 
should for obvious reason avoid cultural generalizations; however it must be acquiesced that 
cultural differences between Dalmatia and for instance the Zagreb-area are quite pronounced, 
in many respects even greater than that between Dalmatia and neighbouring Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The reason I stress this is that political dispute and uncertain, war-like 
conditions have contributed to the development of a distinct Dalmatian identity, something 
which leads to tensions along centre-periphery and urbanism-ruralism axis in Croatia even 
today. It follows that tensions on the Split-Zagreb line are frequent, as will be seen also in this 
thesis. The “Dalmatian identity”, I will argue is connected to a wider, “Balkan” identity in a 
much more profound way than is the case for the areas of Croatia which suffered more 
directly under magyarization and germanization. This “Dalmatian identity is therefore also 
strongly influenced by the hajduk-myth, which originated in the Ottoman context. Perhaps it 
is no coincidence – though one must take into consideration phenomenon such as 
ethnocentrism and romanticism, not to say the historical context in which such notions 
emerge – that ethnographers and historians have to a varying degree subscribed to the notion 
of the Dalmatians of the hinterlands as representing the essence of the primitive South Slav.7      
 All the above reasons hopefully explain to a satisfactory extent why the balance of this 
thesis is slightly leaning towards the advantage of a Dalmatian field of study. However, one 
last point needs to be made. The area that I describe as Dalmatia does not concur completely 
with the precisely defined – and historically quite recent – administrative unit of today called 
the County of Split-Dalmatia. Indeed, the “definition” of Dalmatia which this thesis utilises 
would obviously include the County of Šibenik-Knin, the County of Zadar, as well as large 
parts of both the County of Lika-Senj and the County of Dubrovnik-Neretva. My point is that 
                                                 
7
 Wolf 2003. 
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my “definition” of Dalmatia is purely cultural-regional; it is geographically vague and 
flexible, just as the region of Dalmatia has been throughout history. Only by approaching 
Dalmatia in this wide sense can one begin to acknowledge the region not only as a 
geographical area, but also as a cognitive construction and a cultural sphere to which its 
inhabitants relate to in myriads of ways.   
 
0.5. Outline of the Chapters 
The first chapter examines the methodology and theory which forms the conceptual 
fundament on which this thesis is built. Firstly, I will describe the methodological repertoire 
which was activated during the research phase of this thesis, before I will move on to a 
discussion of the operational understanding of the phenomenon of the branitelj which this 
thesis utilises. Finally, I shall relate this thesis to other theoretical viewpoints and suggestions.         
In the second chapter, I aspire to show how the branitelji grew quickly in number and 
hence in influence, and thus became a potential political force which nobody could afford to 
overlook in their governmental or oppositional politics. As the chapter progresses, it will 
hopefully gradually become clear to the reader how the largest and most important 
organisations of the branitelji slipped into the sphere of influence of political parties. Light 
will also be cast upon the effect of this growth and the political influence that it had on “the 
cause” of the branitelji themselves.  
We shall look closer in the third chapter at how the political potential mentioned above 
was realised. As President Tuđman had passed away by the end of the last millennium, and a 
societal climate change took place following the takeover of a new and different government, 
certain developments on the national and international arenas brought about a more outspoken 
and direct form of political involvement. The veterans were mobilised against the government 
by the help of still powerful structural remains of the Tuđman era. However, while one might 
argue that the branitelji did contribute to the subsequent change in government through their 
massive opposition and protests, their “success” came at a heavy price. The direct political 
involvement of the branitelji contributed greatly to their public image being severely 
damaged, thus rendering the much needed reintegration to society even more difficult.  
Finally, before the short conclusion, the fourth chapter will take a closer look on 
political initiatives emanating from within the veteran population itself, i.e. not provoked or 
realised by more or less external political players. A considerable part of these, I hope to 
prove, stem from the notion of “embodiment of ideology” which was discussed earlier, and 
thus from the different conceptions and understandings of the Homeland War, from which the 
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branitelji are politically, morally and discursively indivisible. The branitelji and their 
organisations, also on their own initiative, strived to combine ideological principles with their 
operation of kinds of charitable organisations, which were to defend the rights of the 
demobilised and isolated soldiers. The first role, however, slowed down or complicated the 
functioning of the second, which, again, went at the expense of the branitelji themselves. 
Moreover, it enabled “industrious” individuals to take advantage of the organisations and the 
“cause” of the branitelji to promote their own agendas. At last, this combination of political 
involvement, lack of adherence to the humanitarian ideal, and financial and power hungry 
exploitation by certain individuals resulted in schisms and divisions among the branitelji 
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1.1. Methodology and Assessment of Sources 
The plethora of veteran’s organizations in Croatia is, scientifically spoken, a poorly 
documented phenomenon. Surprisingly enough, there exists little academic literature on the 
subject even though these organisations have been continuously and widely discussed in 
Croatian media, often to a sensationalistic delight of journalists and politicians with a feel for 
populist rhetoric. It is remarkable how far between it currently is between articles and 
interviews that throw a favourable light on these organisations, which, after all, do represent 
highly important defenders of interests for a large segment of the Croatian public. 
 The theoretical orientation of this paper lies somewhere between political science, 
history and anthropology. Perhaps only very vague – and therefore perhaps unnecessary – 
notions like social/cultural studies capture its orientation. However, more precise is the fact 
that the notion of “discourse” is central to it. In this paper, “discourse” has come to mean the 
total universe of meanings, events, actions, thoughts etc. which surrounds and interplays with 
a given phenomenon. Central to the argument of this thesis is the notion of the public image 
of the branitelji. How was the image of the branitelji affected by the politicisation of their 
cause? And vice versa: How did the “image” of the branitelji influence political 
developments? Only by taking the entire discourse into consideration in this historical 
analysis can one find the answer to these questions. After all, “image”, in the form it appears 
here, is necessarily constructed and de-constructed discursively, as a collective and cultural 
dialogue between holder of this image and his/her adversary, who accepts or refuses the 
version of the image promoted by the holder.       
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If one is to understand this “discourse” in all its complexity, it follows that the 
approach must be holistic. In my quest to establish some sort of overview of the wide and 
many-sided discourse of the Croatian veterans I have therefore come to rely on a broad 
spectre of sources: Analytic articles, reports, statistics, laws and legislations, informants, and 
“study-trips”. However, newspaper articles constitute the main bulk of the material which 
forms the basis of the analysis of this paper. This has given me some headaches, I must admit. 
In Croatia, where the average citizen is much founder of conspiracy theories and a lot more 
critical of both institutions of the state and the media than is the case here in Norway, I 
occasionally experienced the creeping sensation of not being taken seriously. “Newspapers!? 
But they are all lies…”(“Novine!? Pa to je sve laž…), was a common reaction. My agreeing 
upon the need to stay highly critical to the media, but at the same time claiming that a lot can 
be deduced from lies and the way superficial content is presented, in combination with other 
sources, did not win over many of the more critically inclined. However, my belief has 
remained firm regarding newspaper articles functioning as my main bulk of sources. As 
already indicated, while this thesis aspires to write the “history” of the veterans’ organisations 
of the Homeland War, it has been established that this history is indelible from that of Croatia 
since independence itself. Yet while the “history” of Croatia since independence has at least 
to some extent been covered by high quality scientific analysis, the same “history” from the 
viewpoint of the branitelji has not. Therefore, while I deem newspaper articles to be 
extremely apt at giving strong indications as to the “colour, taste and sound” of the discourse 
surrounding and interplaying with the veterans and their organisations, I am also convinced 
that there simply are no other written sources available which allows one to map out this 
“history” in detail. By supplementing with other the other sources mentioned I have become 
sure that I have taken the necessary precautions to prevent errors and misinterpretation 
stemming from analysing newspaper articles.  
The biggest Croatian newspapers have online archives which go back as far as 1999 or 
2000. Consequently, information about the period from around the change of the millennium 
up until today I have primarily found in such online archives. This is not without methodical 
drawbacks, however. For instance, one of my main sources, the Split-based daily Slobodna 
Dalmacija – the most important newspaper of the region of Dalmatia –  does not publish all 
the material of the printed edition; in fact only somewhere around 25% makes its way to the 
online edition. This danger of missing out on important information is something I have tried 
to counter by supplementing my information bank with articles of the printed edition, which I 
have obtained through the archives at University Library of Split (Sveučilišna knjižnica u 
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Splitu – SVKST). However, due to the strains on time and budget such deep dives into 
archives tend to entail, I have been forced to make priorities. Therefore, my search in this 
“physical” archive is less thorough for the later period than for the period from 92 to 00, 
since, after all, this archive is the only source of information I have for that early period. This 
I have tried to compensate for by also thoroughly searching for articles from other online 
editions of Croatian dailies; primarily Zagreb-based Vjesnik and to some extent Jutarnji list. I 
do feel confident that this method of supplying the online archives of Slobodna Dalmacija has 
been successful and that I have not missed out on important information. On the contrary, I 
believe I have gathered enough information for two more papers.   
 This splitting up in two periods, which I must stress is primarily a methodological 
partition, has another reason. The issue here is press freedom. There is reason to question the 
independency of most newspaper sources in the period of Tuđman’s presidency. Vjesnik, the 
main “political analysis” newspaper in Croatia, was undoubtedly supporting the former 
president and his party while in power. It also became increasingly clear during the first half 
of the following decade that Vjesnik continued to be clearly supportive of HDZ, yet to a 
varying degree. With regards to Slobodna Dalmacija, the limited press freedom of the 
Tuđman era also left its marks on the critical approach of the newspaper. Even if Slobodna 
Dalmacija perhaps was not as clearly supportive of Tuđman and HDZ as Vjesnik, several 
battles for the control of this newspaper took place in the nineties. In the immediate aftermath 
of Croatian independence, Slobodna Dalmacija published articles and satirical fanzines in 
cooperation with Feral Tribune, the latter which was to become the most important critical 
voice of Dalmatia, perhaps of the whole of Croatia, in the nineties. In February 1993, 
Slobodna Dalmacija embarked on a general strike for three days to mark its discontent with 
the lack of press freedom in Croatia. However, from this point on, the administration and 
editorial team of the newspaper was beginning to fall under the influence of president 
Tuđman and the HDZ, and during the reign of Editor Josip Jović8 from 2000 to 2001, its 
journalistic independency was only proverbial. However, quickly after he left his position in 
2001, Slobodna Dalmacija returned to a more independent orientation and began a critical 
reassessment of its role during the Tuđman era. Today, sadly, Slobodna Dalmacija struggles 
                                                 
8
 Josip Jović published an article serial ostensibly aimed at compromising newly elected President Mesić by way 
of the latter’s testimony for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the case 
against war time Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević. In the article, Jović clearly displayed confidential 
knowledge. This led critics to believe that he was conspiring with still active branches of the HDZ structure 
within the army and intelligence services to promote the return to power of HDZ. Jović was later indicted by the 
ICTY for publishing the testimony of a protected witness. (“Josip Jović traži 43 000 eura odštete na temelju vrlo 
sumnjivog ugovora”. Nacional, 21.08.2002).  
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under another form of imposed control, this time of the financial sort. The tabloidization of 
Slobodna Dalmacija of the last couple of years has enraged many a faithful reader.  
 After this digression it is necessary to recall what this is all about, namely press 
freedom – or the lack of it – and what possible effect this might have had on this paper. On 
this important matter I have basically trusted my own sound critical judgement and 
independent historical and political knowledge of post-war Croatia to be the most important 
defensive wall against wrong conclusions based on politically flavoured information. In 
addition to this I have also included oppositional newspapers and magazines in my search for 
articles, such as the mentioned Feral Tribune, yet also Novi List and Nacional, which all are 
renowned in their own way for their independence and critical inclination towards the power 
structures of the country they operate in. I am quite certain that my method has given me an 
extremely detailed, yet precise – and most importantly unbiased – overview of the popular 
discourse of the veterans – an overview which forms the basis of analysis for my methodical 
approach.         
 Some words about statistics are required as well, as I initially had the idea of gathering 
some statistic material to use as a foundation for my arguments. This, however, proved to be a 
difficult task. After contacting such instances as the official Croatian Bureau of Statistics 
(Hrvatski zavod za statistiku), the Croatian National Archive (Hrvatski državni arhiv) as well 
as the Croatian Memorial Documentation Centre of the Homeland War (Hrvatski 
memorijalno-dokumenatcijski centar Domovinskog rata), all I got was suggestions that I 
contact the MOBMS, something which I had, naturally, tried on numerous occasions, to no 
avail. All my inquiries and requests – not only about statistics but on other information as well 
as possible interviews – have been met by an impenetrable wall of silence from this ministry. 
Therefore, I have come to rely on the relevant statistics which could be obtained through the 
mentioned Bureau of Statistics, as well as statistics published in the press. One obvious caveat 
regarding statistics published in the press is that some journalist or editor has decided which 
part of the information is relevant, and which is not, thereby switching the focus of the 
statistic fact to suit her or his needs. Such statistics convey information that has been 
tampered with. Given that “the secret language of statistics, so appealing in a fact-minded 
culture, is employed to sensationalize, inflate, confuse and oversimplify”, I have come to treat 
these statistical facts with great caution, paying heed to the fact that “without (…) readers 
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who know what [statistics] mean, the result can only be semantic nonsense”.9 I will therefore 
include any critical remarks when discussing these sources during the course of the analysis.          
 As has hopefully become increasingly apparent in the course of this introductory 
chapter, my main methodological tool is social and political analysis primarily based on 
newspaper articles. However, as mentioned, other methods have been applied as well, some of 
them not leaning on written sources. Most notably among these is, fieldwork, or active 
participation. Now any anthropologist with respect for his discipline would probably disagree 
violently with me on this matter, as the “rules” of ethnographic research quite clearly states 
that any fieldwork should last at least 5-6 uninterrupted months. I have taken several trips to 
Dalmatia during the years of conducting research for this thesis, yet all these trips have been 
limited to shorter periods, spanning from one week to two months at a time. Whether one is to 
call these trips “study-trips” rather than conventional “fieldwork” is in my opinion less 
important; what is certain is that these trips have taken the form of active participation to the 
best extent possible given the temporal and financial limitations. Thus I have taken part in 
informal talks, discussions, concerts and other gatherings organized by veterans’ 
organizations, commemorative events and public rituals such as Victory and Homeland 
Thanksgiving Day and Day of the Veterans, and the annual religious-cum-historical ritual and 
knight contest Sinjska Alka10, as well as discussing matters over with informants who are or 
are not connected to the veterans in any way. Perhaps the most revealing moments in the work 
on this thesis have come to me while sharing newspapers and discussing their contents with 
the other guests of smoke-filled roadside cafés of the Dalmatian countryside. In my opinion, 
this wide approach to what constitutes a popular discourse is vital to the holistic 
understanding of the phenomenon of the branitelji and its “history” which this thesis seeks to 
apply. 
 One final comment on something that could have become a challenge from the outset: 
My personal ties of descent to the area in question. I am going to be frank – in some respects 
having local knowledge has spared me a lot of time and frustration on some occasions. Still, I 
have taken great care not to exploit this advantage in such a way that it might lead to short-
                                                 
9
 Huff 1993 [1954]. p. 8.   
10
 The Alka is celebrated in August each year in the small town of Sinj in the Dalmatian hinterland. This contest 
of knights is dedicated to the heroic efforts of the sinjani of 1715, who, though severely outnumbered, allegedly 
repelled an ottoman onslaught on the town. The Alka also coincides with the celebration of the revelation of 
Virgin Mary of Sinj (Gospa sinjska), as she allegedly manifested herself to the citizens during the ottoman attack 
and inspired them to withstand. The complexity of aspects of this public ritual, combined with the general 
societal climate at the turn of the new millennium made it prone to politicisation, and so it became an arena of 
fierce nationalistic speeches and protests against various governments. The last few years have luckily brought 
normalisation also for the Alka, and it has by now more or less regained its solely cultural image.        
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cuts or quick solutions that might compromise the scientific standards of integrity that a 
postgraduate thesis should aspire to maintain. The question whether I have succeeded in 
keeping the necessary scientific “aloofness” from the phenomenon of study, since I am to 
such an extent involved, is a difficult one to answer unequivocally, since, obviously, the grey 
zones on this matter are substantial. However, active participation necessarily means 
compromising this aloofness, it necessarily must include involvement. Yet I have strictly 
excluded family members and personal friends from the research for this paper to achieve 
some kind of professional balance between involvement and “aloofness”. I am convinced that 
the extent to which I have succeeded in this will be reflected in the pages of this paper.      
  
1.2. “We are branitelji, not veterans”: Conceptualizing the Object of Study 
I turn now to a closer scrutiny of the veterans themselves, and the immediate and subtle 
context in which they find themselves, to form some sort of definitional exit point from which 
this thesis is to be read. The definition of mine which holds that Dalmatia belongs to the 
“Balkan” symbolical and cultural sphere puts me at odds with popular sentiment in Croatia, as 
the extremely loaded term “Balkan” has increasingly come to be associated with Croatia’s 
“dark past” under the yoke of “Yugo-communistic aggression”.11 Croatia has in recent years 
been struggling hard to move away from such connotations, something of which the reactions 
of the media to the notion of certain western politicians that Croatia belongs to the region of 
the “Western Balkans” speak clearly of. However, to justify this move of mine in a way 
which is highly relevant to the theoretical groundwork of this thesis, and at the same time 
rather more specific and concrete than just my vague initial notion of Dalmatia belonging to a 
“cultural sphere”, I wish to direct the reader’s attention to the myth of the Balkan bandit – the 
hajduk.  
 As Wendy Bracewell has pointed out, the concept of the bandit or villain has a special 
normative ambiguity and myth-like quality in the Balkans. Since the popular uprisings against 
the Turks in the period of ottoman domination, the celebration of the hajduci in songs, epic 
tales and later even in school books has led to the cementing of the concept in the cultural 
memory of the peoples of the Balkans. Yet like all myths, and perhaps especially the case for 
Balkan-myths, the hajduk has come to evoke ambiguous connotations – depending on 
perspective – of struggle against oppression, thirst for liberty, and heroic masculinity or 
                                                 
11
 Jugokomunistička agresija is one of those “buzz-terms” that I encountered quite frequently when analysing the 
discourse surrounding the veterans. In this paper I have tried to pay attention to and use such expressions as I 
consider them to be quite revealing.  
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alternatively of lawlessness, primitivism, and violence”.12 The myth of the hajduk originated 
in the intersection of the invention and manipulation by the people of the Balkans and the 
influence of early forms of western ideas of romantic nationalism, and has since been 
transformed and flexed to fit different needs of different times. Especially “national 
awakeners” were prone to take advantage of the hajduk myth and portrait the bandits as 
“precursors of national liberation, guerrilla fighters who set the stage for the national revolts; 
as consciousness-raisers, keeping alive the sense of a national identity; and even as state-
builders”.13 President Tuđman, even if unwillingly or subconsciously, perhaps contributed to 
the reawakening of the hajduk connotations in collective memory when he allegedly recruited 
modern bandits from prisons all over the country to hastily establish a Croatian army in the 
beginning of the nineties.14 Certainly, the younger Tuđman had elaborated on the idea that the 
hajduci were indeed heroes, albeit in a rather different context as this was during the life of 
the second Yugoslavia.15  According to this view, the hajduci were an early sample of 
partisans, struggling for the people of the working class in their time-specific way.16 In the 
1990s the context was new, yet the myth was still employable, especially since it had seeped 
into the collective memory of most Croats through the idealization of the hajduk by Tito’s 
communists.    
 With the construction of parallel nationalized versions of the hajduk myths in rhythm 
with the increasing rivalry between the two largest entities of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Croatia, 
a specific Croatian dilemma crystallized itself when having to balance an understanding of the 
hajduk as a Serb (as propagated by Serb geographer Jovan Cvijić) with the clear presence of 
hajduk and uskok17 myths of undisputedly Croatian regions. After all, “to be national heroes, 
bandits had to have a recognizable national character, belonging to one group and not to 
another”.18 The communists later struggled to counter this split over ownership of the hajduk 
myth by elevating the hajduk as the ideal member of the proletariat, sworn to the fulfilment of 
socialist ideals, thus exemplifying that regime’s struggle to shift the focus from the national to 
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 Bracewell 2003, p. 22.   
13
 Ibid., p. 24.   
14
 Ɖikić 2006. According to this source, Tuđman replied in the following manner when confronted by warnings 
from future president Mesić of the presence of criminals in the army: “Leave them alone, I’ll need more of the 
kind” (“Pusti ih, još će mi takvih trebati”).   
15
 Tuđman 1970.  
16
 Bracewell, op. cit., p. 31.  
17
 The uskoci were, similar to the haduci, organised brigands escaping, or even challenging, imperial control in 
certain areas of the (geographical) Western Balkans. Whereas the hajduci were a thorn in the eye of the 
ottomans, the uskoci were harassing the Venetians at sea during the time when the lion of St. Marc held its sway 
over Dalmatia. As pirates, they were an Adriatic, and thus – today – a Croatian, phenomenon (see Bracewell 
1992).     
18
 Bracewell 2003, p. 27. 
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the political principles which were to keep Yugoslavia united. The discussion of to which 
degree this undertaking was successful does not belong here – it is sufficient to point to the 
notion that two different conceptions of the archetypical Robin Hood existed in the former 
Yugoslavia – one eastern and one western. This manifested itself in another concept of 
idealisation in addition to that of the hajduk, namely that of the peasant insurgent. Whereas 
the hajduk was the ideal character where the collective memory also included experiences of 
anti-Ottoman warfare, the myth of the peasant insurgent had its resonance in areas which had 
suffered under first and foremost the Hungarian nobility.19    
Even if the eastern variant, the hajduk myth, may be less pronounced when one views 
Croatia as a whole, than is the case for Serbia or Herzegovina, it is quite clear in my opinion 
that anti-Ottoman warfare has not “faded from memory”20 in Dalmatia, something which is 
testified by the strong presence of hajduk symbols (though they may be called something else 
nowadays) in the area. Accordingly, not only is the second biggest football club in Croatia 
called Hajduk Split, the roadside in the Dalmatian hinterland was until recently practically 
littered with cafés bearing the hajduk stamp in their names or logos. Moreover, the mentioned 
Sinjska Alka is a museum of hajduk symbolism. The struggle to eradicate hajduk symbols 
from Croatia has at best led to superficial results in Dalmatia. As I touched upon earlier, this 
also highlights the strong regional identity that exists within Dalmatia. Croatia is and is not 
part of the Balkans, yet Dalmatia is the region which in any case gravitates Croatia “back” – 
as many Croats would say today – towards the Balkans. Indeed, the “Dalmatian”, especially 
the rural one, is commonly viewed pejoratively as backwards and “Balkan” by his fellow 
Croats.21 Moreover, there are clearly – as the above discussion indicates – parallels to be 
drawn between the myth of the hajduk and the more recent myth of the branitelj; and 
therefore I believe that it will be advantageous for the initial conceptualization of the branitelj 
in this thesis to highlight these similarities. Surely it is tempting to argue that the branitelj 
represents a context-specific, contemporary – but most importantly a specifically Croatian – 
or perhaps rather Dalmatian – version of the hajduk myth, for in the discourse the branitelj 
spans “from the epitome of a hero, a paragon of masculinity, brave, honourable, and just, to 
the cruel, capricious personification of disorder and violence, not to mention (…) comic or 
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 Žanić 1998 (b).   
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 Ibid., p. 4.  
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 This pronounced regional split becomes especially highlighted during a different kind of regular public ritual 
in Croatia – the football matches between the two biggest teams in the Croatian league, Hajduk Split and Croatia 
Zagreb, which often lead to vandalism and rampaging at which the fans of the two teams compete to be the best.  
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deluded”.22 As the second Yugoslavia fell apart, the hajduk remained a powerful symbol of 
the Serbs, as they did not undergo the same drastic ideological change as Croatia did. The 
political imaginary of the Serbs remained – at least superficially – firmly framed by the same 
Marxist theories, which in the case of Yugoslavia were epitomized by the ideal proletarian, 
the hajduk. The Serbs did not have to reinvent the myth; they had to reinvent their enemies. 
On the contrary, as the new Croatian narrative was constructed in opposition to the Serb and 
Yugoslav, it became vitally important to reformulate this myth according to the new 
conditions, while at the same time keeping its essential content for the use of idealizing 
heroism and violent opposition to “empires of the East”. Most importantly, this reformulation 
had to avoid any overt association with the hajduk myth, as the hajduk was now considered a 
Serb. Thus the myth of the branitelj came into being.      
 Others have touched upon similar problems, for instance Reinhard Lauer who rather 
early drew the parallel between the hajduk myths and the war-crimes committed by Serbian 
paramilitary groups during the break-up of Yugoslavia.23 In this line of argument “warfare is 
simply the continuation of epic poetry by other means”.24 Žanić, in a different volume, argued 
similarly that the hajduk tradition influenced popular perception of “rotten apples” among the 
soldiers of their respective armies during the fall of Yugoslavia.25 This point is taken even 
further by Vjeran Pavlaković who leans on Žanić to draw more clearly the parallels between 
the hajduk and the branitelj by discussing perhaps the most famous of the branitelji, General 
Ante Gotovina, as a political symbol whose aura of heroism was greatly enhanced by his 
success in remaining at large despite attempts by the ICTY and the Croatian government (in 
various degrees of wholeheartedness, it must be added) to capture him. The general can hence 
“be interpreted as a folk hero who defended the Croatian people first from an internal enemy 
(rebel Serbs) and then from an external one, the ICTY (…)”, additionally as a representation 
of the “anti-modern, anti-urban and anti-state mentality that resonates among the peoples of 
the Dalmatian hinterland, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia, who have historically been willing 
to harbour outlaws since the days of the Ottoman occupation”.26 Indeed, Ante Gotovina 
epitomizes the modern and particularly Croat version of the hajduk myth – the myth of the 
branitelj.  
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 Pavlaković (forthcoming) 2010.  
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Myths and symbols do unquestionably have a profound impact on the human way of 
arranging the world into manageable pieces of the jig-saw puzzle that reality is made up of, 
and it is in this way that the hajduk myth has rooted itself deeply in the collective memory of 
the people of Dalmatia. It is also in this way that the connotations that the symbolic hajduk 
revokes have become so powerful, as he epitomizes a whole range of collective experiences, 
ideals and values. Myths are surprisingly flexible and resilient, even if their survival depends 
on giving an impression of the opposite, and as such they are also prone to reflect subtle 
contemporary undercurrents of their “host-culture”. The conceptualization of the branitelj for 
which I argue here is a cluster of such reflections of contemporary Croatia, while at the same 
time it pays attention to the prism of tradition and cultural memory through which these 
reflections pass.       
That the concept of the branitelj became a vital piece in the symbolic process of 
reinventing the Croatian state narrative becomes increasingly clear if one considers the use of 
the word itself in the popular discourse. Literary defender, the word branitelj has traditionally 
been used as a juridical term for the defender of the indicted, similar to the way the word is 
used in Norwegian (forsvarer). However, in line with the narrative of the Homeland War and 
of the rebirth of the Croatian state tradition, the branitelj is the potent actor which defended, 
and thus facilitated the rebirth of Croatia by unselfishly sacrificing on “the altar of the 
Fatherland”; and as such he is the most important persona in the recent drama of the Croatian 
people, to which all Croats owe their utmost gratitude and respect. This notion of defensive 
action also has a profound moral meaning attached to it, for it is difficult to disagree with the 
necessity and unavoidability of violence in acts of self defence – the only “legitimate” form of 
applied violence in the moral universe of modern democratic states. Indeed, the main 
argument of the most important veterans’ organizations in opposing the extradition of 
Croatian officers to the ICTY has been that it is “impossible” to commit war crimes in a 
defensive war.   
Yet not only was the concept of the branitelj invented to fit the more recent events 
during the break-up of Yugoslavia; it was also projected backwards in history along with the 
new narrative. Both the new narrative and one of its most important parts – the branitelj – had 
to be incorporated into the new, official version of the Croatian past, which was dominated by 
the notion of a “thousand year long Croatian struggle for freedom”. As the reinventing – or 
rather readjusting – of such narratives is primarily a symbolic process, it is no wonder that it 
is reflected in public political rituals. Thus, for instance, in connection with Sinjska Alka in 
1995, an old memorial plaque dedicated to the warriors who defended the area of Sinj against 
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the onslaught of the Turks in 1715 was renewed, and a commemorative event took place 
headed by the district prefect (župan) of Split-Dalmatia, Kruno Peronja (HDZ). The newly 
painted and washed plaque was from now on not only to represent the heroism of the warriors 
of 1715 – which were now called the branitelji from the Turks (branitelji od Turaka) – but 
also the branitelji of the Homeland War. Peronja, in his speech, directed the listeners attention 
to the similarities between the two “enemies from the east”, the Turks and the Serbs, but left 
no doubt that as in 1715, the branitelji were once again ready and competent to defend 
Croatia, even if the enemy had changed.27  
While certain points in Croatian history are lifted up and highlighted as examples of 
the long heroic and just struggle for Croatian statehood, others, who challenge the coherence 
or consistency of the new narrative, must necessarily be toned down, erased or reinterpreted. 
Thus the near past dominated by communist rule must be portrayed as a(nother) “dark age” 
for the Croats, especially so due to its temporal closeness and the fact that the number one 
enemy in the new narrative is the recent cohabitant, the Serb. It is therefore no wonder that the 
branitelji has often marked the difference of their organizations from that of the communist 
era, the SUBNOR. As a high ranking member of HVIDRA stated at a conference in 1996:  
 
“if the government does not fulfil its duty, we will have to start functioning politically (…). We do not want to 
repeat the history from 50 years ago, nor do we want to be SUBNOR, so they’d better not force us to, as a last 
resort, start dealing with politics”.28   
 
The problem with such statements is that several organisations, HVIDRA included, did just 
the opposite, namely involved themselves deeply into politics and moral questions on society 
level, thereby becoming a continuation of, rather than a break with, the past. The leader of 
another important organisation, Branko Borković, aptly summed this up by stating that “the 
previous system left many trails in the consciousness of people”.29 Like so many other aspects 
of Croatia’s move from communism to democracy – and perhaps also political and social 
transition in general – the changes were superficial, while the substance proved more resilient 
and slow to adopt changes. Revealing is also the reaction of Tomislav Merčep, one of the 
more politically involved veterans of the Croatian discourse, to the choice of name of the then 
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 ”Spomenik braniteljima od Turaka”. Slobodna Dalmacija, 29.07.1995. This autumn (2009) a document was 
discovered in which, allegedly, Peronja orders the removal of monuments dedicated to the antifascist movement 
of Tito and his peers from the entire County of Split-Dalmatia (“Peronjin naputak: Uklonite neslavnu prošlost”, 
Slobodna Dalmacija, 02.10.2009).  
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 ”Nema zločinaca među hrvatskim braniteljima”, Slobodna Dalmacija, 21.05.1996. 
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 ”Dragovoljce su htjeli ʻuškopitiʼ”, Slobodna Dalmacija, 18.05.1994.  
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(in 1996) recently established Council for Veterans of War of the Homeland War and World 
War Two, headed by General Bobetko. Merčep was reportedly “irritated by the name, since 
veterans of war exist in America, while in Croatia there are only branitelji and volunteers 
(dragovoljci)”. Moreover, he stated that “if the destinies of the volunteers of the Homeland 
War are to be continued to be settled by partisan generals and their children, they will not fare 
well”.30 This discussion highlights the fact that the political and social process of constructing 
a new narrative involves constructing new features of the concurring language. Thus it is 
obvious that the word branitelj is a new one in its current usage, emerging, as Croatia 
emerged, out of the setting of the former Yugoslavia. The use of the word branitelj is “safe” 
since it can not be confused with Serbian, as the right form there would be branilac, as well as 
to Yugoslavia, where a veteran was a borac.   
One final set of theoretical reflections might take us closer to a tentative understanding 
of how the branitelji themselves are experiencing their place in the Croatian discourse – and 
ultimately also in Croatian society. Though it might seem outright impossible to analyze 
scientifically the subjective understanding of the veterans themselves, I wish, at least, to 
suggest some kind of vague sketch of this relation by leaning on the claims I have already 
posed. Consequently, by utilizing some of Victor Turners phraseology I wish now to turn to 
what I argue is a prominent feature of the Croatian post-war discourse, and therefore also of 
the veterans, namely that of liminality.31 Turner leans on Arnold Van Gennep’s 
characterization of important socio-cultural rituals of transition, so called rites de passage, 
which are especially exposed in small-scale societies.32 Such rituals, Gennep argues, are to be 
viewed in three distinct parts: separation, liminality (from limen which means margin), and 
re-aggregation. Whereas the first and last phase of ritual points to the withdrawal of a person 
or a group from and reintegration to structure, the central phase here – that of liminality – is 
characterized by the person’s or group’s “interstructural” positioning; in between, so to speak, 
the structural pillars of society. As he/she/they pass through “the intervening ‘liminal’ period 
the state of the ritual subject (the ‘passenger’) is ambiguous, he passes through a realm which 
has few or none of the attributes of the past or the coming state (…)”.33 In this final aspect of 
my conceptualization of the branitelj I suggest that it might be fruitful as an analytical and 
conceptual tool to point to the similarities between the branitelj, and even Croatia itself, and 
the “passenger” in Turner’s and Van Gennep’s world of rituals. As Turner and Van Gennep 
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among others have shown, “rites de passage are not confined to culturally defined life-crises 
but may accompany any change from one state to another, as when a whole tribe goes to war 
(…)”.34 Further, “transitions between states”35 is not only also descriptive of Croatia’s period 
of process when moving from communism to democracy, but also of the process of 
reintegration of the branitelj; from citizen to soldier, and back to citizen again. However, 
while the notion of being “betwixt and between” is arguably a common sensation among the 
veterans, one might speculate that this feeling of alienation, or suspension from structure, has 
been greatly enhanced by the fact that the structure they once left has been greatly 
transformed while the veterans themselves were “structurally invisible”. Moreover, while 
Croatia’s transition has adhered to a clear goal, that of the branitelji has for too long been 
characterized by a state of limbo which, in line with the major argument of this thesis, is 
largely caused by the inclination of politicians of viewing the veterans as voters who must be 
curtailed by empty ideological phrases, rather that offered effective and targeted assistance in 
the arduous task of returning to a life which has become strange and unknown to them. In this 
never ending state of liminality, the branitelj is “no longer classified and not yet classified”, 
he is “both living and dead”, he is neither soldier nor citizen – in short, his “condition is one 
of ambiguity and paradox, a confusion of all the customary categories”.36    
 
1.3. Some Additional Theoretical Reflections 
I move now from the conceptualization of the central object of this study over to the 
discussion of some other theoretical reflections which are relevant to my thesis. First and 
foremost, what this paper can not afford to overlook is the article by Sharon Fisher which I 
discovered half way through my work, and whose thesis is “dangerously” reminiscent of my 
own, as stated in the introduction.37 Fisher writes in the introduction of her article that the 
veterans’ organizations “can be seen as more political than part of civil society, and [that] 
political activities have overshadowed their more humanitarian aims”, something which has 
brought “the veterans disrepute within certain segments of the population and among other 
parts of civil society [thereby] pushing them further to the edge of society”.38 The similarities 
with my own thesis are quite obvious, so, in light of this, how can I justify this thesis?  
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Firstly, Fisher’s article of 19 pages leaves little scope for in-depth analysis and serves 
more as an overview of the general “history” of the veterans’ organizations as part – or not 
part – of civil society from the beginning of the 1990’s up until 2001. Not only do I tend to 
move deeper down under these events and view them reflexively along analysis of the 
discourse in general, I have also the advantage of surfacing at a later point in time as, I argue, 
the discourse involving the branitelji only got really interesting after 2001, when the political 
parties that were supported by most of the organisations had been ousted from government by 
Račans coalition. I claim that the original material, which I have patiently and painstakingly 
collected trough the last two and a half years, will help me to construct an argument which 
will appear pronouncedly different from that of Fisher’s, though my thesis is similar to hers.  
Secondly, Fisher’s article is published in a theme-specific volume of sociological 
theory focusing on the concept of civil society in transitional societies in Central and South 
East Europe. As Petr Kopecký states in the introductory chapter of this volume, the study 
wishes to include groups “that are often excluded from civil society on both normative and 
conceptual grounds” and thus move “beyond the relatively narrow sphere of ‘pro-democratic’ 
organisations” – hence the title, Uncivil Society?39 Only this way, he argues, can one begin to 
consider the importance of “potentially vital ingredients of associational life and democratic 
politics, i.e. various forms of protest or, as it as frequently termed, contentious politics”.40 
Interesting though they are (especially Kopecký’s convincing reasoning on the influence of 
the dissidents of former Eastern Europe’s understanding of the term civil society on its most 
usual and widespread definition), these theories are not relevant to the central argument here, 
though they will in some ways be part of the background reflections. My point here is that the 
form and content of Fisher’s article, which are strained by the specific context the article 
appears in, makes it somewhat besides the point in this thesis – even though her thesis on the 
outset looks very similar to my own. More weight is placed on placing the veterans’ 
organizations in a setting which is primarily focused on the phenomenon of civil society, 
something of which the fact that a short “history” of civil society in Croatia is included, 
speaks clearly of.   
Thirdly, and now moving to a closer look at the article and the theoretical framework 
which surrounds it, there are some points here worthy of critique. Fisher argues quite rightly 
that HDZ, during the Tuđman era, worked hard on curbing the development of Croatian civil 
society by controlling the funding of various organisations and by adopting laws and 
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legislations which in practice complicated the activities of non-governmental organisations. 
Regarding the war veterans’ organisations, HDZ’s strategy was to establish close links with 
the leadership of some organisations to hinder open public opposition. After all, any 
opposition to the HDZ from the branitelji would seriously challenge the craved after 
impression that HDZ was the mind and the branitelji the hands behind the “creation” of 
Croatia. Given Fisher’s thesis, which was reproduced above, and even if she briefly mentions 
that the veterans’ organizations “have a divided nature that makes it difficult to characterise 
them as a single movement”,41 my clear opinion is that too little weight is placed on the 
diversity of the members of the organisations. The organisations are portrayed more or less as 
united in theory and practice in a way which I find difficult to agree with after studying the 
material I have collected. Then again, I suppose this is unavoidable in an article of sociology 
which aims to study civil society per se, and not delve deeper into a specific segment of it. A 
more detailed and analytical view of the veterans’ organizations themselves, on their own 
terms, is simply beyond the scope of Fisher’s article. Perhaps this is also due to the fact that 
Fisher’s article is limited in time, as I consent that it was really not until after 2001 that the 
complex diversity of viewpoints and the fault lines between the leadership and the members 
of the associations came to be fully displayed. After all, prior to this time any critique of the 
“official” viewpoint was treason. However, and more importantly in my opinion, among the 
reasons for the marginalisation of the branitelji in Croatian society is the fact that too little 
weight has been placed on conveying the fact that the hundreds of thousands of veterans 
represent as diverse a group as the population of Croatia itself. The media, certain political 
parties, and opportunists within the organizations themselves have contributed to – and even 
preferred – such an oversimplified depiction of the branitelji in the discourse. This is 
something which this paper aims to counter. 
Moving on now to another study which is relevant to my thesis is Deborah Cohen’s 
study of disabled veterans of the First World War.42 Writing about British and German 
disabled veterans comparatively, Cohen investigates the highly interesting paradox that while 
the Weimar-republic launched a complex and far-reaching state program of benefits and 
support to reintegrate the veterans into society after their experience of war, the veterans 
gradually grew increasingly antagonistic to the state and alienated from society. At the same 
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time, while no such program existed in Britain, where the veterans were left to the mercy of 
citizens’ ad hoc charity, the reconciliation and reintegration of the disabled veterans proved 
far more effective than in Germany. 43 Cohen states that “in Britain the reintegration of 
disabled veterans proceeded primarily through voluntary and philanthropic efforts”, and that 
this “brought about a reconciliation between disabled veterans and those for whom they had 
suffered”.44  
Yet it is when one compares the British situation with the German that the relevance 
becomes unmistakably apparent, as the German solution to the reintegration of the veterans is 
very similar to the Croatian solution, the way the latter is portrayed in this thesis. The Weimar 
republic granted the veterans immense privileges such as high pensions, not only to the 
veterans themselves but to their children and wives, and promised to find a job for everyone. 
Considering the fact that the Great Depression as well as the recent financial disaster of war 
was dominating the everyday life of the citizens of the republic, these efforts of the German 
state proved close to impossibly strenuous. By the end of the 1920’s, Germany spent 20% of 
its state budget on war veterans’ pensions, while Great Britain spent less than 7%. Yet the 
Weimar Republic planned their efforts to be fruitful not only in the obvious way of increasing 
the productivity of the state by involving masses of disabled citizens. As Cohen writes, “the 
regulation of charity became (…) a means to establish the new state’s authority [and so it] 
sought to establish a monopoly over benevolence [as] unregulated philanthropy threatened the 
state’s legitimacy”.45 In the similar vein, HDZ launched an extremely ambitious program of 
benefits for the Croatian veterans (which will be scrutinized later on in this paper) early on – 
in fact while the war was still far from formally over – despite an increasingly tight budget 
due to the destruction and effort of war as well as a large foreign debt gradually spiralling out 
of control. Further, as I will argue, HDZ also aspired to establish a monopoly over – or 
perhaps rather more precisely to depict itself as the only guarantor for – the veterans’ welfare, 
by curbing non-governmental organizations and hindering them from reaching out to the 
veterans, convincing the public that the state was to take care of the veterans. As noted earlier, 
had the HDZ allowed for other options, they would possibly have facilitated a discursive 
space for oppositional critique which could have proven a threat to the coherence of the new, 
official Croatian narrative, to which the HDZ of the Tuđman era was inextricably bound. 
Only by constructing an image of itself as the great undisputed saviour of Croatia and the 
                                                 
43
 Cohen 2001.  
44
 Ibid., p. 5-7.  
45
 Ibid. 
  30 
veterans, and by taking great care to outwardly consent to the increasing demands of the 
veterans, while at the same time keeping non-governmental organisations under control, did 
the HDZ apparently manage to secure the support of the branitelji. In Croatia, as in Weimar 
Germany, the veterans became “the state’s favoured wards, [standing] in the centre of 
political life [while] politicians, centrist and extreme, carted them as a valuable 
constituency”.46 As Ivan Grdešić has noted, when writing on the Croatian radical right, the 
electoral “cleavage lines [were] formed more along political and ideological values and 
opinions, very often rooted in historical collective memories or religious convictions”, rather 
than there being a “clear and strong socio-structural base”.47 However, the HDZ managed to 
underline that what they propagated as the correct historical narrative – and hence the 
“official” ideology – included the solution to the more pragmatic political question of the 
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2. A Game of Numbers: Emergence and Growth 







2.1. Early Projections 
As early as in 1992, while about one third of Croatian territory was still occupied by Serbian 
forces and state of war penetrated into every segment of society, the first veterans’ 
organisations were founded. As the war in practice had come more or less to a standstill, 
President Tuđman announced the demobilization of 50% of all forces before 31 July that year, 
giving priority to those who held important positions and students, to help “get the country 
back on its feet”. Initially, forecasts for the would-be total number of disabled veterans after 
the war had ended were relatively modest; the Secretariat of Health and Social Care of the 
municipality of Split reasoned that the total number (presumably taking into consideration 
that the war was still officially being fought) would probably be around 3-4000 for the whole 
of Croatia.48 Zvonimir Goreta of the then recently founded Split-branch of the organization 
Croatian Military Disabled of the Homeland War (Hrvatski vojni invalidi Domovinskog rata – 
HVIDRA) estimated the current total number of disabled former soldiers in the area between 
Zadar and Dubrovnik to be around 1000, while the number of members of his organisation at 
the time was 90, though he projected that this number would probably increase.49 By the first 
annual assembly of the Municipal branch of HVIDRA of Split in May 1993, the number of 
members had risen to 450.50 That same month the first central annual assembly of HVIDRA, 
which was to become the single most influential of the veterans’ organisations in the years to 
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come, was held in Zagreb with several prominent HDZ-members present, among them 
Vladimir Šeks and Mate Granić. The newly elected leader, Mladen Jurković, himself also a 
member of HDZ, stated that HVIDRA had gathered 12 000 members and established 67 
branches on county and municipality level throughout the country,51 a number which 
according to a later interview with Jurković in December that same year already had risen to 
18 000.52   
 Later that year, the first organisation which included non-disabled veterans in their 
ranks was established under the name of the Organisation of Croatian Veterans of the 
Homeland war (Udruga hrvatskih veterana Domovinskog rata – UHVDR). It is likely that 
this organisation, led by renowned general Martin Špegelj, and including other well-known 
generals such as Zvonimir Červenko and Janko Bobetko among its members, was initially 
envisaged as the “official” organisation of the branitelji, as President Tuđman was its 
foremost patron. UHVDR aspired to be an umbrella-organisation which included all veterans 
and their organisations, and the number of members was claimed to be close to a hundred 
thousand less than two months after its foundation.53      
The first year of the existence of these two main organisations of branitelji saw an 
explosive growth in their membership, while early projections on the total number of disabled 
as a result of fighting in the war had apparently proven far too modest. This can, of course, 
partly be explained by the general chaos resulting from the state of war, which made precise 
projections on just about anything extremely difficult. It is also an open question whether 
these projections included realistic figures for disability stemming from psychological causes, 
such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).54 Indeed, even the symptoms of PTSD occur 
with a certain delay, and the fact that in most societies – and perhaps especially in Croatian 
society – psychological problems are clouded in stigma and prejudice, probably contributed to 
further delay in the “registering” of the diagnosis. One must also bear in mind that the war 
was still not over, and that, in general, new injuries probably contributed slightly to the 
increase, even if the war had now moved into a low-intensity phase. Still, in such a scenario 
one would perhaps rather expect a slow but steady increase rather than an explosive one.  
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There are, however, some factors which may at least partly explain this massive 
recruiting. Regarding UVHDR, this organisation was to represent the interests of all veterans, 
not exclusively those with disabilities stemming from serving in the war. At the same time, 
however, some of the veterans’ organisations were not exclusive, which meant that 
membership in one organisation did not necessarily exclude membership in another. For 
instance, a disabled branitelj could be member of both UHVDR and HVIDRA. However, in 
time, the possible problem of “double memberships” would disappear, as the number of 
branitelji would continue rising to such an extent that this explanation lost its plausibility. It is 
perhaps more realistic to speculate that both HVIDRA and UHVDR operated with some kind 
of “automatic” membership, i.e. that all disabled branitelji and branitelji respectively were 
automatically included as members in these organisations. After all, the aura of government 
promotion surrounding some of the organisations might easily be imagined as a resource 
which could be utilized to achieve such a feat.  
Demobilisation of soldiers was a recurrent theme surfacing in the national press in 
1995. In April, Minister of Defence Gojko Šušak announced the president’s decision to 
demobilise 35 000 soldiers, something which was deemed executable the state of war and 
occupation notwithstanding.55 Yet it was following the incredibly fast and efficient Operation 
Storm that the process of fundamental demobilisation and reorganising of the army began. 
Less than a week after the operation, the demobilisation of 70 000 soldiers was under way.56 
At this point, the branitelji moved from the inaccessible realm of military statistics to the far 
more open one of unemployment-statistics. Four months after Oluja, in January 96, one tenth 
of these ex-combatants were evidently living in the County of Split-Dalmatia; 5188 out of 
approximately 7000 branitelji were unemployed, and out of a total of 40 004 unemployed, the 
branitelji made out 13% – or 27% of all male unemployed in the county.57 For Croatia as a 
whole, the total number of unemployed was 249 070 roughly at the same time58, while in 
March, according to the Ministry of Work and Welfare (Ministarstvo rada i socijalne skrbi), 
there were 45 384 registered unemployed branitelji.59 These numbers grew gradually 
throughout the subsequent years and reached new heights. In March 1997, one half of all 
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unemployed men in Split-Dalmatia were branitelji.60 It is, of course, necessary to assess these 
statistical facts critically. Firstly, there are always large hidden numbers, perhaps especially so 
in societies were family structure is still tightly knit and unemployed males may be sustained 
through the pooling of family income. Secondly, also regarding family structure, the more 
patriarchal structure in the area promotes the man as the natural worker of the family. Thus 
the real options for women to enter the market of employment are reduced, while women are 
included in the statistics on the same level as men. Thirdly, no information is provided 
regarding how this statistic information is gathered, which opens the way for manipulation in 
either direction depending on the agenda of the publisher. Still, all these dubious elements 
aside, I believe that valuable information is possible to deduce from these statistics. As pieces, 
they fit nicely into the general pattern which clearly shows that the demobilisation of soldiers 
put an enormous pressure on unemployment rates, while at the same time there was no 
adequate system to counter this “wave” of unemployed young men. This led the branitelji to 
seek other solutions to their problems – problems which were addressed with the moral 
weight of collective sacrifice through the veterans’ organisations.  
Early projections of the grand total number of branitelji thus ranged from 200 000 in 
the words of member of the governmental office for injured branitelji, Dr. Zvonko 
Knezović61, and 300 000 which was the official projection of UHVDR (see above), to 350 
000 according to the secretary of the organization Croatian Knights (Hrvatski vitezovi), 
Velimir Milaković.62 Early projections of the grand total number of disabled ranged – or 
rather, grew – from 3-4000 to 18 000. These were the early projections. And they would in 
time prove by far too modest.  
 
2.2. The Law of Rights of the Croatian Branitelji of the Homeland War63 
I turn now to a closer look at the most important features – for this thesis – of the Law of 
Rights of the Croatian Branitelji of the Homeland War (Zakon o pravima hrvatskih branitelja 
iz Domovinskog rata) itself, which is the legal document that regulates all the rights that the 
Croatian branitelji are entitled to. This is unavoidable, since, keeping in mind my thesis, the 
law was on a certain level instrumental in the politicisation of the veterans. The scope of 
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privileges it offered to the branitelji gave those who administered it a hold on those who 
aspired to be included by it. Yet, as we shall see, it is also justifiable to look at it from the 
other way around, since, as their numbers grew on a massive scale, the branitelji were able to 
exert pressure on the government to change the law to their advantage. Be that as it may, 
according to this thesis it is an undeniable fact that the attractiveness of the rights the law had 
to offer was one of the main contributing factors in the explosive growth of the number of 
branitelji.      
The law was adopted in the Croatian parliament, Sabor, by the end of 1993, and was 
formally put into effect in the beginning of 1994. While the war had still not ended, the 
branitelji, especially those of HVIDRA64, had succeeded in convincing the government to 
adopt most of their suggestions and wishes. “By this law the complete rights of disabled 
persons have been encircled” was Jurković’s immediate remark when the first version of the 
law was released in 1994.65 Though demands for and actual increases of the rights it offered 
were abundant in the years to come – following constant demands from the branitelji and 
their organisations – it would certainly prove extremely difficult to make such changes as to 
reduce in any way this platform of rights founded by this law. This was to be experienced first 
hand by several politicians. 
  The most significant of the rights of the branitelji and/or their families66 was of 
course the right to disabled and/or family pension. Accordingly, branitelji who became 
permanently disabled as a result of “protecting the Fatherland” were entitled to such pension 
following military regulations on pension and injury insurance. In the case of killed or 
missing branitelji, these rights were transferred to his or her family. The monthly payment 
according to the military insurance is not stated anywhere in the Law of Rights, probably 
because it fell within army jurisdiction and was therefore kept secret. The pure “disability” 
pension however, which was regulated by the latter of the two laws, is stated as amounting to 
the decent sum of 160% of the annual average payment of Croatia for disabled branitelji, or 
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HRVI (Hrvatski branitelj - ratni vojni invalid domovinskog rata), of the first category.67 
Realistically, however, not much time passed before these financial privileges began to put 
strain on the state budget – already in 1996 some sources claimed that people entitled to full 
pensions received only half of it due to lack of state funds.68 Also, regarding assistance of 
financial kind (or potentially so) the Law of Rights was to ensure for the branitelji the right to 
shares in the so called Croatian fund for privatisation/Croatian Homeland Fund, which was 
also to follow a system of priority in accordance with grade of disability and/or length of 
service. However, in reality, it is questionable whether the measures connected to shares had 
any beneficial effect at all. 45 or so years of socialism are likely to have contributed to there 
being little common knowledge about privatisation, stock exchange, and valuables “on 
paper”. Most of the shares of the branitelji were in fact sold for hilariously low prices to 
players on the newly created Croatian stock market, among them leaders of some of the 
veterans’ organisations.  
Another important benefit was special privileges related to social security payments to 
the unemployed. At this point the often criticised distinction between ordinary citizens and the 
branitelji became more pronounced, as unemployment was a general problem in Croatia 
during these years, and not an exclusive problem of the branitelji. Namely, all branitelji were 
entitled to a 20% higher social security payment than regular job-seekers for a period ranging 
from 104 days for those who had spent less than 3 months to 486 days for those who had 
spent more than 10 months “defending the Fatherland”. This provided the job- seekers were 
registered as such no later than 3 months after their respective date of demobilisation.  
A program for the employment of veterans was also set into motion, consisting of two 
parts. Firstly, branitelji were to be favoured by employers, since the law established that any 
private company with more than 30 employees should see to that at least 3% of these were 
branitelji or members of their families. A system of rewards was set up to speed up this 
process of reemployment; thus tax on these companies’ green figures was to be reduced by an 
amount corresponding to 3 times that of the pay check of the respective branitelj-employee. 
Employers were also to follow a rank of priority when hiring branitelji. Of highest priority 
were HRVI, followed by family members of killed branitelji, family members of missing or 
imprisoned branitelji, and finally, “ordinary” branitelji who had been demobilised and were 
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unemployed.69 The branitelji who had HRVI-status were, according to article 15, to be fully 
exempt from paying tax on their wages. However, though they sounded nice, it became 
increasingly apparent that these measures were not effective enough, as only about 10% of the 
966 branitelji who returned to work in Split-Dalmatia County in 1995 did so thanks to these 
measures. It also seemed that employers were elegantly ignoring the law’s demand of 3% 
branitelji in their staff, without having to face any consequences.70 
The second constituent part of the program for employment of the branitelji was based 
on the granting of loans to encourage self-employment, especially in the agricultural sector, 
offering the veterans affordable loans to buy equipment and other necessities to start their 
own businesses. The maximum amount of each loan was 92 500 kuna, and they were to be 
distributed and handled by the Croatian Bank for Renewal and Development (Hrvatska banka 
za obnovu i razvitak – HBOR).  
However, the implementation of these measures, which was to safeguard arguably the 
most important process of reintegration of the branitelji – through work – was mainly a 
failure. In the first two years of existence of the mentioned program for employment of 
branitelji, only about 2 000 (out of approximately 45 000) unemployed branitelji passed 
through the system of the program.71 In 1996, however, the program was ”re-launched” with 
the help of the media, which led to a massive increase in demands for the mentioned loans for 
self-employment. By autumn of the following year, after 3 657 loans had been granted 
(amounting to about 320 million kuna), the program had to be terminated as HBOR simply 
ran out of funds. 7 757 applications had thus to be refused.72 In 2004, more than 3 000 of the 3 
657 loans actually granted before HBOR’s cashbox was empty had to be refinanced with then 
Minister Jadranka Kosor guaranteeing for them, as the branitelji in question could not handle 
the repayment of the loans any longer.73  
One of the more controversial rights that this law established was that regarding 
residence. True, the demobilized branitelji and others had up until now had the privilege of 
carrying out undisturbed occupation of empty flats and houses that were property of the state, 
and which had mostly been confiscated from fleeing Serbs or former Generals of the 
Yugoslav Army (JNA). 70% of all property in possession of the state was to be earmarked for 
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branitelji; yet primarily for those with the HRVI-status. Those with a disability rate of 100% 
as well as the families of killed branitelji were to be accommodated within 2 years, those of 
90-70% as well as families of missing or imprisoned branitelji within 3 years, those of 60-
50% within 4 years, and finally, those with a lower rate of disability were to receive the keys 
to their flats within a period of 5 years. However, this part of the law was to prove perhaps the 
most difficult to realise. The building of new flats and houses, as well as the readapting of 
older ones to fit the needs of disabled veterans, would lay serious strain on the state budget, as 
well as leading to several accusations of corruption and intransparent practices both in the 
tendering and building phases. Moreover, the constant breaking of promises from successive 
governments on this matter has led to horror stories in the media of veterans surviving the 
winter in their cars or under bridges, leading thereby to a giant amount of frustration and 
agitation among the branitelji. The fact that the State was actually legally bound by a 
paragraph in the law to fulfil this excessively ambitious promise bereaved the various 
governments – be they HDZ-led or not – of a lot of credibility. In 2005, only 931 of 15 874 
waiting claims for flats were processed,74 and as this paper was reaching its conclusive phases 
in autumn 2009, there were still veterans waiting to receive their keys.  
Two benefits – or privileges, depending on 
viewpoint – were especially to cause envy among 
regular citizens. The first one of these was the 
right to vehicles. The law stated that HRVIs of 
100% disability were to be provided with vehicles 
by the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of 
Croatia (Ministartsvo obrane Republike hrvatske – 
MORH)  to be used unconditionally. HRVIs of 
70% or more were to be allowed to import cars 
without paying import taxes or customs.75 By the first reformed Law of Rights of 1997, this 
right was expanded to all branitelji, as well as to their families. By October 1998, 74 432 
approvals for importing cars had been given. According to Damir Kajin of the Democratic 
Sabor of Istria (Istarski demokratski sabor – IDS), the money the state lost on these cars could 
have opened up 15 to 20 thousand new places of work.76 Though probably exaggerating, his 
line of reasoning is difficult to disagree with, given the economical situation his country found 
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itself in at the time. In 2000, then Minister of Branitelji Ivica Pančić estimated that the 
number of imported cars had passed 130 000, on which the state had lost a potential income 
of about 400 million dollars.77 The reform of the Law of Rights which took place during his 
mandate did to a greater extent limit the rights connected to car-imports, mostly by way of 
limiting the number of cars each branitelj was allowed to import. Though Pančić did succeed 
in bringing about a certain reduction in the scope of some of the privileges the branitelji 
enjoyed through the changes to the Law of Rights adopted during his mandate, he did not 
erase any of them completely, probably out of fear of massive protests.78  
The effect of provocation of the second of these privileges, though short-lived, was 
probably even greater. As a result of the new Law of Rights of the Branitelji adopted and 
implemented by the HDZ-led government in 2005, the children of branitelji were to be given 
priority in enrolment to high schools and universities, even at the cost of better qualified and 
better performing students. This specific paragraph of the new law was, however, erased by 
high court as soon as December 2006, as it came close to causing social upheaval among 
students in the larger cities of Croatia. Its short-life span does limit its importance, yet the fact 
that a law with such a paragraph was adopted does stand as an example of the often ill-timed 
and poorly thought through politics towards the branitelji which I argue HDZ was following. 
Instead of bridging the gap between the veterans and ordinary citizens, this measure – if not 
eventually overruled – would only have succeeded in ensuring that the gap would be inherited 
by future generations. A related point was also aptly put forward by rector of the University of 
Zagreb, Aleksa Bjeliš, when he lamented that this apparent interest in the education of the 
branitelji and their children had come ten years too late.79 
Even if a lot of weight in this thesis is put on the so-called “fake” veterans, who 
exploited the system and the law described here, it is vital to keep in mind that there existed 
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and exist a great number of veterans with real sufferings and real grievances. In the early 
years of the organisations, the newspapers were full of stories of frustration and despair, with 
a clear undertone of sympathy with the veterans. “Waging war with the bureaucracy” became 
the buzz-phrase of these times. And indeed, even if the law looked nice on paper for many a 
veteran, it was the implementation of it which was one of its real Achilles heels. Firstly, it is 
obvious that the law, through its poor implementation, created a large, discontented and 
frustrated segment of the populace, whose very real grievances became a source of potential 
capital for those who wanted to gain political power froms their “cause”. Secondly, the design 
of the law enabled more “industrious” and connected individuals to earn a great deal on the 
privileges it offered, while perhaps those who were most in need of the assistance the law 
originally intended to provide were not capable of realising their rights, thus increased the 
frustration further. This unfortunate combination, catalysed by some of the mentioned 
privileges of the law which clearly brought about envy and feelings of injustice among other 
citizens, increased the gap between the branitelji and others. Thirdly, and more related to the 
“essence” of the law, it failed in practice when it came to decreasing or eliminating this gap 
by facilitating the much-needed reintegration of branitelji to society. Instead of 
unconditionally offering the privileges that it did, the law should have been specifically 
designed to facilitate such reintegration by way of the privileges. The privileges became an 
end, rather than a means.80 One grave fault of the law in this regard was that unemployment 
was soaring, while there existed no effective program to return the demobilized soldiers – 
disabled or not – to work, which is arguably the main arena for integration and contact in any 
society.81 Another grave fault was that the entire system of rights and benefits was 
administered by the state, not involving “real” non-governmental organisations and other 
citizen-founded initiatives, which clearly would have brought about points of close contact 
between veterans and ordinary citizens. Moreover, such an approach would quite clearly have 
proven far more effective when it came to finding and caring for those veterans who, perhaps 
too broken down to be able to apply for jobs or realise their lawful rights, were falling right 
through the system.82 These two faults deprived the branitelji of two of the potentially most 
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important arenas for contact with other citizens and thus society. In total, I argue that this 
contributed greatly to an increasingly large, isolated and discontent social group evolving, 
which not only became a safe and untouchable haven for corruption and criminal acts, but 
also a controllable political force which would be catastrophic to overlook. It is likely that he 
was thinking in similar lines, the then former minister of finance Borislav Škegro (HDZ), 
when he reportedly said that the Law of Rights of the Branitelji is “possibly one of the worst 
that Sabor ever brought. It stimulates idleness, interest seeking, alcoholism and the use of 
drugs, instead of giving young people the chance to work, re-socialise, and progress”.83   
 
2.3. Vague Definitions and Early Indications of ”Hyperinflation” 
In the previous section, the privileges the Law of Rights offered to demobilised soldiers was 
launched as an explanation for the dramatic increase in the number of branitelji in the post-
war years. A closely related cause is the existence of almost as many understandings of the 
definitions of the Law of Rights as there existed branitelji. If the mentioned benefits were the 
goal, then one kind of loophole through which this goal could be reached was the vague, and 
sometimes inexplicable, definitions of the law.  
The law not only established who were entitled to privileges but also established the 
grounds for a hierarchy of priority between these groups. Accordingly, any person having 
served in OSRH or in the Ministry of Interior, i.e. the Police (Ministarstvo unutarnjih poslova 
– MUP) as well as any volunteer who had participated in the “defence of the sovereignty of 
the republic of Croatia” in an “organized manner” since 30th May 1990, and had this 
confirmed by MORH or MUP, was to be legally recognized as a branitelj. The new and 
improved Law of Rights which entered force in the beginning of 1997, after the war had 
formally ended, stipulated that the latest date for possible participation was 30 June 1996, 10 
months after Operation Storm took place. Željko Kurtov of the Croatian National Party 
(Hrvatska narodna stranka – HNS) rightly wondered in Sabor with “whom Croatia was at 
war with in 1990 and the beginning of 1991”84, and could have asked the same question 
regarding the 10 months in 95 and 96 mentioned. He could also have asked about those who, 
gun in hand, defended their country on their own initiative before there was anything called 
“the sovereignty of Croatia”, and “organised” was still an empty phrase.   
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Regarding who was to be legally defined as HRVI, the law refers to the Law on the 
Protection of Military and Civil Persons with Disabilities of War.85 Accordingly, any person 
who has suffered 20% or more damage – including illness and poor health – to their organism, 
and to whom this damage was inflicted while he/she was performing tasks of defending the 
“sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia from 17th 
August 1990 to the cessation of hostilities” was eligible for HRVI-status. Again, the problem 
seems to lie in real or constructed ambiguities regarding how long the “hostilities” lasted, as 
well as how broad the definition of “defensive” tasks really was meant to be.   
 An early and, with the gift of hindsight, very apt case in point of how the vague 
definitions of the law facilitated individual manipulation was offered by Dr. Marija 
Medvidović, a member of the board of directors of HVIDRA and contact person for members 
of the organisations with regards to health and medical issues. In an interview, Medvidović 
addresses the need to clearly distinguish injuries stemming from accidents unrelated to war as 
well as civilian injuries from those directly related to armed combat. This is made difficult by 
the fact that there existed, at the time, no official regulations or laws by which one could 
precisely define military disability. Everything was in the hands of various commissions 
which employed disparaging criterions independently of each other. Further, she stated that 
60% of the members of the Split-branch of HVIDRA “got” their disability status based on 
diseases which they had already been suffering from prior to the war. Moreover, she pointed 
to the need to “distinguish between those who became disabled in the battle zone due to 
drunkenness or driving fast, and those who were injured on the front line, [since] because of 
them, other disabled and injured are not able to realize their rights”. Moreover, she stated that 
“HVIDRA will not have the authority and necessary “weight” if we don’t eliminate such 
cases”.86 The clear-sightedness of Dr. Medvidović was perhaps not appreciated by everyone, 
as she disappeared completely from the discourse after this interview.     
The broad timeframes the Law(s) operated with, as well as the many creative 
interpretations of the phrases “participating in the defence” and “organised manner” would in 
time, as we will see, prove difficult to swallow for many of those whose participation and 
contribution in the Homeland War was unquestionable, as the “hyperinflation of branitelji” 
intensified and became unmistakingly apparent. These branitelji in time began promoting a 
tighter or more complex definition, by which the branitelji would be classified and receive 
benefits to a degree which corresponded with the length and importance of their service. 
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These “true” branitelji typically marked their aversion by refusing to accept distinctions 
which were, in their opinion, handed out in every direction. One such group, the “Vipers of 
Zadar”, spoke out against the “devaluation of distinctions” which was seen as “spreading 
moral erosion in society” through their “multiplying like mushrooms in the rain”.87 Similarly, 
the Split-branch of UHVDR tried to introduce a system of gold, silver and bronze 
membership-cards, based on length of service and acclaims of heroism.88          
On the other side, the side from which the “true” branitelji wanted to distance 
themselves, were those who felt they had sacrificed substantially “on the altar of the 
Fatherland”, yet were bypassed by the definition. Thus a struggle began for them to become 
included by the law. These were, for instance, people who had served in operational 
headquarters, medical services, or the National Guard, who felt dismayed at not being found 
worthy of receiving the benefits which were enjoyed by war-reporters, radio-hosts, and even 
cooks, as they too had contributed to the “defence of the sovereignty of the republic of 
Croatia”. While the first group was fighting to secure their status, this latter group was 
fighting to hinder inflation to their status.  
 
2.4. Struggling to Keep the Numbers Down 
Unavoidably, the controversies surrounding the “inflation” of status necessarily had to 
develop into even bigger controversies, as the question of “fake” veterans became 
increasingly prevalent. As a consequence of the sheer number of veterans and thus scale of 
the alleged fraud, not to say the morally deplorable side to it, the issue had to gradually enter 
the limelight if the political discourse as the nineties waned and the new millennium dawned. 
“Fake” veterans were understood as those who had taken advantage of the unclear definitions 
of the law, or, worse, had taken to lies and bribery to achieve their statuses. In the beginning 
phase of this critical reassessment of the veterans of the Homeland war, the ones who spoke 
up were typically from their own ranks (for instance the mentioned Dr. Medvidović). As 
noted several times already, a critical approach to the veterans without at the same time 
questioning the legitimacy of the Homeland War had become impossible. Thus it was only the 
veterans themselves that, given their legitimacy deriving from the vital participation in the 
“creation of Croatia”, could begin this reassessment. Soon after, catalysed by political change, 
the politicians and the public would follow. 
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Early on in the discursive lifespan of the issue of fake veterans, HVIDRA’s Goreta 
was highly supportive of a revision of all disabled veterans, the great majority of whom were 
members of his organization. HVIDRA’s estimate in August 1996 was that out of 18 900 
disabled veterans of the Homeland War, 7 000 were fakes.89 This puts them in line with 
Mladen Borković of the Organisation of Croatian Branitelji-volunteers of the Homeland War 
(Udruga hrvatskih branitelja - dragovoljaca Domovinskog rata – UHBDDR), who estimated 
the number of fake disabled veterans to 40 %, and – looking at the branitelji as a whole, 
regarded the unofficial estimates of between 300 000 and 500 000 a “catastrophically large 
number”.90 However, contrary to these estimates, after a Commission for the Revision of 
Disability had been established and functioning for almost a year, out of 3054 reviewed cases, 
only 175, or 5,73%, were concluded to be cases of fake veterans.91 The Commission, notably, 
was led by prominent UHVDR and HDZ-member Červenko, and UHVDR was clearly critical 
of the suspicion of the veterans which was implied by the work of the commission as well as 
to the mentioned estimates of number of “fakes” by the leaders of HVIDRA. Although 
occasional incidents brought some attention to the case of “fake veterans”, little progress was 
being made towards uncovering the scale of things and prosecuting those who had received 
and granted statuses irregularly. The commission remained ostensibly unconvincing in its 
dedication, not even notably encouraged by such incidents as the arrest of several employees 
of the Commission for disability of the District office of the pensioners’ insurance fund in 
Split in August 1998, who had allegedly sold statuses of disability to anyone with enough 
financial means. An interesting testimony regarding the apparent inertia of the commission 
was to be heard from Stjepan Adanić in March 2000. Adanić was at that time former assistant 
to the Minister of Defence, and claimed to have first-hand knowledge of the commission and 
its work. According to him, had not the commission been hindered in its work, it would have 
disclosed 15-20 % of investigated cases as fake, a number which more closely resembles the 
initial estimates made by HVIDRA. Moreover, while Červenko had blamed the eventual 
discontinuation of the commission by the end of 1998 on Generals Bobetko and Ante 
Gotovina, as well as HVIDRAs new leader, Marinko Liović, Adanić had an explanation 
which refined the picture even further:  
 
                                                 
89
 ”Revizijom protiv lažnih invalida”, Slobodna Dalmacija, 28.08.1996, and ”Treba izvršiti reviziju našega 
članstva”, Slobodna Dalmacija, 11.09.1996.    
90
 ”Naša su prava – nedorečena”, Slobodna Dalmacija, 27.12.1996.  
91
 ”Istina o lažnim invalidima”, Slobodna Dalmacija, 14.10.1997.  
  45 
“(…) amongst the leaders of the government of that time a political climate was created which resulted in the 
political decision to stop the revision, even if the arguments for its continuation were more than satisfactory. The 
wrong political decision was made, something which is seen right now.”92      
 
Interestingly, this explanation for the discontinuation of the commission’s work receives 
support – retrospectively and unintended, that is – from Marinko Liović, who in an interview 
in 1998 answered that HVIDRA had demanded an end to the commission’s work, a demand 
which was supported by members of the government.93  
The timing of Adanić’s testimony was no coincidence, as it took modern Croatia’s 
first real change of government to start addressing these issues seriously. The “Father” of the 
Croatian nation had by now passed away, and with him – it seemed – some of the aura of 
sanctity surrounding the Homeland War. Minister of Veterans of the new government, Ivica 
Pančić, started his mandate on a high note, and it was not long before he was engaged in a 
verbal and often theatrical full scale media war with the branitelji, which was to last 
throughout his mandate. Pančić, himself a branitelj and refugee from Vukovar, came from the 
ranks of new Prime Minister Ivica Račan’s own party, the Social Democratic Party 
(Socijaldemokratska partija – SDP). It is likely that his own background lent him some 
authority to speak more freely on the matters pertaining to the branitelji – at least in the eyes 
of his party-fellows. “Speak freely” is perhaps to soft a phrase, though. The chair in his office 
could hardly have been warm when he started accusing 30 generals, many of them members 
of the “inner circle” of the old elite, of fraud in achieving their statuses of disability. It seemed 
a great many of these had been injured in traffic accidents, yet, all of them claimed, while in 
service.94 Pančić seemed determined to solve these cases, as well as restarting a massive 
revision of statuses to compensate for the obvious lack of coherent routines and criterions 
which had characterised the assignment of statuses thus far. The implications for those who 
had achieved their status under a different regime were obvious, and their reaction was 
furious. Moreover, Pančić put his hand in a wasp’s nest when halting almost all governmental 
support to HVIDRA95, the most powerful of the veterans organisations, claiming corruption 
and shady business was going on, while openly attacking the leader of one of the main 
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Slavonic branches of the organization, Darko Beštek, for being a “fake”.96 Yet perhaps his 
poorest move, speaking from a PR-viewpoint, was going after fake veterans among those who 
were diagnosed with PTSD. True, as mentioned, this way of achieving the wanted status was 
probably the easiest (for those cynical enough), and probably had attracted a number of 
fortune seekers.97 However, the extremely weak position of those who actually did suffer 
from such a psychological condition warrants quite a lot more tact and manner than Pančić 
seemed to be in possession of on this matter.  
At any rate, Minister Pančić’s full confrontation with the veterans unleashed a giant 
brouhaha in the media, something to which, however, the branitelji themselves also 
contributed substantially to by their patterns of reaction. Slobodna Dalmacija printed a 
reader’s letter composed by HVIDRA Split which in typical fashion viewed the revision as an 
insult to the “sanctity” of the Homeland war, while at the same time relating this to difficult 
contemporary as well as historical themes. This became the trademark of the extremely 
polarised discourse of the Račan period:  
 
“A revision of the invalidity of our generals is demanded; after the generals, you’re next. Everything that took 
place related to the defence of Our Beautiful98 must be portrayed as satanic and a dark age of our nation, and one 
should distance oneself from the struggle for a free Croatian nation, Croatian thoughts and Croatian ideas. (…) 
Our new government is competing to be the best (…) at defaming and portraying their little Croatian sons as 
war-profiteers, war-criminals (…). In the middle ages they had the inquisitions – the burning of witches. We 
have new times, the “revisions” and the Hague”.99      
 
One might justifiably pose the question if not Pančićs tactics and timing in dealing with the 
branitelji contributed strongly to the polarisation of Croatian society at the time. The left 
versus the right, World War Two versus the Homeland War, Nationalism versus socialism; all 
these recurrent Croatian themes were suddenly at the forefront again. It was no secret that a 
considerable number of veterans were highly disconcerted by the results of the elections, 
which in many eyes had brought the “Yugocommunists” back to power in a country which 
had promised never to return to “leftist terror”. Opting for full on confrontation with the 
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veterans, beginning right after the elections, the minister did contribute to souring the 
relationship between the new government and the branitelji, and thus he did contribute to 
increased political polarisation. However, one might argue that these themes mentioned above 
were bound to surface sooner or later, and that a “clearing of the air” is vital to any country 
aspiring to become a developed democracy. Still, the question remains why Pančić did not opt 
for a start more of the quiet sort, and then choose the timing and verbal ammunition for his 
battles a little more selectively. One answer to this question may be found in political 
pragmatism. The government he was member of came to power on the promise that they 
would rip up the rest of the HDZ elite, and embark on a complex reorganization of society 
which would bring back justice to the country. Therefore, one may argue, Pančić had to make 
such a “brave” move to contribute to establishing the legitimacy of the new government. If 
this is the case, then it is arguably another example of political abuse of the branitelji. 
Moreover, it is possible to argue that the holding back of funding for HVIDRA mentioned 
above was an attempt to influence the organisation and its work, thereby committing the sin 
of political manipulation of which it is HDZ that is the main perpetrator in this thesis.    
Pragmatic and cynical or just overzealous and clumsy, Pančić’s official reason for 
accusing the veterans was economic. And on this matter his line of thought was easy to 
understand, as there existed little doubt that a revision was badly needed. The state budget 
was becoming under increasing strain from the massive – and still rising – number of 
entitlements to benefits and privileges that were handed out. Former soldiers who had served 
in the war were still streaming en masse to clinics and army archives to realise their 
entitlements, while, to deteriorate the situation even further, MORH was announcing 
profound reorganisation of the army, predicting that 10 000 more personnel would have to 
leave by 2002.100  These facts were undoubtedly occupying the minister’s mind regarding 
long term prospects. When it comes to the short time prospects, the situation was becoming 
even more pressing. In an interview, Pančić claimed that 880 millions of the 1,2 billion kuna 
put aside for veterans’ pensions for the whole of 2000 had already been spent by the end of 
June, which meant that all the money for pensions would be spent by August that year. One 
does well to keep in mind that Croatia is a country whose program of social benefits occupied 
one third – or 14,5 billion kuna – of the state budget already in 1997. 101 The state had – since 
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the first adoption of the Law of Rights – been chronically short of means to fulfil the promises 
made to the branitelji and others. This at least partly explains its poor implementation, as was 
mentioned earlier. The number of branitelji, and the concurrent explosive growth in budget 
spending, had by now developed into an enormous weight for the state to carry.  
Yet there were other obvious reasons why a fundamental revision was badly needed. 
In the same interview, Pančić criticised the Law of the Branitelji for having contributed to 
increasing social differentiation among the people in general, and among the branitelji 
especially. From the minister’s viewpoint, a first important step to sort things out was to 
establish once and for all a final number of true veterans, and thereby – presumably – put the 
ongoing discussions to death.102 And, Pančić’s political orientation notwithstanding, his 
assessment of the situation, and his suggestion for a remedy, clearly had direct and indirect 
support from a great number of individual veterans as well as several organisations, ranging 
from the considerable UHBDDR to more peripheral ones, like Uzdanica 1990103. Like Pančić, 
they held the viewpoint that the “fake” veterans, many of them hiding behind the infallibility 
of the Homeland War, were seriously themselves the biggest contributors to the 
“criminalization” of the said war, and thus of the branitelji.   
 Indeed, Pančić did set his revision into motion. This was made possible by the changes 
to the Law of Rights, which were adopted in Sabor in autumn 2001. Thus, during 2002, more 
than 33 000 disabled veterans were to have their statuses reviewed to make sure they were in 
accordance with the guidelines of the new law. Each disabled veteran was to document his 
injury and service, as well as be examined by a commission of specialists in medicine and 
psychology. All disabled veterans diagnosed with PTSD were to complete a special written 
psychological test of American origin to establish whether they in fact were suffering from 
the disorder. As mentioned, this last feat was bound to create upheaval among the branitelji. It 
was massively opposed, yet on diverging grounds. One of the more understandable arguments 
was that it is unlikely that a person suffering from PTSD (and therefore, in practice, short 
concentration span) would be able to complete a written test lasting for several hours. Among 
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the more curious arguments against the test, however, was the one stemming from Branko 
Smrčak, president of the Organization for Croatian Branitelji Cured of Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder of Šibenik-Knin County. According to Smrčak, it was impossible to use the test in 
Croatia since it stems from the USA, as “USA conducted expansionist warfare, while Croatia 
only defended itself.”104 Some also expressed concern that answering truthfully on the 
questions in the test would prove incriminating and might lead to them being extradited to the 
ICTY. The last argument was in fact voiced by Pančić’s assistant, Blaženka Gogić, who had 
to leave her post as a result of the whole affair. Pančić, as usual, saw things from another 
angle. According to him, the test had been used in Croatia before, without any problems 
encountered, and the test under no circumstances could or would be used for incriminating 
purposes.105 Moreover, he rhetorically asked how it was possible that a country like Israel 
only had 2 000 registered diagnosed veterans, while Croatia at the time had 10 000.106 Pančić 
also pointed to the inconsistency that of these, 9 000 had kept their driving licenses and 3 000 
their weapon licences, a “right” which HDZ had earlier defended. According to him, PTSD 
had become an instrument for those seeking to settle their personal social situation:  
 
“A huge number of those who are being forced to leave the MoD are currently beleaguering psychiatric clinics 
(…). If they are experiencing stress then it is not stress caused by some experience from the war, but stress 
caused by them leaving the MORH (…). Apart from the 10 000 people who have already realised HRVI-status 
on such grounds, another 4 700 have filed claims (…)”.107                 
 
The necessity of such a complete revision was beyond any doubt. However, the fear it 
sparked among the “fakes”, and the humiliation and feeling of being suspected it gave rise to 
among “true” disabled veterans, produced considerable anger directed against the 
government. It is likely that this is one of the reasons why Pančić’s revision in the end came 
to nothing. The government he was part of was losing overall popularity quickly, even if 
certain positive results, such as a slight reduction of unemployment, both in general and 
among the branitelji, were being claimed. Among the main reasons of the loss of popularity, 
one should arguably note that Račan’s government had considerable remnants of the old 
HDZ-structure to wrestle with, both in Sabor and in the country’s other institutions. As a 
direct consequence of this, the government on many occasions came across as a lame duck, 
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especially in light of its initial lofty promises. It is highly likely that structures of the old elite, 
especially in MORH, were hindering Pančić and other ambitious ministers in the government 
from putting their plans into life. Pančić himself admitted this: “(…) the new law can not be 
put into action without [MORH’s] full support. Obstacles are being created in the preparation 
of its implementation by persons who, by all means, wish to obstruct the entire process.”108 
Combined with all this, the defeated HDZ of the last millennium was regrouping quickly in 
the background under its new leader Ivo Sanader, and it is highly probable that this spelt more 
pressure on Račans government. His “brave men” were about to lose both their self-declared 
war on injustice, as well as the trust of the impatient electorate. 
 Perhaps it was a desperate last-minute attempt to turn failed efforts into something 
positive, or perhaps just a dirty campaign move, as some claimed109 (or both) which formed 
the underlying rationale for Pančić’s last controversial move as Minister in autumn 2003. 
Prime Minister Račan and the entire government stood behind Pančić’s decision to publicise 
the – until now – secret register of all branitelji who had received benefits of agreeable loans 
and flats/houses since 1998 (not the “complete” register of later times, as this would demand a 
lot of work and time to put together). Račan stated that the government was obliged to inform 
the public of how the taxpayers’ money was spent.110 And, indeed, several veterans’ 
organizations were openly supportive of the plans to publish the register, as many saw this as 
an excellent way to expose “fakes” and thereby regain some of the lost sympathy from the 
public, as well as counter “inflation” of their statuses. However, the whole affair gradually 
became shaped by frustration and perhaps even vengeance, so that Račan’s “noble” rationale 
of “informing the public” was soon to seem rather hollow. The timing also – once more – 
opened up for doubts as to what the true goal was, as this was taking place right before 
elections, when society was extremely politicised, even by Croatian standards. Having been 
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blocked from exposing the proportions of fraud regarding the status of the branitelji by the 
political and juridical tricks of their opponents, who were in a symbiotic relationship with a 
large segment of the veteran population, it now seemed as if the government had decided that 
the time was ripe to rely on social control and a shocked electorate to reveal the scandal and 
expose those responsible for it. The underlying element of frustration of the act becomes even 
more probable as Pančić had, shortly before, received another of numerous death threats, yet 
this time it was directed at his family.111 However, this attempt to publicise was to prove 
futile. After conferring with legal advisers and experts, it became clear that such a move could 
not be made by the government without any legal basis whatsoever. The legal stumbling 
block consisted of existing laws regarding the protection of personal privacy, which had to be 
overcome before publishing the register, to prevent the possibility of an unprecedented wave 
of lawsuits against the state.112 The government, now in a hurry due to the pending elections, 
handed over a suggestion for an amendment to the Law of the Protection of Personal 
Information (Zakon o zaštiti osobnih podataka) to Sabor for express treatment on 18 
September. The suggested amendment would make it possible to override existing laws if in 
the interest of the wider public.113 Unsurprisingly, the suggestion was not accepted in Sabor. 
The frustration and feeling of loss must have been strong for Pančić, as he in despair stated to 
the media that he would personally put up the register on internal information boards and on 
the internet. The whole end of the giant controversy was a small computer located outside 
Pančić’s office open to everyone for the last 20 days of his office, which had the disputed 
register saved on its hard disc. The legal stumbling block remained unsolved, and was to 
become the major excuse for the following HDZ-led government to keep from publishing the 
controversial register.    
 
2.5. The “Final” Number: End of the Controversies? 
After a period of stagnation during the period of the Račan government, the number of 
branitelji was again to increase under the following government, of which the “new” HDZ 
was the spine. Immediately after assuming power, the new government took several steps to 
reverse measures introduced by the previous government, thereby reproducing their image as 
the only true protectors of the branitelji and their rights, an image which is highly likely to 
have won them a lot of votes. The controversial test to determine PTSD was annulled, and 
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Pančić’s computer was removed from the premises of the ministry. Finally, in March 2004, 
the entire controversial revision was officially abolished.114 It is tempting to speculate that this 
was a tactical move to appease the veterans’ organisations on the issue of Croatian Generals 
extradited to the ICTY, which had caused extreme political turbulence during the period of 
the Račan government (see the following chapter). After all, the decision to extradite two 
Croatian “war heroes” and the decision to stop the revision were two of the first decisions the 
new HDZ-led government made. The political turnaround with regards to the branitelji was 
fittingly symbolised by Prime Minister Sanader and the new Minister of Family, Veterans and 
Intergenerational Solidarity, Jadranka Kosor115, through the theatrical return of Darko 
Beštek’s prosthesis. As previously mentioned, Beštek was accused by Pančić for being a 
“fake”, upon which Beštek, lacking one leg, gathered a group of journalists and went to 
Pančić’s office to return his prosthesis, since he – in Bešteks line of reasoning –  was not in 
need of it, according to the minister. This episode laid the grounds for a tear filled reunion 
between Beštek and his prosthesis, witnessed by all national media, in which Jadranka Kosor 
took the opportunity to introduce herself: “This is a symbolic act by which the new Croatian 
government sends a clear message that it will work to counter injustice and return the dignity 
of the Croatian branitelji”. Subsequently, she announced that Beštek was to become one of 
her advisors on matters regarding the veterans,116 something which perhaps was no surprise to 
Beštek since his Osijek-branch of HVIDRA had openly supported Kosor, calling her the 
“ideal Minister of branitelji” even before she was assigned to the post.117 Once again, the 
times they seemed to be a-changing.  
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The new minister, Jadranka Kosor, returning Darko Beštek’s prosthesis.  
Pictures taken from Slobodna Dalmacija online (http://arhiv.slobodnadalmacija.hr/20040203/novosti04.asp).  
           
 Even if one might argue that the period under Pančić was characterised by a lot of will 
and little momentum, and that his aspirations to uncover the scale of fraud with regards to the 
statuses were unsuccessful, at least his period saw an intensive rise in general awareness of 
the public and media. The Račan government did contribute to promote a societal climate 
where one could to a larger extent question “established truths”, even if perhaps the most 
difficult themes of the recent past were tacitly overlooked, out of fear of total breakdown in 
their public support. Regarding the branitelji, this meant that the issue had now been placed 
on the agenda, and that critical voices were increasingly surfacing. It is reasonable to assume 
that the pressure stemming from this fact was an important factor influencing Kosor to create 
a complete and final register of veterans, and thus trying to end the debate regarding the 
continuing increase in their numbers.118 It is probable that the new government’s rationale 
behind this decision was that, since opening the register to the public could give rise to a 
scandal of unprecedented proportions, one should try to appease the increasing demands for 
publishing by giving the public the exact and final number of veterans who had participated in 
the war. It was a question of giving the people bread when they wanted circus, hoping that 
would end the debate. 
 And indeed, for some time after the new government stepped up, confusion and more 
or less accurate and probable estimates of the total number of Croatian branitelji did twist the 
course of the growing debate of the new millennium. The question was now how many they 
were, rather than who they were. After a few months had passed, in spring 2005, as the 
register was closing in on its completion, rumours went that the number would be 450 000. 
Several veterans’ organizations commented that the number could not possibly be higher than 
350 000, and that “housekeepers, cooks and servants” could not be regarded as branitelji.119 
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However, the coming register was mainly positively viewed among the veterans, as its 
completion would bring simplification. They would now find everything they needed in one 
place, and not have their papers and files spread over several ministries’ archives. Moreover, 
every person in the register would receive an ID-card, proving his/her being a branitelj. 
 In the middle of September 2005, the “final” number was at last published: 489 407 
branitelji had defended Croatia between 5 August 1990 and 30 June 1996. 454 174 were 
taken from the database of MORH, while 60 141 from that of MUP. 24 908 branitelji were 
subtracted from the final number due to them being listed both in the register of MORH and 
MUP. Josip Đakić, the new leader of HVIDRA, was among the few who openly stated that 
the number was realistic, while most of the organizations in their reactions to the “final” 
number were more preoccupied with the aforementioned perceived necessity of dividing the 
branitelji into combatants and non-combatants.120 And, a few months after, the veterans’ 
organisations were once more to have their way. On 1 December, the number of 437 518 
branitelji-combatants was publicized, while the rest of the initial number was branitelji in the 
field of “logistics”.121 However, this number was by no means “final” either, as the number of 
branitelji continued its steady increase of several thousand each year. The last version of the 
“final” number published before this paper was to be completed, in August 2009, was 499 
315, meaning an increase of 9 908 new branitelji since 2005. The total number of disabled 
branitelji (HRVI), which we recall was alleged to be roughly 18 000 in 1993, had by 
November 2009 reportedly grown to 45 703.122 One blogger, with a view to the unfolding 
economic recession, commented the figure thus: “500 000 branitelji…a million 
pensioners…and each day work places are being shut down…you don’t have to be a great 
economist to see where we will end”.123 
 Soon after the “final” number had been made public, however, it became apparent that 
the public was not by any means satisfied with this. On the contrary, the general temperature 
of the discourse surrounding the branitelji rose several degrees as a result of the number, 
which the majority of the opinion found hopelessly inflated. The opposition, led by SDP, 
HNS, and the Croatian Social-liberal Party (Hrvatska Socijalno-Liberalna Stranka – HSLS), 
were not prepared to give the government coalition any rest on the issue, and knew well how 
to create more upheaval. In a session in Sabor in June 2007, which centred on whether the 
Register should be an official or secret document, several voices were heard doubting the 
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criteria by which the branitelji had received their status. Zlatko Kramarić (HSLS), looking 
back at the Homeland War, stated that “with half a million branitelji we would have pushed 
through to Vienna or Istanbul, depending on which way we turned”.124 On the other side, a 
small in number (since by now, HDZ was the only party in Sabor which refused publication 
of the Register) but powerful chain of politicians and veterans’ organizations centred around 
HVIDRA, its leader and Sabor-representative for HDZ, Josip Đakić, and minister and now 
vice-president Jadranka Kosor, were insisting on the aforementioned juridical details of 
“personal privacy” which accordingly prevented official insight into the Register. This seems 
somewhat strange as, we recall, both HDZ and HVIDRA has on many occasions, mainly 
before 2000, openly admitted that “fake” disabled branitelji is a large problem in Croatia, and 
that a revision is badly needed. To refresh earlier mentioned facts, the leadership of HVIDRA 
officially estimated in 1996 that of almost 20 000 disabled veterans, 7 000 were “fake”,125 and 
during a session in Sabor that same year, Jadranka Kosor acknowledged the scale and 
graveness of the problem of “fakes”.126 Once again, the cause for this turnaround should be 
looked for in the ICTY-issue. As will be described in details in the next chapter, it was 
politically unavoidable to “make peace” with the veterans’ organisations on the issue, which, 
after all, had created numerous crises for the previous government. If the whole fraud was 
even close to the scale which was hinted at by critics and analysts, the veterans’ organisations, 
or more precisely, their leaders, probably accepted to lay low on the ICTY issue if the dirty 
closet cleanout that the revision might have become, did not materialise. The irony of it all 
was not lost on the oppositional weekly Nacional, which reported that the entire Register, 
which was kept from the Croatian public, was actually in the hands of the Austrian bank Erste 
Invest, which was administering the Fund of the Croatian Branitelji of the Homeland War and 
Members of their Families. Moreover, Nacional speculated that the financial consequences of 
the high and increasing number of branitelji might be a rise in annual related costs as a result 
of this from 4.8 billion kuna in 2007 to over 6 billion sometime in the near future.127 Former 
minister Pančić stated that:  
 
“People who did not spend a day at the front have received status as branitelj. The number of 489 000 is 
degrading real warriors, who, as a consequence, will receive a lot less financial means than they are entitled to. 
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Another problem lies in the politics of the current government, which is seeking to solve the problems of the 
branitelji by sending 35-year olds into retirement.” 
  
The article was but one of many highly critical features directed at the government in 
relation to the way they were handling the questions of the branitelji, something which 
portended that this question would actually be one of the main issues of the election campaign 
of the local elections of 2007. It is highly questionable whether a new round of pre-electoral 
politicisation of the branitelji did them any good. The discourse was reaching its boiling 
point, with SDP and several other smaller parties supporting publication, while HDZ was 
against it. Again, the issue was the “dignity” of the branitelj, and therefore, the “dignity” of 
the Homeland war itself.128 Yet, even if this probably temporarily caused more suspicion and 
agitation between the branitelj and the citizen, it is difficult to disagree that a complete 
opening up of the Register combined with a systematic withdrawal of all undeserved statuses 
in all probability would lead to an improvement of the image of the branitelj, as well as 
removing a lot of related tension from the discourse and society as a whole. 
 However, the actual development on the issue ends here. The last few years have 
witnessed, as noted, the continuation of the general increase in the numbers of branitelji, as 
well as the continuation of the politics of denying transparency regarding the Register of the 
branitelji. The HDZ-led government has instigated certain steps allegedly meant to disclose 
and counter the production of “fake” statuses, going after doctors and specialists who have 
been diagnosing veterans. This is interesting only because it implies that – once again – even 
HDZ admits that fraud has taken place. Overall, it is safe to say that these steps, better known 
under their operational names, “Dijagnoza 1” and Dijagnoza 2”, gave the impression of being 
rather whimsically implemented, often in concurrence with the release of a new European 
Union progress report on corruption in the country, or heated public debates on the matter. 
Afterwards, the momentum was quickly lost, without one single “fake” branitelj ever being 
charged. Several organisations, all of which seem to be HDZ-loyal through their leaders, with 
HVIDRA up front, is highly supportive of the government policy of refusing publication and 
revision of the Register. The rationale for the refusal is aligned with that of Kosor and HDZ, 
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namely that it will harm the right to privacy and general welfare of the veterans, and that only 
when all the organizations agree upon publication will it actually be able to take place. HDZ 
and Kosor continued their image-building as the saviours of the branitelji, refusing to “join 
the prosecution”.129 Some, like Đakić, have even stated that publication will lead to new 
indictments from ICTY, and it therefore is not in the interest of the branitelji.130 At the same 
time, however, it is vital to stress that a plethora of the veterans’ organisations of Croatia 
actually supports publication and revision. This has even led some organisations to announce 
their members’ backgrounds voluntarily. Even several local branches of HVIDRA (for 
instance HVIDRA Bjelovar), are clearly in opposition to their leaders on the matter, and 
support transparency.131 Even President Stjepan Mesić publicly described it as “probable” that 
the government was knowingly giving shelter to “fake” veterans by refusing to publicise the 
Register.132          
The path chosen by the government and the most politically influential – or influenced 
– organisations on this matter seems indeed to bring about a continuation of the air of 
intransigency and suspicion which to such an extent sours the relationship between the 
branitelj and the ordinary citizen. It also upholds the by now established and very frequently 
heard conception in Croatian society that HDZ has been overtly and knowingly abusing the 
sufferings of the branitelj to gain power and important allies, as well as financial benefits for 
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3.1. Early Demonstrations  
The previous chapter entails the claim that several of the veterans’ organisations were 
profoundly influenced by HDZ through their leaders. This, however, does not mean that they 
have always tacitly accepted government policy on the branitelji. As it quickly became 
apparent that the Law of Rights, or its implementation, did not meet the demands of the 
veterans to a satisfactory extent, utterances of discontent and critique against the government 
who was administering the law were increasingly heard, albeit without any direct challenging 
of the government’s mandate. Early leaders, like Jurković and Goreta, were highly visible in 
the discourse, calling for improvement and better implementation on behalf of their members, 
and there was not always much that did resemble a hidden cooperation except for the fact that 
several of the leaders of HVIDRA, UHVDR and other organisations were also members of 
HDZ and representing the party in Sabor. At the same time, however, there was no form of 
open conflict going on, as basically all critique and demands of the branitelj – some of them 
aired when the war was still officially being fought –  were seemingly answered by consent 
and understanding by the policy makers, which at that time meant different people within the 
HDZ. Thus this period is perhaps best summarily described as one of cooperation and 
agreement between the veterans and the government, while at the same time there were 
numerous indications, vented through the media, that the veterans were not satisfied with their 
position in society and the implementation of the system of benefits which was made 
available to them on paper by the Law of Rights.    
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 It was with the rise of Marinko Liović to the position as leader of HVIDRA in the first 
half of 1996 that things seemingly took a turn in the direction of open conflict, even if Liović, 
like all HVIDRA leaders have been, was a HDZ-member. Liović made himself noticed 
frequently in the discourse, for instance by “jokingly” delivering derogatory remarks about 
women, Serbs and Jews. Aaccording to one source, he stated that “the [ICTY] tribunal in The 
Hague was created by freemasons and Jews”.133 It was, however, by calling for and taking 
part in the organisation of the first considerable “airing out” of the grievances of the branitelji 
at St. Mark’s Square in Zagreb on 15 September 1996, that Liović truly marked his entrance 
onto the political scene. The demonstrations appeared to be well planned, and the warnings – 
or threats – that preceded them were plentiful. As early as in July that year, Liović warned 
that demonstrations would take place unless HVIDRA’s demands for a better position for its 
members were fulfilled, and that possibly the demonstrations would mark the beginning of a 
hunger strike that would last until his organisation had achieved this goal. Further, he 
mentioned that the leading figures of HVIDRA were considering registering as political 
candidates for the next elections, while at the same time stressing that, in case this plan was 
realised, they would be independent candidates – “We don’t want to be anyone’s extended 
arm”.134 The period in early autumn, with the demonstrations closing in, was marked by an 
increasingly agitated Liović and HVIDRA, who raised the temperature of the discourse by 
several degrees with harsh rhetoric, such as speaking of the “shame” of the government and 
calling for a “destruction of this bureaucracy”, while his colleague, Mario Filipi, stressed that 
the coming protests “were going to be remembered.”135 In one interview, however, Liović 
somewhat moderated his frontal attack on the government, by calling then Minister of 
Defence Gojko Šušak, Vice President of Parliament Jadranka Kosor, and Vice President of 
the Government Ljerka Mintas-Hodak “exceptions”. 136 
These “exceptions” gradually became part of an emerging pattern, as considerable 
behind-the-scenes mobilisation was taking place, thus bringing greater nuance to this initial 
picture of “veterans against the government”.  Prior to the demonstrations, speculations run 
wide that Šušak was the real “master of puppets” behind HVIDRA’s thoroughly announced 
demonstrations, and that the real aim was to gain moving space for the extreme right fraction 
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of HDZ by removing Prime Minister Zlatko Mateša.137 According to one source, Šušak 
“generously sponsored demonstrations against himself by paying for 50 buses and meals for 
the protesters. No one was amazed when a demonstration against the government turned into 
support for Gojko Šušak and the rightist fraction of HDZ”.138 Others claimed that most of the 
demonstrators were actually employees of MORH.139  Interestingly, President Tuđman’s 
behavioural pattern in the last days before the demonstrations did indeed seem to signalise 
that something was going on “behind the scenes”. In a meeting with the Zagreb branch of 
HVIDRA the day before the demonstration, he delivered a speech which – had one replaced 
the nationalist pretext with the socialist one – probably would have made Tito himself 
envious.140 Tuđman directed the attention of the listeners towards conspiring internal and 
external “enemies of the state”, referring to a “Yugocommunistic residue” present in all 
political parties, which “by all means wish to destabilise the Croatian government” by way of 
“exploiting the problems of the disabled”.141 The demonstrations, which gathered around 
4000 branitelji, yet very few “ordinary” citizens, despite calls for their participation, also saw 
verbal assurances from both Kosor and Šušak of the dedication of the president in solving the 
issues concerning the veterans, while putting the blame on unnamed bureaucrats.142  
This apparent absurdity of the power structure protesting against itself may be 
interpreted as a well directed stunt to divert the grievances of the branitelji away from the 
party in power, while perhaps at the same time facilitating internal shuffling within the party. 
As one analyst was later to somewhat harshly comment, “in the time of the Tuđman-Šušak 
governance there was no overt need for the politicisation of HVIDRA, since nationalistic 
radicalism was built into the foundations of national politics”.143 Rather than a protest against 
the government, it was a case of clever manoeuvring by political forces on the highest level, 
yet with the vital assistance of the “insider” Marinko Liović, in what was the first prime 
example of political manipulation of the branitelji and their “cause” As others have claimed, 
this “started a chain reaction, and other ministers reportedly rushed to pay compliments to the 
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veterans and to express support for their demands”.144 However, while the events that 
culminated with the demonstration at St. Marc’s Square gave a clear impression of the power 
latent in the cause of the branitelji, one still lacked a “trigger” for the full release of its 
potentiality. This “trigger”, however, was to present itself as the new millennium dawned, and 
a new government grabbed power in Croatia. And with it came cooperation with the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.     
 
3.2. The “Power” of the Organisations Reaches its Peak  
The death of President Tuđman, the “father of the Croatian nation”, in late fall 1999 left a 
waning HDZ with no “strong man” around who could muster badly needed support. An 
increasingly economically broken down and agitated public, mobilised by non-governmental 
organisations and an opposition with wind in their sails, meant the end of a long period of 
HDZ dominating Croatia. However, as we shall see in this subsection, the fact that HDZ, by 
far the largest and most influential right wing party, was too weak to remain in government, 
did not mean that right wing forces were not still to be reckoned with in politics and in society 
in general. As the new centre-left government made it clear that cooperation with the ICTY 
was the only way out of the increasingly isolated position in which Croatia found itself. This 
was largely caused by the previous government’s refusal to compromise the “sanctity” of the 
Homeland War through such cooperation.  The right wing parties, with HDZ as the most 
powerful, were able to realise the full political potential of the “cause” of the branitelji. The 
aim was to topple the new government and regain political control over Croatia.      
As was discussed in the previous chapter, the new government was perceived and 
portrayed by HDZ and other political opponents as the “other”, i.e. the “Yugocommunists”. 
HDZ and the entire narrative of the modern Croatian state, and thus the branitelji, as 
constructors of that state, were in opposition to them. However, as has been stressed several 
times, the veterans are not the homogenous group that politicians and the media like to 
portray them as, and there is little doubt that many of the smaller organisations as well as 
many individual members of the larger organisations were ready to give the new government 
a chance – if not out of sympathy with the perceived ideology of the new government, then 
perhaps out of disillusionment brought on by the previous one. Indeed, a considerable number 
of veterans are likely to have voted against HDZ at the elections. Even if the more 
nationalistically oriented were truly convinced that the politics of new government would 
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compromise the “dignity of the Homeland War”, it follows that there must have been other 
reasons and dynamics underlying what was to become the massive mobilisation of veterans 
on the ICTY issue. Firstly, the much elaborated “war” on the branitelji of the new Minister, 
Ivica Pančić, accompanied the ascent of the ICTY to the “front lines” of the discourse. His 
questioning the veracity of the status of a large number of veterans, as well as his decisive cut 
in funding to their organisations, is likely to have convinced a number of veterans that his 
government was really out to get them. Thus it is likely that there were veterans who sincerely 
believed that the ICTY was being used as an instrument against them. There were also those 
who became nervous by the governments promise to fight corruption – not only through the 
revision of statuses, but also by the thorough review of the organisations’ financial 
portfolios.145 Those likely to be made nervous by this were also most likely in a high ranking 
position, which enabled them to mobilise the members of their respective organisations. 
These were probably underlying factors which contributed to the massive mobilisation of 
branitelji against the ICTY and the government.   
Then, turning to the ICTY-issue itself, its “genius” as a mobilising factor was the fact 
that it appealed to veterans and ordinary citizens alike. For the branitelji, as has already been 
discussed extensively, the issue had a burning closeness to it, given their direct participation, 
or even: given the substantial sacrifice that they lay down in the name of their country. 
However, the appeal was also strong to many outside the segment of right wing hardliners, 
who had but a strong patriotic sympathy with their country, something not at all uncommon in 
a young state with a recent violent history. Scepticism stemming from direct experiences with 
international organisations and their representatives before, during and after the war, 
combined with the collective historical perception by Croats as being “a small country bullied 
by great powers”, led to an atmosphere where it was unacceptable that a foreign, “political” 
judiciary was to judge the acts of Croatian branitelji. The fact that ICTY in many ways 
pursued what has been perceived in Croatia as a policy of levelling guilt, first and foremost 
probably to prove its unbiased vantage point had quite the opposite effect in Croatia. Most of 
the worst perpetrators of the Serb “enemy” were still at large, while demands to Croatia were 
perceived as increasing, something which was taken as further proof by propagandists that an 
international anti-Croat conspiracy was in the brewing. Moreover, the connection between a 
much needed development of the rule of law and the adherence to international obligations 
were not obvious to everyone, following a long period of authoritarianism where the concept 
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of rule of law was a rather hollow one. 146 An excerpt from a press release by UHBDDR 
serves as elaboration: 
 
“The [ICTY] has from the beginning been a political instrument and an instrument for pressure of international 
powers with which one wishes to level guilt and hide the responsibility of Western powers for the crimes 
committed by Milošević (…). In the struggle for biological persistence, in a justified war the Croatian nation 
created its Homeland by blood. In the naivety of our politics we welcomed the establishment of the court in the 
Hague, believing that designers and executors of war crimes would be held responsible by it. Today, only Croats 
are in The Hague (…) Enough is enough! (…) don’t force us to, now in 1999, continue what we started in 1990. 
Today, we are older, more experienced, less naïve while equally adamant in our struggle for Croatia – as well as 
a lot better armed.”147        
  
A survey from September 2002, when the controversies were at their peak, indicated that as 
much as 71% of the populace was against the indictments.148 One may establish that, in the 
initial phases of the controversies regarding Croatia and the ICTY, there was some sort of 
merging of interests between the branitelji and popular opinion, though the latter was 
probably less zealous and vocal in their grievances – at least viewed over time. This brought 
the ICTY up as the ideal gathering point for anger directed at the new government, something 
which HDZ and other parties of the far right took advantage of. 149 Vital to the realisation of 
the full potential of the ICTY issue was the “collectivisation” of guilt, i.e. the promoting of 
the notion that the ICTY sentences and indictments were against the Croatian people, and not 
against individual perpetrators. By adopting this tactic, those who were bound to scream the 
loudest against the “criminalisation of the Homeland War” in fact became its biggest 
contributors.    
The turbulent period of the new government had its prelude in the sentencing of 
General Tihomir Blaškić to 45 years in prison by the ICTY in March 2000. Massive outburst 
of street protests on the issue took place in front of the US Embassy in Zagreb, yet also in 
Herzegovina, in places like Mostar and Kiseljak, where local branches of organisations like 
UHDDR and HVIDRA were visited and encouraged by their central leaders.150 The sentence 
was interpreted by many as the “criminalisation of the Croatian nation and all participants of 
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the Homeland War, and a political judgement of all Croats” 151, and it brought about the first 
of several political crises on the issue. The new government now found itself between a rock 
and a hard place. Namely, international demands were impossible to disregard any longer, 
should Croatia be pulled out of isolation and economic underperformance. The nationalistic 
opposition and the veterans’ organisations, however, by playing the “collective judgement”-
card, made it quite clear that they would not accept such cooperation, if it meant challenging 
the established truths about the Homeland War. To a wide extent, the veterans’ organisations 
actually, according to the interpretation of Sharon Fisher152, succeeded to establish and legally 
cement the “sanctity” of the Homeland War through the adoption of the Declaration of the 
Homeland War (Deklaracija o Domovinskom ratu) in Sabor in October 2000. However, by 
also introducing the principle of individual accountability and guilt, the Račan government 
managed to open some space for political manoeuvring on the ICTY issue, even if this 
principle was at the time a far cry from practically realisable, taking public opinion into 
consideration. Still, following Fisher to some extent, the adoption of the Declaration is indeed 
possible to interpret as an indication of the power of the veterans’ organisations, as it is 
obviously drafted under pressure from such groups, something which the wording of the 
document speaks clearly of.       
However, as summer and the tourist season came closer, it became apparent that the 
protests were about to become more “complex”. Namely, alongside street protests, Liović and 
HVIDRA were reportedly preparing to sabotage the coming tourist season by methods which 
were to provoke strong public reactions. According to the weekly Globus, HVIDRA would 
dynamite bridges and other infrastructural weak spots to prevent tourists from successfully 
entering or travelling within the country. The part on using explosives was quickly disclaimed 
by Liović, who stated that what he really meant was that these spots, including entry points at 
the border, were to be blocked physically by the members of HVIDRA.153 Yet details on 
method were hardly the point. The timing of these threats was extremely poor, as Croatia was 
in desperate need of the economic boost of a successful summer tourist season. According to 
one poll, close to 90% of all Croats disapproved of Liović’s threats.154 Moreover, bearing in 
mind the previous chapter, these events were taking place parallel to the “war” on “fake” 
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branitelji instigated by Minister Pančić, something which undeniably contributed to parallel 
negative PR for the veterans. Obviously quickly recognising the possible negative outcomes 
of his statements, and probably also pressed by members of his own organisation, who were 
by no means united behind him, Liović “apologised to the Croatian people”.155 Yet the 
damage was probably already done. Even if the tourist season went by free of incidents, the 
early autumn saw the assassination of ICTY crown witness Milan Levar, something which 
once again brought back public fear of national terrorism and the destruction of Croatia’s 
reputation as a safe and friendly tourist destination. Though there is nothing to substantiate 
that veterans were involved, there undeniably was a clear anti-ICTY message underlying the 
militant-terroristic assassination, which brought about strong public aversion and horror. This 
aversion was also likely to strike the branitelji indirectly, as they were becoming more and 
more associated with quasi-militant methods in opposing the ICTY and the Račan 
government. Thus, while the self assurance underlying the threats of national sabotage was 
indicating that the realised power lying in the alignment between veterans and politics was 
about to reach its peak, these incidents were also anticipating what was to put an end to that 
power, namely the destruction of the popular image of the branitelji.  
On 11 February 2001, the ancient city centre of the Dalmatian harbour town of Split, 
Croatia’s second largest, was filled to the brim with somewhere between 100 and  150 
thousand agitated protesters. Furious slogans and emotional appeals resonated against the 
antique walls of roman emperor Diocletian’s palace, while old women and little children 
wept, shouting out their frustration with the government and the ICTY. The pretext for this 
enormous display of discontent was the indictment against General Mirko Norac for his 
alleged acts of war crimes during the Homeland War, and rumours about his impending 
extradition to The Hague.156 This instigated massive protests all over the country, the one in 
Split being by far the largest.  
 
“You will not judge the legends of the Homeland war! Mesić and Račan seem to want Croatia to kneel 
before the Serbs and beg for their forgiveness. (…) Judging Norac is judging Croatia’s freedom, and 
Norac’s freedom is Croatia’s freedom. As long as we, the creators of the country of Croatia, are alive, 
Norac will not be judged.”157 
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These were the words of Mirko Čondić, disabled colonel of the Croatian Army and head of 
the organisation Central Headquarters for the Defence of the Dignity of the Homeland War 
(Središnji stožer za zaštitu digniteta Domovinskog rata – from now on referred to as the 
CHQ). Aroused by the energetic cheering of the crowd, he went on to call for the resignation 
of the new government and the arranging of early elections.158 Of the speakers, 
representatives of veterans’ organisations were among the fiercest, naming Račan and his 
government “traitors” and “communists”, as well as exclaiming poorly veiled threats to topple 
the government, since “all of Croatia’s army is here”.159  Not surprisingly, HDZ officials were 
well represented among the more active participants, most notably among them future Prime 
Minister Ivo Sanader, who demanded the resignation of the government, and stated that Mesić 
and Račan “do not have the moral right to accuse the legends of the Homeland war”.160 This 
“moral right” Sanader himself presumably had, since he started his term in 2003 by 
extraditing two other “national heroes” to The Hague.  
The CHQ, which was established at roughly the same time as the fall from power of 
HDZ, is perhaps best viewed as an umbrella organization encompassing various veterans’ and 
other organisations, and bringing these in close contact with bureaucrats of MORH, army 
officers, profiled HDZ party members, and other right-oriented groups which had been part of 
the Tuđman elite. Occasional support was also mustered from, among others, high-ranking 
clergy of the Croatian Catholic Church and the football club Hajduk Split. Moreover, 
powerful HDZ-loyal groupings within the Croatian intelligence service (Hrvatska izvještajna 
služba – HIS), or better yet, remnants of Tuđman’s secret police, the Service for the 
Protection of the Constitutional System (Služba za zaštitu ustavnog poretka – SZUP), were on 
occasions seen at sites of chaos and violence during Račans mandate, seemingly directing and 
instructing bullies and vandals.161 In other words, the CHQ was nothing less than a broad right 
wing interest group with the main aim of bringing down the government, thereby regaining 
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the influential positions of right wing hardliners in society.162 The branitelji were utilised as 
instruments to realise this aim. Yet it was those in the background who were “pulling the 
strings” that represented the true danger to the young democracy. The CHQ’s ability to 
effectively organise and coordinate actions like the demonstrations in Split, as well as the 
financial resources such “operations” demand, speaks volumes of what kind of alliance of 
power lurked underneath.163 “Synchronisation rather than spontaneity”164 was the trademark 
of actions involving the CHQ, and the sheer display of power that the demonstrations in Split 
was, has led many analysts to align themselves with politicians of the then government in 
speculating that the protests in Split were really a coup d’ etat in the brewing.165 The 
democratically elected government, as well as, presumably, a large number of those who 
voted in favour of it, was severely shaken. 
Yet it was by no means the last spectacular incident directed by the CHQ, even if the 
“success” of Split would prove difficult to repeat in the following months, and demonstrations 
and protests were arranged with varying luck and support. This varying degree of success, 
however, was a trademark of the actions of CHQ. For instance, as early as in November 2000, 
the CHQ arranged protests against the EU during a summit of “Western Balkan” states, 
strongly opposing the connotation between Croatia and the Balkans in this newly and 
“diplomatically” constructed region. In this, they were following HDZ closely, adopting their 
rhetoric in detail.166 Perhaps Croatia had become so “European” over the last ten years that 
she had even adopted her prejudice, and thus the CHQ refused to be denoted with this 
“pejorative” term. A more likely explanation, however, is the understanding of the term in the 
specifically Croatian nationalist reason, which is more in the line of “Communism”, 
“Yugoslavia”, or even better, “Yugocommunism”. This is ever the more likely, as another one 
of the issues “bothering” the protesters was the presence at the summit of Yugoslav premier 
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Vojislav Koštunica, “as long as he has not apologised for the aggression on Croatia”.167 The 
demonstrations, despite the fierce rhetoric and attempts to mobilise protesters by promising 
free transport168, was a failure, as only 500 protesters showed up.169 Other demonstrations the 
CHQ was involved in, like the ones against the arrival of ICTY investigators in Knin to 
exhume alleged victims of Croatian war crimes, were also moderately successful, attracting 
only a few hundred protesters even in this war torn city of the Dalmatian hinterland.  
               
 
Demonstrations in Zagreb, 20.10.2001. Picture taken from the front page of Vjesnik, 21.10.2001 
 
Parallel to the events in Knin, however, another large demonstration took place in 
Split, attracting some 20 000 demonstrators, this time against the government’s alleged 
removal of HDZ-loyal journalists and editors in the management of Slobodna Dalmacija. The 
attempt at wringing this one time star among Yugoslav newspapers from the control of the 
remnants of the “Tuđman elite” provoked furious reactions, and the demonstrations must be 
termed a “success” measured against the aim of the CHQ. However, this demonstration 
portended a sharp downwards turn in the standards of behaviour of the demonstrators, as 
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slogans as “Račan you thief!” and the popular “Mesić you Gypsy!” were frequently heard 
among other more generally unfavourable comments on the mentioned politicians’ 
mothers.170 Such slogans and behaviour was to contribute to turning the public against the 
CHQ and therefore the branitelji, especially as the rhetoric reached a new, unprecedented 
bottom in 2002, when grave threats became mixed with the foul language.  
After Split, another two successful actions followed: The demonstrations at Ban 
Jelačić’s square in Zagreb in October 2001 as well as the barricading of the home of the 
ICTY-indicted General Janko Bobetko a year after. The first attracted some 13-14 000 
protesters, mainly from Dalmatia, something which at any rate must have been a 
disappointment to the organisers, as they were projecting a “repetition of Split” in the days 
preceding the protests.171 Again, there was no attempt at hiding the fact that the goal of the 
demonstrations was early elections, as this was both stated by Čondić172 and appeared among 
the “demands” of the CHQ, which were read out loud during the protests. Among other 
“demands” were the withdrawal of the arrest order on General Gotovina and the reversing of 
the implementation of the new Law of Rights of the Branitelji, which had been formulated 
anew by Pančić and the government.  
Then, as demands were put forward by the ICTY to extradite Bobetko in September 
2002, his house in Zagreb was symbolically surrounded by CHQ-mobilised generals, 
representatives of HDZ and veterans organizations for more than a month, who together 
vowed to “defend him” against this government which “only meets the conditions of Carla del 
Ponte and putrid Europe, like the communists who were once the vassals of Belgrade”. 
Among those present were Jadranka Kosor, Vladimir Šeks (member of HDZ and UHDDR), 
General Ljubo Ćesić Rojs (HDZ), as well as Ante Kotromanović, famous for his fierce anti-
government speech at the Sinjska Alka of 2001.173 This was perhaps the last of the successful 
actions of the CHQ and the veterans – from their point of view, as it found a new way of 
depicting the solidarity and persistence with which the veterans “were looking after each 
other”. Meanwhile, the government was beginning to show increasing signs of ICTY-fatigue, 
and had started to drag its feet on the new indictments, like the one against Bobetko, 
something which was taken as another proof of the “success” of the CHQ.    
With the events described here, the inherit power in the “cause” of the branitelji was 
realised and displayed to the maximum. The government was struggling hard from one ICTY-
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related crisis to another, spending all the energy saved for the battle against corruption and the 
“cleaning out” of the HDZ influence which to such an extent dominated society. Yet, as it has 
hopefully become clear, these events also laid the premises for what was to be the diminishing 
of the image of the branitelji. The public, who initially to some extent followed the critique 
against ICTY, were becoming increasingly tired of organised chaos, insults and hate speech 
against politicians they themselves had elected for office. The tactic of “collectivisation” that 
the anti-ICTY movement was utilising had another dimension to it as well, namely the claim 
of its most vocal perpetrators to be representing “the voice of the Croatian nation and all 
citizens of Croatia”174 when calling for the resignation of the government, selectively 
forgetting that it was placed there by the people. The moral support that the branitelji had 
initially enjoyed on the ICTY-issue was becoming seriously over-stretched by the fact that it 
was utilised to protests against a wide array of ideologically “tainted” issues, not all of which 
were very important to the average citizen. Alongside the government, the public were also 
beginning to struggle under ICTY-fatigue. A few unfortunate events were about to incur the 
failing support of the public giving rise to an outright lack of patience with the organisations 
of the branitelji.   
 
3.3. The Second “Log Revolution”  
On March 24 2003, a crowd of about 500 had gathered outside the court in Rijeka to await the 
sentence of the trial against the “Gospić Group”, of which General Mirko Norac was part, for 
alleged war crimes committed during operations Flash (Bljesak) and Storm. His colleagues 
from the Alka Society of Sinj had allegedly for several days arranged gatherings for the 
awaiting of the acquitted general, generously sponsored by the Mayor of Sinj Mate Jukić 
(HDZ).175 However, as news of the sentence of Norac to 12 years in prison spread through the 
crowd like a Dalmatian forest fire, the crowd allegedly so convinced of his innocence quickly 
broke down into frustration, and “through their tears (…) sang “hey Ivica and Stipe, the black 
crows will eat you”, while the members of the Alka Society were wiping away their tears with 
the Croatian flag”.176 Subsequently, the protesters, headed by Čondić, boarded a number of 
buses and headed for the main town of Norac’s home district, Sinj, where nightfall saw 1 500-
2 000 protesters blocking the main road to Zagreb, which at that time ran right through the 
centre of town. Many ordinary citizens of Sinj reportedly joined the branitelji in marking their 
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aversion with the sentence and expressing solidarity with Norac. Similar actions were 
coordinated in nearby Trilj, as well as in Kaštela, where the airport of Split is located.177 It 
seemed that the method Liović had “introduced” as a possible measure in 2000, was now 
being put into effect by his successor, Damir Varaždinec178, alongside Čondić’s CHQ and 
other veterans’ organisations. This time, the organisers among the branitelji had obviously 
disregarded the negative signals Liović had received three years earlier, and vowed to keep up 
their efforts continuously by announcing new actions in the coming days.  
However, the day after only saw around 30 protesters in the Sinj area, who were not 
enough to block the road successfully.179 A similar action in Split on the same day was also 
only moderately successful; 40 protesters attempted twice to stage a blockade, but had to give 
up when they, with the police present, realised their faltering support, which obviously had 
not been helped by visible promotional material in large areas of the town.180 Yet the worst 
was still to come. At a protest meeting in Trilj on March 26, Dražen Pavlović, leader of 
HVIDRA Sinj, delivered his infamous speech in which he wished “that Račan and Mesić 
would soon join Ɖinđić for breakfast”. Zoran Ɖinđić, the former Serbian premier, had 
recently been assassinated in Belgrade by forces of the underworld in cooperation with 
political opponents, and Pavlović’s statement was interpreted as nothing less than a direct 
death threat and call for assassination of Croatia’s prime minister and president. Even 
Varaždinec and Čondić, neither of whom seemed to have really understood the power of the 
emotions they were trying to control, seemed “shocked” by Pavlović’s speech. Račan, 
however, was not. His reaction was to point to the contradictory reasons for the protests; after 
all, Norac had been tried in Croatia and not extradited to The Hague, and the demonstrators 
were really attacking their own court, even if the proceedings were not even completed as the 
sentence was to be appealed to the supreme court.181 
Then, the day after Pavlović’s speech, a nation wide campaign of roadblocks was 
initialised by CHQ and HVIDRA. The specific connotations such campaigns have in the 
Croatian “collective memory” have to some extent been discussed, yet one vital aspect still 
deserves to be mentioned. Using roadblocks was the method by which the Serbian rebels of 
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the Krajina “cut off” this region from the rest of Croatia in 1990, which marked the beginning 
of the events which culminated in the Homeland War. The Serb rebels chopped down trees 
and used the logs to block roads, thereby leading to the start of the war in Croatia being 
remembered as the “Log Revolution (Balvan revolucija)”. This, I argue, is a vital component 
in the understanding of what constituted the “turning point” of the general support of the 
actions of the branitelji, as well as the catalyst in the destruction of their popular image. The 
road blocks, Pavlović’s threats, the insults directed at the democratically elected government, 
and TV images of thousands of protesters, interplayed with each other to create a threatening 
atmosphere resonating with dark memories.  
This had a strongly alienating effect on the way the public related to the branitelji. This fact 
was by now beginning to dawn on several prominent members of HVIDRA and other 
participating organisations, who were now listening to signals from the public as well as a 
number of their own members. They started to show open opposition to such actions, which 
led to internal discord, especially in HVIDRA. Indeed, even Norac himself, it was rumoured, 
was opposing the actions which were being implemented in his name. Several local branches 
of HVIDRA failed to mobilise their own members, and the number of less than 2 000 
HVIDRA-members participating in the nation wide campaign is by no means impressive, 
given the 33 000 members of this organisation at the time.182 The protesters were becoming 
marginal, even among “their own”.  
In the following days, the frenetic manoeuvring in the media of Varaždinec and 
Čondić consolidated the impression that they were aware of the detrimental effects that their 
“loss of control” over the protests had led to. Varaždinec “apologised” for the roadblocks to 
the citizens, but refused to take any blame for Pavlović’s ill-timed threat183, while Čondić 
claimed to have been deliberately misinterpreted by the media, who according to him were 
acting on orders from President Mesić and Prime Minister Račan. He therefore announced 
lawsuits against – among other – both the president and the prime minister, for “threats, 
spreading of misinformation, misleading the public, and libel directed at the CHQ”. 
Moreover, Čondić corrected that the real reasons for the protests had not been the “sentence” 
of Norac, but the fact that the court was subjected to pressure from the government.184 
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3.4. The “Quiet” Return to Power of the HDZ 
In the background, as ever, political manoeuvring was taking place. The “cause” of the 
branitelji, parallel to it losing its popular support and understanding, was about to be pushed 
further into the margins of the political spectre of Croatia. As HDZ under Sanader was 
undergoing what was ostensibly a change towards a more moderate, “European” stance, the 
party gradually developed the need to distance itself from the extreme turn the actions of the 
veterans’ organisations had taken, especially as a return to power was imminent. Though the 
mobilisation of the veterans against the government was supported by several parties of the 
right, HDZ had gained the most, since it was the largest, most popular, and most powerful 
party with nationalistic credibility. Even if the political “reorientation” of HDZ necessarily 
had to lead to a more pronounced political split between, as well as within, the various 
organisations, HDZ remained in control over organisations like HVIDRA and UHVDR. Thus, 
Sanader and his fellow party members had secured themselves a powerful base of support 
both among the veterans and among ordinary citizens, while pushing the other organisations 
to seek support further to the right, from parties like Croatian True Revival (Hrvatski istinski 
preporod – HIP) and the Croatian Party of Rights (Hrvatska stranka prava – HSP).  
As mentioned, Sanader and HDZ, who initially had “fiercely” opposed the extradition 
of Croats to the ICTY, started his term by sending two suspects, Mladen Markač and Ivan 
Čermak, to The Hague. This time, however, there were no protests, except from certain 
spontaneous outbursts of insults from the more radical elements of the Croatian political 
landscape. The confirmation of Norac’s sentence for war crimes in the Croatian Supreme 
Court, which was made public in June 2006, did cause some turbulence, but this was again 
primarily stemming from marginal sources to the far right, as well as less politically 
influential and organised veterans’ organisations, and was never threatening to cause any 
serious problems for the government.185 The overall “tone” of the most influential – or 
influenced – organisations, most notably HVIDRA and UHVDR, was remarkably different 
than it had been only a year earlier. Dečak of UHVDR, for instance, stated that “the problems 
can only be solved at the table and within the national institutions”.186 In a strange paradox, 
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HVIDRA of the County of Vukovar-Srijem even threatened to march out to stop a group of 
protesting workers who were threatening to block the roads leading into Vukovar, as such 
actions “bring back black memories of 1990”.187 The circle of paradox was complete when 
the most profiled of Croatian generals by far, indeed, the “saintly embodiment of Croatia’s 
struggle for freedom”188, Ante Gotovina, was arrested on the Canary Islands in 2005 with the 
help of the government of Sanader. In December, the new leader of HVIDRA, Josip Ɖakić, 
announced that “peaceful demonstrations in support” of Gotovina would take place in the 
municipalities and counties where HVIDRA was present. However, he refused to give support 
to HVIDRA Split in the planning of their demonstration, again at the waterfront in the centre 
of the city, as he “found it impossible to participate on the same gathering as those who call 
the government treacherous”. A minor incident of blocking a road close to Zadar was, 
according to Ɖakić, similar to the “Log Revolution”, a statement which provoked negative 
reactions amongst his own members present.189    
How is one to interpret this remarkable turnaround in the relation between the largest 
veterans’ organisations and the government? The apparent irony or self contradiction of this 
turnaround may for a large part be explained by clever political pragmatism. One reason was 
of course that this time the opposition agreed on the matter, unlike in the period of Račan’s 
government, and did not put an effort in mobilising popular upheaval on the issue. Moreover, 
the fact that HDZ was a party with “nationalist credentials” stemming from its role in the 
“(re)-birth” of Croatia, perhaps made it easier for the same party to extradite “national heroes” 
without being perceived as traitors as its governmental predecessors had been.190 However, 
recalling the previous chapter, I claim as highly likely that substantial amount of turmoil was 
avoided by way of striking a deal with the organisations, the essence of which – one can 
imagine – was that HDZ asked for peace on the ICTY issue in return for promising not to dig 
too deep into the financial dealings of the organisations, as well as the way the statuses of its 
members had been achieved.  
It may be established that the issue of the ICTY, and the consequences of its 
dominating the discourse and consuming most of the government’s energy, did contribute 
considerably to facilitate the return of HDZ to power. The government of Račan had spent all 
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its energy on the ICTY-related crises, not being able to handle issues of real importance to the 
citizens, like corruption and a weak economy, thus paving the way for the return of HDZ. It 
follows that the branitelji were important players. This is not, however, to say that the 
branitelji and their organisations were the sole perpetrators in bringing back HDZ to power; 
rather a whole range of factors interplayed to this end: a reforming HDZ, an impatient and 
war-tired electorate, a weak economy, a divided far right wing, and so on. Yet whereas these 
were factors with more indirect influence on the course of events, the branitelji in the 
collective sense, and their organisations, were the most directly active in trying to bring about 
a change in government, even though they for a large part acted on cues cleverly provided by 
others. This was even openly bragged about by some leaders of local branches of HVIDRA, 
like Željko Strize of HVIDRA Kaštela, who stated that “HVIDRA played the decisive role in 
the ousting of the previous government”. 191 Andrija Hebrang of HDZ, when asked by 
national television why the veterans were not protesting the extradition of Gotovina like they 
had on other occasions, reportedly answered that this time, “they have the government of their 
liking”.192        
 
3.5. From Demonstrators to Desperados 
Yet under the collective category of the “protesting branitelji” favoured by the politically 
involved, a large number of individual branitelji who where not as loud or influential as their 
leaders were included. Attitudes and political orientation was directly or indirectly ascribed to 
them through the actions and statements of their leaders, something to which the branitelji 
themselves did not always approve of. This raising awareness of being politically manipulated 
became especially apparent as the popular image of the branitelji was coming under serious 
strain parallel to the unfolding of events. It seems that those who were “pulling the strings” in 
the background of the turmoil of 2000-2003 overrated the dedication and support of a large 
number of the branitelji as well as the public. However, now that a “moderate” HDZ was 
back in power, the need to distance itself from its “radical” past presented itself, thereby 
providing an escape route for those who had been “pulling the strings”. By its political 
“reorientation”, and the peace subsequently made with more radical forces within the party 
itself, HDZ escaped the mainstream negative reactions on the blending of politics and 
veterans. It was the branitelji who took the punch, through being left with reduced political 
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influence, a number of social and personal difficulties still unaddressed, and a drastically 
reduced public sympathy for these difficulties. 
 As exemplified in the introduction, the popular image of the branitelji has undergone 
drastic changes in the 17 years that have passed since the first organisations were established. 
It is possible to view this change as passing through three phases of the “history” of the 
branitelji, which is reflected, even partially constructed, through three concurrent phases in 
the way that Croatian media has related to them. This is not to say that the media has 
“controlled” and “used” their image as they have pleased; rather, by adopting a discursive 
approach, it is possible to view this as a process in which the media has influenced and has 
been influenced on how it perceives the image of the branitelji. The media is conveyor of 
popular sentiment, while also being influenced by the same popular sentiment.  
In the first period, from 1992 up until the takeover of Račan’s government, the main 
weight was placed on the grievances of the veterans, with a clear sympathetic inclination 
towards their stance. Even the occasional sensational “desperado”, meaning a branitelj 
“loosing” control and consorting to criminal acts to gain attention for his problems, was 
reported with a clear sympathy for he who in such cases was perceived as the victim, namely 
the perpetrator branitelj, who was “at war with the bureaucracy”. The second period was 
completely dominated by the protests and efforts to oppose a great deal of the Račan 
government’s politics, something which stole all energy and attention from the real 
grievances of the veterans, many of which were still living under extremely difficult 
economic and social conditions. From a clear tendency of publishing reports and articles on 
the individual branitelj, a “collectivisation” of the whole issue now took place, meaning that 
the individual was no longer reaching out in the same way as before. The third period to some 
extent overlapped the previous two, and saw a gradual emergence as a distinct phase. The 
media was becoming far more critical in their treatment of the branitelji, while still utilising 
the “collective” analytical angle, seemingly only rarely shifting to the individual, except for 
when “desperados” or “loose cannons” delivered statements or performed ill-timed actions 
which stimulated inclinations towards sensationalism of journalists squeezed between their 
own integrity and their editor’s demands for profitability. 
 The political manipulation of the branitelji was directly the destruction of their 
popular image, which is a recurrent theme in this thesis. The media were part conveyors, part 
influencing this process. However, the real stimulators of this process was beyond any doubt 
those who knowingly took advantage of the “cause” of the branitelji, the initial sympathy they 
enjoyed, as well as their sheer numbers, to project them as a collective and homogenous 
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political force which could determine the political path and thus the future of Croatia by 




Two examples of typical headlines to be found from the first period, of which common sympathy towards the “cause” of the branitelji is the 
main characteristic: “We are unjustifiably forgotten”, Slobodna Dalmacija, 15.08.1995; and “Nobody care about us any longer”, Slobodna 
Dalmacija, 05.05.1998. The latter case involved the self injuring of the depicted branitelj in front of the MORH-buliding in Zagreb. 
Symbolic actions such as these gradually became more frequent and violent during the years.  
   
 
 
The  second period is characterised by the gradual emergence of a far more threatening tone. The first demonstration at St. Marc’s Square in 
Zagreb in 1996 brought by a recognition of the potential striking power inherit in the “cause” of the branitelji by veterans, politicians and 
citizens alike: “We are through with waiting!”, Slobodna Dalmacija, 08.09.1996; and “If our demands are not met, we will demonstrate like 
HVIDRA”, Slobodna Dalmacija, 11.10.1996.   
 
 
The third and – as of yet – final period is mainly characterised by the increasingly critical viewpoint from which the branitelji are seen. The 
antagonism and poor communication between the veterans and the rest of the population which manifested itself during the Račan period – 
and which was intensified by political manipulation by external factors as well as some aspects of the internal dynamics of the organisations: 
“Veterans and/or millionaires”, Slobodna Dalmacija, 01.08.2009; and “Fake disables – Organisations of HRVI’s after the sentences in 
Rijeka: Revise all sentenced cases of ʻDijagnozaʼ”, Večernji List, 13.12.2008. So far, only a few doctors and psychiatrists, and not a single 
branitelj, have been sentenced in relation to the aforementioned “Dijagnoza”-operations.  
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4. Internal Dynamics of the Organisations:  






4.1. The “Embodiment of Ideology” Revisited: A Moral Force 
On 5 August 2009, I was participating in the celebrations of the Day of Victory and 
Homeland Thanksgiving, which is also Day of the Branitelji (Dan pobjede i Domovinske 
zahvalnosti/Dan hrvatskih branitelja), in Knin, “capital” of the Krajina region of the 
Dalmatian hinterland. I had been invited to join two of my branitelj-informants and their 
friends and families for the celebrations, which started early in the morning, at eight o’ clock, 
with the tolling of church bells symbolising the entry of Croatian forces into Knin on that very 
day, fourteen years earlier. After that, the branitelji who had gathered for the occasion came 
marching through the town centre, orchestras playing, and banners and flags of the various 
brigades wavering in the already blazing sun. According to one of my informants, “Milan”, 
the number of branitelji participating was greatly reduced this year, following a media-
conveyed call for boycott from several organisations, who were dissatisfied with the 
government’s policy towards them as well as the commonly met opinion that the politicians 
were receiving more focus in the programme of the celebrations than the veterans 
themselves.193 A large number of branitelji had thus decided to participate in a parallel, 
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operating secretly and non-transparent, thus “throwing a shadow of doubt on their work, which leads to lack of 
trust in those for which that ministry exists (…) Our ministry has a few organisation which it is favouring to the 
cost of all other branitelji. In this manner, the organisations of Josip Ɖakić [HVIDRA], Ɖuro Dečak [UHVDR], 
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“unofficial” gathering in Čavoglave, a small village not far from Knin. In stark contrast to the 
celebration in Knin, which had the form of an “official” one, being frequented by government 
representatives, politicians and bishops of the Croatian Church, the gathering in Čavoglave 
was to be more of a people’s feast with free concerts held by famous “patriotic” singers such 
as Marko Perković Thompson and Mate Bulić.194 This is not to say that music and public feast 
were not characteristic of the celebrations in Knin as well; while President Mesić and now 
Prime Minister Kosor held their speeches at the city stadium two blocks away, the main street 
of the town quickly became filled up with branitelji and their families, who were in a festive 
mood indeed, dancing, singing and playing joyful music, while swinging glasses with wine 
and rakija. 
 Even if true joy was the emotion dominating the celebrations in Knin on that day, the 
troubles of the past and present were never far beneath the surface. Some of the darker 
elements were, in the genuine Balkan way, tackled with humour, like the branitelj I met 
who’s t-shirt had the print: “Sorry! PTSD!”. An elderly gentleman, wearing all-black 
Ustaša195 iconography, answered my questions politely and with a sympathetic smile on his 
face. Yet the day after, when having distanced myself adequately to the experience of the 
celebrations, two different, but closely connected incidents stood out in my memory most 
vividly. Firstly, at one point during the day as we were walking towards the stadium, “Milan” 
spoke out loudly against the current government, claiming that it had “sold” the branitelji for 
the sake of their own, personal interests. “Milan’s” brother reacted sharply on this, saying that 
his brother should spare such comments for the private sphere, and not yell them out aloud on 
the streets on a day of pride and joy such as this, whereupon “Milan” answered that he had 
“bled for this town and this country”, and had the right to say what he wanted about whatever 
or whoever he wanted – “especially in this town where we re-raised the Croatian flag”. The 
second incident I noticed was a conversation between a young police officer and a branitelj as 
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the latter was parking his car outside what was the approved area for parking. The young 
officer, who must have been a child at the time of the Homeland War, tried politely to explain 
to the branitelj that he could not park there, especially on a day like this, when the potential 
for infrastructural chaos was looming. To this the branitelj in the car snapped: “Who are you 
to tell me where to park my car? Where were you in 1991?”  
 In the introduction of this thesis, as well as through the following chapters, the concept 
of the branitelji embodying the ideology of the Croatia of the 90’s was established and 
elaborated upon. Through their participation in the Homeland war, which represented the 
culmination of the central myth of the “thousand year dream of Croatian statehood”, the 
branitelji became central actors in the ideology of the Tuđman-regime, which was based on 
this charter myth. As the morally superior goal of independence became the paradigm by 
which any act within that ideological system was measured against, it follows that the 
branitelji, who were the most directly active in achieving this goal, had become as infallible 
as the Homeland War and itself. It was this moral force, stemming from the ideological 
weight placed on their participation in the Homeland War by the Tuđman regime, which by 
some was seen as truly the most valuable privilege of the branitelji.  
How this privilege sometimes manifested itself practically was described by the 
anecdote above. Yet it was also put to use on a far larger scale; indeed the motivational force 
behind the demonstrations of the previous chapter, and the calls for the resignation of the 
Račan government must at least be traced in part back to the same phenomenon. Those 
seeking to utilise this moral force for political purposes simply had to set it up against the 
symbolic “other”, who threatened to question the whole perceived ideological fundament the 
Homeland War represented, as well as the status of those who had sacrificed the most to 
realise this ideology – in other words, against the “criminalisation” of the Homeland War, as 
the popular phrase went. However, initiatives also came from within the branitelji segment 
itself for the practical utilisation of this moral force. In some respects, they became the 
guardians of the ideology, and therefore the specific narrative, which lent them their moral 
force. This not only implicated a strong inclination towards fighting against any other 
conception of history than the one contained within their ideology, but also towards 
attempting to judge and influence the present and the future to make it more in line with the 
ideological fundament of the Homeland War.  
This is reflected in, and perhaps even better explained by, some of the statutes and said 
goals of the organisations. As Marko Džaja of the League of Volunteers in the Homeland War 
of the City of Split (Liga dragovoljaca Domovinskog rata grada Splita) stated in an 
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interview, “first and foremost, [our aim] is to promote the fundamental ideas and goals of the 
Homeland War” and that his organisation was for people “who because of their pure Croatian 
hearts went to war”, thereby earning the right to a “moral force and the exclusive right to 
point their finger at anybody and direct everyone’s attention towards injustice”.196 Similarly, 
Neno Boban of the Split branch of UHDDR described his organisation as “(…) a latent moral 
and ethical force which, in time, will represent an imperative behaviour, will discuss every 
question, and demand the settling of all scores (…)”.197  
Sometimes, this ideological engagement was reflected in mere indignation over 
conceptions of the recent past which diverged from the one propagated by the, at the time, 
dominating ideology. Vice President of HVIDRA, Petar Prša, reacted in a revealing manner 
when a group of members of his organisation were visiting the Dalmatian island of Vis for a 
recreational vacation, and were not met with the “due respect”: 
 
[Some inhabitants of Vis] are chasing away the injured with impious provocations, like for instance, by listening 
to Radio Knin198 in the restaurant, while the waiter decorates himself with the emblem of Socialist Yugoslavia. It 
is like pouring salt into the wounds of the injured. And when the person doing this is your fellow Croat, for 
whom you lost your leg or arm, you can imagine how the wound burns!”199       
 
At other times, however, the “moral force” of the branitelji was translated into political 
activism which more or less consciously aimed at consolidating the new narrative. This, 
among other, entailed an element of censorship. Thus the Omiš branch of UHDDR in 1994 
took to the streets and started physically removing statues, memorial placards and other 
artefacts which marked the public sphere of the city with its 50 or so years of communist past, 
because they “insult our patriotic feelings”. The city council had already agreed upon the 
removal of a large part of the mentioned “public memorabilia”, yet the decision had not 
materialised into action quickly enough for the members of UHDDR, who did not want to 
“allow anyone to uphold and cultivate the memory of such a black period of the Croatian 
nation (…)”.200 One of the items removed was a placard containing the names of 66 local 
Partisans killed in World War II. This was analogous to removing from history the fact that a 
large number of Dalmatians were among Tito’s Partisans, and families of the “branitelji of the 
previous epoch” reacted as strongly as they dared, given the tense societal climate at the 
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time.201 The specific conflicting perceptions surrounding the branitelji versus Partisans-
discussion were to be a recurrent theme of the discourse in the years to come. When veterans 
of World War Two – meaning mostly former Partisans who claimed to have been 
discriminated against during the Tuđman regime – were granted a 40% raise in their pensions 
during Minister Pančić’s mandate, this was termed “immoral” and “injurious” by 
spokespersons of several organisations.202  
 The issue of branitelji versus partisans also connected to a broader reassessment of the 
past, more specifically World War Two and the parallel civil war raging in large areas of what 
was to become the “second Yugoslavia”, which in the newly established narrative was 
portrayed as the entrance into the “dark ages” of Croatia. The redrawing of the image of the 
losing forces of that war, the Ustaše, into the true, “moral” winners, was only a small step 
away and a natural consequence of the negating of Tito and his Partisans, as well as their 
political system summed up by the Yugoslavian concept. Indeed, for many nationalists, the 
NDH was seen as the first manifestation of a modern, independent Croatian state and thus as 
something solely positive, as the realisation of a Croatian state was seen as the ultimate goal 
for which all means were justified. It is against this backdrop one has to view some of the 
actions of the branitelji which were inspired by the perceived “moral force”. For instance, in 
2004, a homemade memorial placard romanticising the Ustaša-movement was placed outside 
the municipality building of Otok, a small village right outside of Sinj, in the dark of night.203 
The police suspected that members of veterans’ organisations were among the perpetrators.204 
More explicit manifestations were recorded in Zadar on the day of the “December 
martyrs”205, when members of various organisations paraded the streets of the city in black 
Ustaša uniforms, waving the flag of NDH206 and posters of Gotovina and Ante Pavelić. The 
parading “troops” were addressed by member of the city council, Davor Aras (HDZ), who 
nevertheless was criticised by his own party members for getting involved in such events.207        
Yet such actions and statements, though extreme, were relatively harmless compared 
to some of the more dangerous forms of activism that branitelji were involved in. In what can 
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be seen as a tasteless interpretation of the “moral force” lent to the branitelji by ideology, the 
leader of HVIDRA Vir, Željko Bonato, attempted publicly to downplay the horrific act of 
three drunken local youngsters beating a Serb returnee to death in Vir in 2000. Bonato 
claimed in the media that the victim had been member of a Serbian paramilitary unit, thus 
clearly coming across as apologetic towards the murder. Bonato’s claim was refuted by all 
official instances, something which at any rate, as one analyst commented, is beside the 
point.208 To the backdrop belongs the fact that in Croatia, at the time, what must be termed a 
dangerous way of thinking was developing, stemming from the increasingly popular notion 
that war crimes committed in self defensive war were morally justifiable. Perhaps even more 
disturbing in light of this is the story of Croatian Serb Nikola Smolić, himself a branitelj who 
actively took part in the Homeland War on the Croatian side, only to return to his village in 
the Šibenik area allegedly to find his grandparents brutally murdered by his “colleagues” in 
the Croatian army during Operation Storm. According to Smolić, his grandparents were also 
maltreated and beaten up frequently during the period of Serb occupation, due to their 
grandson fighting on the “wrong” side. As the murderers were arrested, the leader of 
HVIDRA Šibenik, according to Smolić, protected the arrested branitelji by giving false 
testimonies claiming that the near-blind and immobile elderly couple were firing at the 
suspected soldiers with machine guns. Smolić was disgusted and dismayed by veterans’ 
organisations, which “through their statements a priori protect the people who have 
committed such acts of bestiality”.209 Smolić’s testimony was publicised through the media 
seven years after the crimes had been committed, still awaiting justice for his grandparents.   
 In many ways, however, it was more banal, though in essence no less politically 
extreme actions that perhaps contributed the most to the quickly rising public scepticism 
towards the organisations and thus, unfortunately, their members. The defending of murder 
was an infrequent, if immensely grave, phenomenon. The violent reactions over apparent 
banalities on an almost daily basis are what contributed the most to the branitelji activists 
devaluating their own importance as a “moral force” in society. For instance, in 2004, a group 
of veterans’ organisations publicly demanded to have the grass surrounding a new monument 
to their honour in Makarska removed, when it was rumoured that the soil and grass had been 
delivered by a company from Banja Luka in Republika Srpska, the Serb entity of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.210 Similarly, Željko Strize of HVIDRA Kaštela attacked the administration of 
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the County of Split-Dalmatia and of the Municipality of Kaštela when it became known that 
Serbian bulls had participated in a bull-fighting competition in the area. The leader of the 
event, Mate Radanović, probably reflected the mainstream reaction to such a critique when 
stating that they “were really not interested in the nationality of the bulls”.211 In another, even 
more unfortunate move, Strize and his organisation made numerous efforts to prevent Bosnian 
singer Halid Bešlić from headlining a humanitarian concert which was to provide disabled 
children of Kaštela with money to buy important equipment. As the sociologist Dražen Lalić 
commented, HVIDRA was operating as a “cultural inquisition”, determining what type of 
music could be listened to and not, while at the same time revealing an inherit hypocrisy of 
such actions, as one “often can see cars with flags of the Black Legion displayed out of which 
Ceca roars”.212     
Such “activism” as described above served to create a gap of mutual contempt and 
alienation between the branitelji and ordinary citizens, a gap which in the end proved 
detrimental for the majority of individual branitelji who were in desperate need to find 
recognition and approval among the rest of society. Not to say the least, by taking the role as 
“inquisitors”, the branitelji in question, who were most often high ranking members of their 
organisations, contributed themselves to keeping open “their own” – so to speak – wounds of 
war. Not to mentioned the wounds of the ordinary citizens, most of whom also had very real 
and direct experiences of the Homeland War. The branitelji acted as constant reminders not 
only of the war, but also of the period of tight, unquestionable government control of the 
Tuđman regime. Moreover, the concept of “criminalisation of the Homeland War”, which had 
some resonance to ordinary citizens on such issues as the ICTY, was subjected to serious 
inflation by its utilisation in the critique of issues of no importance to the average Croat. Not 
only was the critique stemming from the “moral force” of the branitelji gradually becoming 
bereaved of any content to most citizens, it was also in many cases, following the previous 
chapter, seen as a critique of the larger part of the population itself. The notion that “the 
branitelj knows best” was not only provocative when the organisations were working to 
remove the government which had been elected by a majority of citizens, but also when trying 
to rewrite considerable parts of recent history to which a large number of citizens, perhaps 
especially in Dalmatia given the region’s specific history, had a positive relation to, or at least 
not an undisputedly negative relation to.  
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Recalling the previous chapter then, the picture would be incomplete if only the 
political manipulation by outside forces were to be given place in this thesis. As has hopefully 
become clear during this subsection, there were also political initiatives emanating from 
within the branitelji segment of the population which had negative effects on the image and 
thus the position of the branitelji in Croatian society. Although these more vaguely defined 
initiatives made the branitelji more susceptible to manipulation, and thus were often 
channelled into concrete political aims by outside forces, a considerable amount of energy 
stemming from the “moral force” described above was also directly translated into political 
activism on their own account. Therefore, it makes little sense to speak of most of the 
veterans’ organisations mentioned in this thesis as apolitical organisations. Not only were 
they, as the previous chapter described, exploited for political means by “outsiders” belonging 
to political elites and groupings of the Croatian right, they were also implicitly defined as 
political by their leaders and spokespersons who, on their own initiative, meddled in political 
affairs ranging from ideological debates on the outcome of World War Two as well as more 
pragmatic political support provided for General Gotovina and other “national heroes” 
suspected by the ICTY. Moreover, organisations like HVIDRA had an administrative 
structure resembling that of political parties, with leaders, central committees, and even their 
own form of internal legal system defended by their Tribune of Honour (sud časti). From this 
vantage point, which, I argue, already defines the organisations as political, even if this view 
was not shared by the leaders of the organisations judging from their constant reminding of 
their “apolitical” nature, it was a small step to actual political involvement. Thus, instead of 
viewing external political factors as the sole perpetrators of the manipulation of the branitelji, 
such internal activists as described in this subsection must take their part of the blame for the 
increasingly deep gap between branitelj and citizen.            
 
4.2. Humanitarian Organisations of Personal Interest? 
Having established that the veterans’ organisations themselves definitely were political in 
nature, it is worth reflecting upon the way the organisations were portrayed to most of their 
members, as there is a wide gap between that face of these organisations, and the way they 
actually operated or functioned. To most members, and also the public, at least to begin with, 
HVIDRA and other organisations, like UHVDR and UHDDR, were perceived more as 
humanitarian organisations who aimed at defending the rights of the demobilised, disabled 
and marginalised veterans of the Homeland War. Yet as time progressed, and the meddling of 
the organisations into various ideological and political projects of more or less democratic 
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character became increasingly apparent, a clear discrepancy presented itself between what the 
organisations were initially advertised as, and what they actually were. This discrepancy 
provided a loophole for “industrious” individuals, often among the highest ranking members 
and leaders of the organisations, which enabled them to exploit “their” organisations and their 
positions within them to promote their personal agendas.  
Some of these agendas have been discussed, as for instance those of the leaders of 
HVIDRA, UHVDR and other organisations, who were simultaneously representing HDZ and 
other parties, thus, it must be said, pursuing their own political goals. Indeed, small cliques of 
HDZ-friendly branitelji have tried to intervene also on the local level, trying to remove or 
pressure local power structures, such as those in Sinj or Opuzen.213 Yet the political 
involvement of various leader-figures among the branitelji has been discussed extensively. 
What has not, however, is the way the organisations have been used as the private firms of 
certain leaders. Several presidents of HVIDRA, like Mladen Jurković, Marinko Liović and 
Josip Ɖakić, have been accused of financial malversation in the organisation they have acted 
as leaders of, as well as in the dealings of some of the firms which HVIDRA has established, 
such as Krilnik and Hvidra d.o.o. operating in Split.214 Jurković was publicly criticized for 
“shady” dealings with the share of the mentioned Croatian Homeland Fund, which was 
established to ensure long-term economic participation for disabled branitelji. In 2004, 
several media announced that the entire fund, amounting to 38 million kuna, had 
“disappeared” during Jurković’s time as leader of the organisation.215 Jurković was in fact 
simultaneously chairman of the Croatian Homeland Fund itself, and it is suspected by some 
that his dealings connected to the privatisation of Tisak, Croatia’s biggest tobacco and 
newspaper chain was the “hole” through which the millions trickled.216 Though the 
“disappearance” of the money was a serious loss for all HVIDRA members, no one within 
that organisation ever determinedly raised the question of Jurković’s mingling of roles and 
possible corruption.         
Liović also faced accusations, yet these were primarily voiced from within his own 
organisation. At a central meeting in 1999, representatives of HVIDRA Zagreb attacked their 
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own leaders for disregarding the “criminal operating” of several branches of their 
organisations on municipality and county level, and demanded to know why a considerable 
amount of the financial means of HVIDRA was blocked by the bank administering the 
organisation’s funds.217 However, Liović, as usual, was more preoccupied with discussing the 
then possible extradition of branitelji to the Hague, a trend which Tomislav Tomečić of 
HVIDRA Rijeka later described as deliberate attempts to “turn the attention away from the 
real problems of [HVIDRA] by inventing enemies of HVIDRA and the branitelji (…)”.218 A 
year prior to the critique of the representatives of HVIDRA Zagreb, the entire delegation of 
HVIDRA Rijeka, led by Tomečić, left a similar central meeting after Tomečić had – on behalf 
of the 800 members he represented – pointed to the millions of kuna of government support 
that had vanished somewhere on the path between the leaders of HVIDRA and their members, 
and demanded to see valid documentation on how and where the financial means had been 
spent. According to Tomečić, he and his members were obstructed in arguing their case 
before the central committee of HVIDRA on several occasions. Interestingly, he also stated 
that the criminal behaviour of certain HVIDRA-members had to end, as the Croatian public 
were about to turn against the branitelji, “since they receive millions of kuna yet are never 
satisfied”.219 Critique also came from one of the original founders of HVIDRA in 1992, Ante 
Čarapović, who claimed that the 2001 election of the new president of HVIDRA, Damir 
Varaždinec, was staged by some of the members of the central committee to safeguard them 
against a possible investigation of HVIDRA’s financial affairs.220 
Another character, known for his allegedly “undemocratic” methods in leading the 
considerable UHDDR, is the “Napoleon of Vukovar”, Tomislav Merčep. His own position 
within the organisation has been safeguarded by several “re-elections” which have been 
immersed in controversies and claims of foul play, something which, as we shall see, has led 
to schisms within UHDDR. Merčep has been subject to accusations of financial fraud within 
his organisation, while also on several occasions openly using the organisation as an 
instrument for realising his own political ambitions. Yet perhaps the best example on how the 
juggling of membership of HDZ and HVIDRA was translated into real political and financial 
power is the case of Vinko Brkan. In 2008, he combined the positions as the leader of HDZ 
Trogir, vice-mayor of Trogir, member of the council of the County of Split-Dalmatia, 
president of the Football Club Trogir, vice-president of the Women’s Handball Club of 
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Trogir, and finally, president of HVIDRA Trogir.221 Apart from reflecting the total control 
which HDZ still enjoys in some areas on the local level, this “industrious multitasking” also 
raises questions about how the various positions affect each other, and, not to say the least, 
what scope of manipulation the combining of them opens up for. Accusations of financial 
malversation against the HDZ-led administration are abundant, the most recent involving 
Brkan himself is the indebting of Football Club Trogir of about 3,6 million kuna without any 
documentation whatsoever on where the money has been spent. According to some sources, it 
has been established that the football club was used for extensive money laundering, while 
Brkan has resigned his post in the club and remained silent.222 
The vaguely defined agendas of the organisations, as well as the privileged positions 
the most profiled members enjoyed, opened up the possibility for this group to take advantage 
of their positions and thereby the organisations themselves, to gain economically and 
politically. Of course, as usual, the losing part was the larger part of the members of these 
organisations; those who needed the organisations to function humanitarianly on their behalf 
and not as personal interest organisations for their leaders, who paid but lip service to the 
humanitarian ideal. These conflicting perceptions on the essential meaning of the 
organisations between the bottom and top segments of the members bereaved the in many 
respects just “cause” of the branitelji of a lot of public sympathy. Ordinary citizens, who were 
gradually becoming fed up with the high level of corruption in society and the lack of genuine 
political will to confront it, came to view the organisations as smokescreens for criminal 
activity. After all, it was the scandalous dealings of the leaders of the organisations that 
gradually took the front pages – and thus the public focus – away from the despairing, 
marginalised veterans of previous times. However, it was the latter group, who often did not 
have any other means of addressing their often existential problems than through their 
organisations, which became the biggest losers, as the different priorities of the leaders of the 
organisations stole away momentum and energy from the work of reintegrating these 
branitelji to society. Perhaps no wonder then, that Ante Prkačin, himself among the leaders of 
one of the more “low key” organisations, the Union of Croatian Defensive Forces (Zajednica 
hrvatskih obrambenih snaga - ZHOS), called the leadership of certain organisations 
“mafiosos, freeloaders and blackmailers of a kind the world has not yet seen. They have 
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grabbed control over the organisations of the branitelji which they use for private means.”223 
Božo Drmić, who in 2005 led a group of veterans who broke away from HVIDRA and 
established their own organisation, expressed it in even simpler terms: “Regarding the 
veterans’ organisations, most of them do not exist. What exist are their presidencies, which 
duly spend the taxpayers’ money”.224                 
 
4.3. Internal Divisions 
It remains clear that it never made sense to refer to the organisations as anything but political 
in nature.   The consequence of this, I argue, that the organisations, contrary to their own 
expressed wishes and aims, could not possibly be united to a common force from the start. 
After all, the branitelji segment of the populace was, in normal times, not the politically 
homogenous group that certain politicians and leaders struggled to portray them as. What 
united the branitelji was their social position, not their political orientation. Therefore, the 
only way for the organisations to remain truly “apolitical” and united in their work would 
have been to focus solely on humanitarian efforts. As this failed, however, the branitelji 
became internally divided, something which added more difficulties on their path of 
reintegration to society. The political orientation of the organisations – openly admitted or not 
– in combination with the overriding priority being given to the personal ambitions of several 
of their most important members, contributed to there evolving a dividing, rather than 
unifying force within the organisations. This force was greatly enhanced by external political 
manipulation, which not only caused quarrels but also the acknowledgement of having been 
exploited by politicians and leaders alike. However, it must be stated that the internal 
divisions were just as much a result of the various destructive factors as contributing to the 
destruction themselves, thus nicely depicting the dynamics in the vicious circle of increasing 
failure of the organisations, measured against the humanitarian ideal initially cultivated.  
A closer look at the early period of Merčep’s UHDDR may highlight some of the 
destructive dynamics of the interfacing of moral force, personal ambition and external 
manipulation which this chapter in general, and this subsection especially, is concerned with. 
UHDDR was at the time among the most powerful veterans’ organisations; some analysts, 
encouraged by Merčep who early on realised the power inherit in the sheer number of 
branitelji, estimated its membership to close to 300 000225, but this number is likely to have 
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been inflated. Merčep never did any efforts to hide his personal political ambitions, which 
were undoubtedly inspired and stimulated by having such a powerful organisation backing 
him up. The fact that Merčep viewed UHDDR as instrumental to his personal ambitions did, 
however, bring about serious schism within the organisation. It all started on the second 
annual assembly, or sabor, in Zagreb in the beginning of 1994, when roughly half of the 
members of the different county and municipality level branches left the meeting in a display 
of protest against the way the “sabor was prepared, organised and led”. In the name of the 
boycotters, Neno Boban, leader of the County of Split-Dalmatia branch of UHDDR, denied 
the legitimacy of all decisions made during the sabor, since it had been “obstructed by the 
most vulgar populist and Bolshevik methods”. Boban went on to accuse Merčep of being the 
organiser of the chaos which, according to several sources, was intended as a smokescreen 
behind which the election of Merčep as president took place by unauthorised – and highly 
undemocratic – methods. The combination of strategically distributed non-functional 
microphones, crowds applauding and whistling whenever anyone outside of the Merčep 
clique tried to grab the word, as well as scores of unidentified participants with questionable 
rights to vote casting ballots, all together took the shape of a small, internal coup. The 
secretary of the Makarska branch, Pero Šimić, was supported by several other high ranking 
members of UHDDR when stating that this was an obvious attempt at exploiting the 
organisation for a specific political option as well as the realisation of personal political 
ambitions.226 It was obvious that Šimić was referring to Merčep and HDZ, of which Vladimir 
Šeks, Juraj Njavro, Ivić Pašalić,227 and other high ranking members were observed at the 
meeting in the immediate proximity of the disputed leader, following them having been 
accepted as members of UHDDR two days prior to the meeting and election of the 
organisation’s presidency.228  
In the aftermath of the meeting, according to Boban, 16 out of 21 branches of the 
organisation delivered formal complaints and demanded that the sabor was proclaimed 
invalid, and that a new election of the organisation’s presidency had to take place. Their 
protests were to no avail, with the consequence that the break-away organisation UHBDDR 
was established, with Branko “young hawk” Borković as president. A year after, UHBDDR 
itself was subject of a second schism, when Zvonimir Trusić broke away and established “his” 
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Independent Volunteers of Croatia (Nezavisni dragovoljci Hrvatske – NDH). The reasons for 
this second schism were probably numerous, yet the fact that Trusić had established his own 
political party, the Croatian People’s Movement (Htrvatski narodni pokret – HNP), was seen 
as problematic to the leaders of UHBDDR, which, at the time at least, seemed genuinely 
against any mingling of politics and veterans.229 The media also speculated that a personal 
conflict with Borković, on top of the one with Merčep, had been one of the triggering factors, 
something which was not denied by Trusić. NDH also seemed more bent on the adoption of 
the notion of a hierarchy among the branitelji, thus reserving a membership in NDH for “the 
elite” only.230 Thus the early schism(s) of UHDDR became a premonition for the years to 
come, combining several of the factors with dividing effect on the veterans: personal 
ambition, political manipulation, and, following the “hyperinflation” of statuses, the question 
of an hierarchical order among the branitelji based on level of “sacrifice”.231  
As the Račan government took office in 2000, the added factors of the “war on 
branitelji” or revision of statuses of Minister Pančić combined with more outright external 
political manipulation and the “going against the government” became a complex cocktail of 
factors of pressure on the already fragile unity of the veterans. Even prideful celebrations of 
their heroic efforts during the Homeland War became clouded by the insistence of powerful 
segments within the organisations on using such opportunities to mark political aversion or 
loyalty. It must indeed have been a discomforting paradox to the branitelji who had defended 
Šibenik when the ten year jubilee celebrating their united efforts was marred by divisions. 
HVIDRA and the CHQ led the boycotters of the official celebrations, apparently due to 
President Mesić’s presence, and organised their own, parallel celebrations, while the members 
of – among other organisations – UHVDR stuck to the official programme.  Some speculated 
that the aversion against President Mesić was but a smokescreen for internal power struggles 
within HDZ, which manifested themselves among segments of differing loyalty within 
HVIDRA, the CHQ and UHVDR.232 The most important in this case, however, is that – as 
has already been mentioned in relation to the “second log-revolution” – divisions between as 
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well as within the organisations were becoming visible parallel to the branitelji becoming 
increasingly at odds with public opinion, and the functioning and activities of the 
organisations were moved further from the humanitarian sphere than ever. Meanwhile, as the 
divisions were becoming more pronounced and visible to the public through the media, they 
themselves contributed to the emergence of the general impression that the veterans’ 
organisations were nothing but political interest groups. This reduced their legitimacy in the 
eyes of the ordinary citizens, consequently contributing to the destruction of the image of the 
branitelji.     
Yet, interestingly, it was not until the return of HDZ to power and the extradition of 
General Gotovina to the Hague that schisms of a similar magnitude to that affecting Merčep’s 
UHDDR became a reality. The secret “charter of understanding” between HDZ and its most 
loyal organisations, of which, I argue, the ceasing of revision of statuses was exchanged for 
peace on the ICTY-issue was the backbone, was not put into effect without costs. After all, it 
was the leaders of these organisations, with their central structures in Zagreb behind them, 
which were cooperating with HDZ on behalf of the organisations. The internal fault lines 
between, the leaders and central body of organisations such as HVIDRA on the one hand, and  
their local branches and members on the other hand, manifested themselves clearly as it 
became apparent that HDZ was not going to pursue its oppositional politics of refusing 
cooperation with the ICTY now that they were in government. The anti-ICTY sentiment was 
very real to many of the local branches, as well as a considerable part of the total members of 
the involved organisations and not just something that could be used to gain political points to 
the advantage of certain parties As it gradually dawned upon the more genuinely dedicated 
protesters that their efforts had been in vain, or worse yet, that their message had been 
deliberately exploited for other means, widespread internal discontent and frustration became 
a strong divisive factor among the branitelji. 
Regarding HDZ and HVIDRA, the key moment was the election of Josip Ɖakić to the 
post as HVIDRA’s first man. This powerful parliamentarian representative of HDZ, who also 
had the necessary high-ranking military background from the Homeland War, became the 
centre of the interface between HDZ and HVIDRA, a role which his opponents in the quest 
for the presidency, Miodrag Demo and Stjepan Sučić, probably would not have performed 
equally to the taste of HDZ.233 Ɖakić’s first important task was to repeat ad nauseum in the 
media and elsewhere that there was no such thing as internal divisions within HVIDRA, and 
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that HVIDRA did not support the policy of the government on the issue, even if several 
spokesmen of the government claimed the opposite.234 Moreover, contradicting Ɖakić even 
further, the convention “The Truth about the Homeland War”, held by the end of February 
2005 under the auspices of UHDDR and HVIDRA of the Counties of Zadar and Split-
Dalmatia, was concluded with the announcement that Croatian veterans should go up against 
the government on the Gotovina issue. According to some sources, a large number of 
members representing the various branches of HVIDRA were demanding the resignation of 
the organisation’s central leadership.235 The manoeuvring between his own members, his 
political orientation and position, as well as the HDZ leadership, must have been a 
complicated one indeed, especially as a major schism appeared within his organisation 
thereby making his claims of unity seem even more absurd. Retired Colonel Bozo Drmić, 
former soldier of the legendary 2nd brigade called “Thunder”, led the initiative to establish a 
breakaway organisation consisting of discontent HVIDRA members. According to some 
sources, he had considerable support at least weighed in credibility and legendary status, if the 
support measured in numbers was more undefined as of yet.236 Drmić explained that the 
thought of a new HVIDRA was not new, but that the Gotovina affair had made it crystallise, 
and that his organisation was to practice a strict apolitical attitude while making sure that a 
comprehensive revision of statuses was implemented.237 It is probably not too far-fetched to 
speculate that the suppressed discontent within the branitelji population at this critical 
moment of staking out Croatia’s future political path, both domestically and internationally, 
made HDZ nervous. After all, according to a well informed source, the HDZ leaders were 
“not used to having organisations presenting themselves on the scene of the branitelji which 
they did not found or do not completely control”.238       
Yet it is necessary to refute not only the claims of unity put forward by Ɖakić and 
other prominent members of HVIDRA and other organisations, but also the claim of many 
critical journalists and politicians of the opposition, who took as proof of the unquestionable 
loyalty of the branitelji towards the new government that they remained pacified during the 
controversies surrounding the arrest and extradition of Gotovina to the Hague. As has 
hopefully become clear, the branitelji were not the united “pacified” collective such 
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argumentation seems to imply. Rather, the frustration and discontent this time gradually – as 
the initial shock wore off – turned towards the direction of their leaders and political allies, 
who had cynically betrayed the branitelji and their “cause”. However, this time the protests 
took the form of internal showdowns and chaotic and often misguided critique, as there was 
no overarching structure which could organise and direct the anger of the veterans. For only 
by employing the vast and powerful network of the “old elite”, which still was HDZ’s greatest 
asset, could such a diverse group as the branitelji be united and organised to pursue one 
specific goal. Sadly, the goal of successful reintegration to society was never allowed to 
become such a united front.  
HDZ’s political “reorientation” from isolationist to integrationist, in which 
cooperation with the ICTY was the central marker, resulted in a widespread feeling of anger 
among the branitelji due to the manipulation and perceived deception by HDZ, which, after 
all, had come to power partially as a result of their anti-ICTY stance. Many veterans went to 
seek other political alternatives further to the right, which, however, where fractioned and 
small and thus of no real political weight, at least when compared to HDZ. Others tried to take 
back the control of the “cause” of the branitelji by registering own parties, thus opting for 
open and full fledged political involvement as parties instead of the poorly hidden political 
activity of many of the “humanitarian” organisations. The Croatian Party of Branitelji 
(Hrvatska stranka branitelja – HSB) was established as early as in 2001, and was, policy-
wise, clearly opposing HVIDRA and other organisations which were deemed instruments in 
the hands of politicians. In an interview, the leader of HSB, Željko Galeković, even claimed 
that the seeds to the many divisions among the branitelji were sown on purpose by the 
wartime political leadership, as every battalion or troop was encouraged to establish their own 
organisation to ensure that the veterans’ would be controllable by the old recipe of divida et 
empera.239 In summer 2008 the rumour ran that General Gotovina and singer Thompson were 
to be the front men in another example of an open political initiative from the branitelji, the 
so called Assembly of Branitelji. This, however, apparently took on the form of wish making 
by branitelji and journalists hungry for sensation rather than any serious attempt at forming a 
political party.240 More serious, yet ostensibly enjoying little support, were the efforts of 
former leader of the CHQ, Mirko Čondić, who was among the most vocal criticizers of 
HDZ’s “new direction”. The arrest and extradition of Gotovina inspired the retired colonel to 
contemplate creating a new political option. The party, according to Čondić, would even have 
                                                 
239
 ”Prevaranti su dobili činove i plaće”, Slobodna Dalmacija, 09.09.2003. 
240
 ”Thompson nam je bio ʻokidačʼ da se udružimo”, Jutarnji List, 01.09.2008. 
  95 
a “military wing” which should deal with, among other things, the “betrayal” of the branitelji 
of the new, HDZ-led government. Čondić also promised to file law suits against “all 
politicians who took advantage of the branitelji on their way to power”.241 However, none of 
the three initiatives mentioned here managed to gain any political importance. 
Simultaneously, the political and social importance of the veterans’ organisations was 
diminishing rapidly by the end of the controversies surrounding General Gotovina’s arrest and 
extradition, leaving behind them an essentially broken reputation of the branitelji in the eyes 
of the general public.      
The Homeland War, and the place given to it in the narrative promoted by the Tuđman 
regime, was treated by many of the leaders of the organisations as a vantage point for 
ideological and political formulation of acts. Yet what the “fundamental goals and ideas of the 
Homeland War”, as mentioned by Džaja in the previous subsection, exactly was, was subject 
to diverging interpretations. Thus, while both the “self inflicted” and the external 
manipulative politicisation of the branitelji contributed to the destruction of their popular 
image, the politicisation in itself led to the various organisations being divided among them as 
well as, in time, internally. This caused further difficulties for the branitelji and their path 
back to society. Schisms and quarrels had the detrimental result of leading the focus of the 
organisations away from their “real”, humanitarian goal of defending the rights of the 
branitelji and facilitating their quick reintegration to society.  
Yet, as discussed, the question remains whether this was the true goal at all of the 
organisations from the beginning. The analysis of the actions of certain leaders, which was the 
theme of the previous subsection of this chapter, shows that personal ambition, on many 
occasions whether political or material, was allowed to override any other considerations. 
Thus this, to some extent, justifies accusations that the organisations were run as personal 
interest organisations. Vital to this subsection, however, is that this contributed further to 
increasing disunity among the branitelji thereby, in effect, hampering the reintegration of the 
veterans to society when the organisation should ideally have been the greatest promoter and 
facilitator of reintegration efforts. Failing to promote a single, clear focus on humanitarian 
efforts created the potential for disunity among the branitelji, something which resulted in 
there being at least 30-35 organisations on national level, which paradoxically had very 
similar statutes and operational aims while at the same time being completely irreconcilable.  
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The Croatian veteran of the Homeland War, the branitelj, emerged from the horrifying war 
for independence which ravaged Croatia from 1991 to 1995. The success and glory of the 
effective retake of occupied Croatian territory by way of Operations Storm and Lightning 
became the success and glory of the branitelj, effectively melting together the heroism of his 
actions and sacrifice with the purity and infallibility which in most cultures the phenomenon 
of birth is associated with – so also the birth of a nation. In the ideological theatre which was 
partly invented by the wartime ruling elite, first and foremost by the “father of the modern 
Croatian nation” Franjo Tuđman, the branitelj was the main actor. However, while the 
prospect of war, chaos and “rebirth” arguably necessitated an ideological concept which 
served as promoter and facilitator of coherence and endurance through patriotism, the concept 
was also used for other, far less noble causes. Patriotism spilled over into destructive 
nationalism, which was used to justify Croatian aggression in a foreign country, as well as 
denial in the face of accusations of war crimes committed during the acclaimed military 
operations. This reduced international sympathy and effectively paved the way for post-war 
isolation. Arguably more serious for Croatia in the long term, however, was the abuse of the 
ideology and the isolation by the elite and its closest supporters as a smokescreen, under 
which they gained extensive personal privileges of status, power and money.  
Unfortunately, this darker side of the ideology was also inherited and personified by 
the branitelj, sometimes actively and deservingly; yet in most cases passively and unjust. The 
strong focus on collectiveness as a sharp defensive line against the Other of the new narrative 
had the effect of rendering it difficult for the individual branitelj to escape his image, as this 
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gradually fell apart in the eyes of the citizen. Indeed, it was the official, state sponsored efforts 
to portray the branitelji as an infallible, solely positive force that contributed in the greatest 
sense to this “collectivisation”. Sadly, as the public gradually became aware of and eventually 
dared to address the errors and injustice of the wartime regime, the singular branitelj, no 
longer discernible from the plural branitelji, stood to take the strike. The duality of the image 
of the branitelj – as both hero and villain – comes into interplay with the ambiguity of another 
popular conception of the collective memory, namely the tendency to view criminal acts and 
war time endeavours as heroic defiance of law and death, as exemplified by the ambiguous 
hajduk myth. However, the branitelj, as a marginal character, being not soldier (any longer) 
and not citizen (yet), is subject to ambiguity and dualism on a far more severe scale than the 
brigands of Ottoman times. The horrifying experiences of war, manifest in physical or psychic 
scars (or both), marks the branitelj first and foremost as a victim.  
 The privileges and status that were made available to the branitelji after the war took 
the form of mere compensation, rather than a means to promote the two way process which 
any form of integration truly is. The branitelji were not stimulated to seek reintegration to 
society, while the citizens were not inspired to receive their heroes with open arms. The fact 
that most branitelji – in time – became well provided for materially, is not to be confused 
with the reintegration being successful. Slowly, a gap of alienation, mistrust and fear was 
allowed to develop between branitelj and citizen, a gap which rendered a successful 
reintegration – viewed from both sides – impossible. Instead of realising the immeasurable 
positive potential of the branitelj, as a young, experienced and dedicated member of society, 
the policy of the successive governments led to the opposite; the branitelji came to be viewed 
as an unpredictable and ungrateful lot – much the same way many branitelji in time came to 
view the nation for which they had fought.  
 Thus, the question this thesis has aspired to provide an answer to is: How did this 
come about?  Firstly, the dramatic increase in the number of branitelji – both disabled and not 
– from a few thousand to half a million led to an overstretching of the sympathy and heroic 
acclaim the branitelj enjoyed in the public. Parallel to continuous reports and testimonies of 
alleged extensive fraud and of the often uncritical criterions by which the statuses were 
“handed out” to people who never held a weapon, this increase led to widespread suspicion 
and erosion of the hero status of the branitelji – a so called “hyperinflation” of status. Their 
eventual large number, combined with the fact that they were organised into powerful 
organisations of interest, led to the branitelji being viewed as a group rather that as 
individuals, a group which hid swindlers who tried to steal a share of the “debt” of the nation 
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to their heroes. The fact that the governments who were most active in were insinsting on the 
right to secrecy for the groups contributed to there being cast an even greater shadow of doubt 
over the branitelji as well as on the motivation of the governments themselves. The 
government of President Tuđman – and, later, the government constituted by the remnants of 
the political elite of Tuđman’s government – monopolised not only the program for caring for 
the branitelji; they also to a large extent had the power to decide who were to be considered a 
branitelj and who not, just as they during the war had decided who should become generals 
and heroes, and who not. 
The second reason, closely related to the first, as to why the reintegration failed is to 
be found within the Law of Rights of the Croatian Branitelji. The Law must partly be viewed 
as instrumental to the government; not solely as a system of awards for political loyalty, but 
also as a means to pacify possible discontent within the large and well armed segment of the 
population that the branitelji constituted. From “below”, the law was also viewed as 
instrumental; realising the rights it stipulated became a way out of unemployment and the 
general economic uncertainty which characterised the post-war society for the ordinary 
citizen. The vague definitions, corruption, and poor control of the demanded documentation 
led to a massive assault of “branitelji” on the Law. Instead of becoming a motivation for 
branitelji seeking to become regular citizens, the Law became a motivation for citizens 
seeking to realise status as branitelj.  
Yet the biggest fault lies in the way the law was utilised. Instead of using the benefits 
and privileges as a temporary inspiration and facilitator for the branitelj to seek a quick return 
to society, the Law provided unconditional material benefits allowing the former soldiers to 
sustain their existence in the margins of a society which they found themselves ever further 
alienated from. Also, the constant changes to the Law as well as to the institutional structures 
which were supposed to enact it made its implementation a long lasting and difficult process, 
thereby creating a lot of frustration among branitelji waiting to have their rights realised. 
Frustration was further increased by the sometimes appalling discrepancies between 
apparently well situated veterans flashing imported cars and symbols of political power, while 
other branitelji, too run down to be able to fight for their share of the privileges, were brought 
to the border of extinction by sufferings and trauma which remained unaddressed by the 
various governments’ efforts to care for them. Few citizen led initiatives to alleviate the 
sufferings of the most needing branitelji were founded; after all the government had pledged 
to help, and the apparent material well being of many branitelji was taken as proof of success. 
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In many ways then, the law actually increased the gap between the branitelj and the ordinary 
citizen.            
Gradually, as the societal climate warmed up partially due to the political change 
brought by the Račan administration, it became possible for others than those with 
unquestionable war time credentials to openly question the way the issue of the reintegration 
of the branitelji was progressing. However, the new government – pressured between its own 
promises to root out the corruption and lawlessness of the former government and the threat 
of instability still powerful remnants of that government represented – seemed somewhat 
overeager to confront the branitelj segment of the population. The frontal attack on the most 
powerful branitelji – who, after all, had large organisations to back them up – contributed to 
an increasingly heated and polarised debate on major issues dominating Croatian society at 
the time, a debate that did little to bring about reconciliation between the branitelji and those 
for whom they had suffered. Though perhaps not a reason for the failed reintegration in itself, 
the failure of the Račan government to set the record straight did not improve the situation 
either. Importantly, however, many “independent” veterans’ organisations saw the pressing 
need to clear up in their ranks, and supported the Račan government’s effort to disclose the 
dimensions of the fraud, the existence of which had by now become an established fact in the 
eyes of most citizens.   
In this way, the legacy of the Račan administration was important. The issue was put 
on the agenda, and it has remained there since. In the eyes of the citizens, the constant use of 
the “protection of privacy”-rationale to keep from publishing the disputed register, and thus 
put an end to the controversies, has only cemented the notion that HDZ is trying to prevent 
the disclosure of an unprecedented scandal, in which that party plays the central role. 
Moreover, the effective abolition of any measures to remove the rights of “fake” veterans, 
parallel to the ever increasing number of branitelji, has come at a huge cost in financial 
resources. Today, as the number of branitelji is passing 500 000 and that of disabled branitelji 
45 000, Croatia is trying hard to cope with a perilously large foreign debt while also suffering 
under a strangling economic recession. In recent months, critical voices among the branitelji 
have been heard speaking out against the government, the latter which has requested the 
branitelji to accept reduced pensions as an act of patriotism while it is continuing to grant 
large sums in funding to the organisations known as HDZ-friendly. Moreover, as this thesis 
was sent to the printing press, the Sabor was discussing the closing of the still open timeframe 
within which one may realise status as branitelj of the Homeland War, a war which officially 
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ended almost a decade and half ago. That is a beginning, but it is hardly enough to solve the 
problem. On this issue, one does right to expect further controversies and heated debate.  
 The gradual growth of frustration and increasing sense of alienation combined with the 
fact that several of the most powerful organisations were subject to political meddling through 
their leaders, paved the way for the more explicit political involvement of the branitelji during 
the period under which the Račan administration was holding office. This leads us into the 
third major reason for the failed reintegration of the Croatian branitelji which this thesis 
argues in favour of. The demonstrations at St. Marc’s Square in Zagreb in September 96, 
which were the result of cooperation between the more hawkish members of HDZ, fronted by 
then Minister of Defence Gojko Šušak, and the leaders of HVIDRA and possibly also other 
organisations, were the first true manifestation of the potential power implicit in the “cause” 
of the branitelji. However, it was not until roughly three and a half years later, when Croatia’s 
right wing forces found they were unable to accept the fact that they had been ousted from 
government by a sharp turn against them in popular opinion, the necessity of realising this 
power presented itself. The releasing trigger became the issue of cooperation with the ICTY, 
which was an unavoidable political move if Croatia was to be pulled out of the increasingly 
destructive international isolation which was the legacy of the Tuđman era. The aptness of the 
issue, in the view of those seeking to bring down the government, was the broad public 
support and the fierce emotions it spurred in a war ravaged population who followed their 
leaders claim to have been acting in self defence, thereby removing all potential guilt from 
their shoulders. However, the question remains how much actual control it was possible to 
exert over the veterans’ organisations, even for those who ostensibly held the loyalty of their 
leaders. As these leaders became dangerously self-assured by the power which their 
organisations apparently were in possession of, various activist operations began sending the 
wrong signal to the public, which alongside the government was coming to view the 
organisations as a considerable internal security threat. This disturbing fact was epitomized by 
the demonstrations in support of General Mirko Norac on the Split waterfront in January 
2001, which represents the ultimate peak of the power of the “cause” of the branitelji. The 
numerous attempts at bringing down the democratically elected government through 
mobilisation on a wide array themes of varying importance to the public, combined with the 
threats, insults and fear-spreading rhetoric, led to the beginning of the destruction of the 
popular image of the branitelji, and thus the undermining of a vital part of the ability of their 
“cause” to muster support. This was detrimental, as what should have been the most important 
part of that “cause”, namely to care for suffering veterans and re-include them into society, 
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was rendered a lot more difficult after this further loss of sympathy. Moreover, the protests 
and activism during the time of the Račan government put the political strings pulling the 
organisations on display, thereby contributing to the establishment in popular opinion of the 
veterans’ organisations as political instruments of the country’s right wing forces.  
However, the mobilisation of the organisations did prove successful in reinstalling the 
popular version of the Croatian right, the HDZ into power. After all, the government of Račan 
had spent all its energy on alleviating tensions and crises which by and large were created or 
released by its political opponents, the latter which used the veterans’ organisations to do the 
“dirty work”. The fact that the newly elected HDZ-led government started its term by 
extraditing two “war heroes” to the Hague, as well as its involvement in the arrest of the 
greatest Croatian “hero” of them all, General Ante Gotovina, was not only amazing due to the 
ostensible irony and hypocrisy of it all, but also due to the peaceful acceptance of these 
actions by the most influential veterans’ organisations. However, as the initial shock waned it 
became apparent that it was just a question of political pragmatism, thereby confirming the 
widespread perception that many organisations and branitelji – consciously or not – had acted 
as HDZ’s extended arm.  
 Yet one should refrain from viewing this political manipulation as solely propagated 
by external factors. In many ways, the ostensible political viewpoints of those who managed 
to capitalise on the “cause” of the branitelji resonated deeply with segments of the branitelji 
populace, who perceived their much acclaimed role in the realisation of the “thousand year 
old dream of Croatian statehood” as a source of pride and moral power. This was perhaps, in 
the eyes of some veterans, their biggest asset, and it was utilised as discursive weapons 
against any phenomenon, person or event which could be taken as conflicting with the 
nationalistic ideology which had forged the young Croatian state. However, by the constant 
self declaration of their moral infallibility on issues which were difficult to see as in any way 
connected to the war, which at any rate most citizens now wished to view as a closed chapter, 
the branitelji in the eyes of many a citizen functioned as some sort of inquisition, upsetting 
the feelings of many who did not adhere to the strict, yet often inconcistent nationalist 
ideology which had dominated Croatia for such a long period. Thus the politicisation of the 
“cause” of the branitelji was also brought about actively by parts of the branitelji population 
itself, the representatives of which on their own initiative used their organisations as political 
rather than humanitarian instruments. This was the fourth contributing factor to the failed 
reintegration of the branitelji.   
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 Another, closely related reason, was precisely this gap between the initial 
“humanitarian” face and the emerging political face of the organisations, which to some 
extent served as a loophole for various “industrious” persons, who saw it fit to promote their 
own political and financial power through their influential positions in the organisations; 
positions which were often combined with other political and professional roles in a way that 
may at best be termed unsound. This bereaved the branitelji further of much needed public 
support, while at the same time it stole away both money, time and momentum which should 
have been invested in facilitating the return of the branitelji to society.  
 A final factor contributing to the destruction of the popular image of the branitelj, 
thereby also complicating their successful reintegration even further, were the internal 
divisions of the organisations that came as a result of the abuse of the “cause” of the 
branitelji. By allowing politics, power and money to overshadow the most important rationale 
of the existence of the organisations – the humanitarian ideal – seeds of potential discord were 
sown. As it became clear to the diverse majority of “regular” members of the organisations, 
for whom they existed in the first place, that certain individuals and political parties and 
groups were capitalising on their “cause”, a certain amount of upheaval was created, resulting 
in the overall loss of influence and internal support of the organisations and their leaders. This 
process was greatly catalysed by the parallel loss of public sympathy, the reasons for which 
were also becoming clearer to the branitelji themselves. Yet it was the arrest and extradition 
of General Gotovina to the ICTY that caused the most severe divisions within the more 
influential organisations, as the organisations had to take the punch of the political turnaround 
of the HDZ on the issue orchestrated by the new Prime Minister Ivo Sanader, a turnaround 
which proved impossible for the organisations to follow. Thus, with the loss of power and 
credibility following the Gotovina-affair, which had publicly and explicitly displayed that 
many of the veterans’ organisations were nothing but political tools, the final blow to the 
process of reintegration to society, was delivered. Even today, internal division are still 
characterising the branitelji and their organisations; HVIDRA of the municipality of Zadar 
has recently (November 2009) broke loose from the central organisational structure with more 
local branches expected to follow.   
 The end of the Homeland War never meant that the “rebirth” of the Croatian state was 
a closed chapter. Rather, the war was only part of the job. However, as the reconstruction of 
Croatia started and her people held the blocks of which their bright future was to be built in 
their hands, those who had long claimed to be Croatia’s biggest supporters failed to join in. 
Instead of realising the positive potential of the patriotism of the nation and making use of it 
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now that it was needed the most, they instead exploited it to realise their personal agendas. 
This was indeed the “criminalisation of the Homeland War”, which was such a favoured 
phrase by these “patriots”. And in the wake of the “criminalisation of the Homeland War” the 
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